From ciac@tholia.llnl.gov Sat Mar 21 03:30:34 1998
From: CIAC Mail User <ciac@tholia.llnl.gov>
To: ciac-bulletin@tholia.llnl.gov
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 1998 13:02:11 -0800 (PST)
Subject: CIAC Bulletin  I-037: FreeBSD mmap Vulnerability

[  For Public Release  ]
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             __________________________________________________________

                       The U.S. Department of Energy
                    Computer Incident Advisory Capability
                           ___  __ __    _     ___
                          /       |     /_\   /
                          \___  __|__  /   \  \___
             __________________________________________________________

                             INFORMATION BULLETIN

                           FreeBSD mmap Vulnerability

March 16, 1998 23:00 GMT                                          Number I-037
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM:       A vulnerability exists in the 4.4BSD VM system which allows
               files to be "memory mapped".
PLATFORM:      FreeBSD 2.2.*, FreeBSD-stable and FreeBSD-current before
               1998/03/11.
DAMAGE:        If exploited, unauthorized users may gain root access.
SOLUTION:      Apply patches listed below.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY  FreeBSD recommends that the patches be applied on affected
ASSESSMENT:    systems.
______________________________________________________________________________

[ Start FreeBSD, Inc. Advisory ]

=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-98:02                                            Security Advisory
                                                                FreeBSD, Inc.

Topic:          security compromise via mmap

Category:       core
Module:         kernel
Announced:      1998-03-12
Affects:        FreeBSD 2.2.*, FreeBSD-stable and FreeBSD-current
                before 1998/03/11 suffer from this problem.
Corrected:      FreeBSD-current as of 1998/03/11
                FreeBSD-stable as of 1998/03/11
FreeBSD only:   no (also other 4.4BSD based systems may be affected)

Patches:        ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/CERT/patches/SA-98:02/

=============================================================================
IMPORTANT MESSAGE: The FreeBSD advisory archive has moved from
ftp://freebsd.org/pub/CERT to ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/CERT
=============================================================================

I.   Background   

     The 4.4BSD VM system allows files to be "memory mapped", which
     causes the specified contents of a file to be made available
     to a process via its address space. Manipulations of that file
     can then be performed simply by manipulating memory, rather
     than using filesystem I/O calls.  This technique is used to
     simplify code, speed up access to files, and provide interprocess
     communication.

II.  Problem Description

     Due to a 4.4BSD VM system problem, it is possible to memory-map
     a read-only descriptor to a character device in read-write
     mode.

III. Impact
    
     The hole can be used by members of group kmem to gain superuser
     privileges. It also allows the superuser to lower the system
     securelevel.

IV.  Workaround

     No workaround is known.

V.   Solution


     Apply one of the following patches, rebuild your kernel,
     install it and reboot your system.

     The patches below can be found on
        ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/CERT/patches/SA-98:02/


     Patch for 3.0-current systems:

  Index: vm_mmap.c
  ===================================================================
  RCS file: /home/cvsup/freebsd/CVS/src/sys/vm/vm_mmap.c,v
  retrieving revision 1.74
  diff -u -r1.74 vm_mmap.c
  --- vm_mmap.c 1998/03/07 21:37:01     1.74
  +++ vm_mmap.c 1998/03/10 21:51:30
  @@ -162,6 +162,7 @@
        vm_prot_t prot, maxprot;
        void *handle;
        int flags, error;
  +     int disablexworkaround;
        off_t pos;
  
        addr = (vm_offset_t) uap->addr;
  @@ -252,6 +253,26 @@
                        pos = 0;
                } else {
                        /*
  +                      * cdevs does not provide private mappings of any kind.
  +                      */
  +                     /*
  +                      * However, for XIG X server to continue to work,
  +                      * we should allow the superuser to do it anyway.
  +                      * We only allow it at securelevel < 1.
  +                      * (Because the XIG X server writes directly to video
  +                      * memory via /dev/mem, it should never work at any
  +                      * other securelevel.
  +                      * XXX this will have to go
  +                      */
  +                     if (securelevel >= 1)
  +                             disablexworkaround = 1;
  +                     else
  +                             disablexworkaround = suser(p->p_ucred,
  +                                                        &p->p_acflag);
  +                     if (vp->v_type == VCHR && disablexworkaround &&
  +                             (flags & (MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_COPY)))
  +                              return (EINVAL);
  +                     /*
                         * Ensure that file and memory protections are
                         * compatible.  Note that we only worry about
                         * writability if mapping is shared; in this case,
  @@ -265,12 +286,20 @@
                                maxprot |= VM_PROT_READ;
                        else if (prot & PROT_READ)
                                return (EACCES);
  -                     if (flags & MAP_SHARED) {
  -                             if (fp->f_flag & FWRITE)
  -                                     maxprot |= VM_PROT_WRITE;
  -                             else if (prot & PROT_WRITE)
  -                                     return (EACCES);
  -                     } else
  +                     /*
  +                      * If we are sharing potential changes (either via
  +                      * MAP_SHARED or via the implicit sharing of character
  +                      * device mappings), and we are trying to get write
  +                      * permission although we opened it without asking
  +                      * for it, bail out.  Check for superuser, only if
  +                      * we're at securelevel < 1, to allow the XIG X server
  +                      * to continue to work.
  +                      */
  +                     if (((flags & MAP_SHARED) != 0 ||
  +                             (vp->v_type == VCHR && disablexworkaround)) &&
  +                             (fp->f_flag & FWRITE) == 0 && (prot & PROT_WRITE) !=
0)
  +                             return (EACCES);
  +                     else
                                maxprot |= VM_PROT_WRITE;
                        handle = (void *)vp;
                }

     Patch for 2.2 systems:

  Index: vm_mmap.c
  ===================================================================
  RCS file: /home/cvsup/freebsd/CVS/src/sys/vm/vm_mmap.c,v
  retrieving revision 1.53.2.2
  diff -u -r1.53.2.2 vm_mmap.c
  --- vm_mmap.c 1997/03/25 04:54:29     1.53.2.2
  +++ vm_mmap.c 1998/03/10 21:50:46
  @@ -157,6 +157,9 @@
        vm_prot_t prot, maxprot;
        caddr_t handle;
        int flags, error;
  +     int disablexworkaround;
  + 
  +     addr = (vm_offset_t) uap->addr;
  
        prot = uap->prot & VM_PROT_ALL;
        flags = uap->flags;
  @@ -230,6 +233,26 @@
                        flags |= MAP_ANON;
                } else {
                        /*
  +                      * cdevs does not provide private mappings of any kind.
  +                      */
  +                     /*
  +                      * However, for XIG X server to continue to work,
  +                      * we should allow the superuser to do it anyway.
  +                      * We only allow it at securelevel < 1.
  +                      * (Because the XIG X server writes directly to video
  +                      * memory via /dev/mem, it should never work at any
  +                      * other securelevel.
  +                      * XXX this will have to go
  +                      */
  +                     if (securelevel >= 1)
  +                             disablexworkaround = 1;
  +                     else
  +                             disablexworkaround = suser(p->p_ucred,
  +                                                        &p->p_acflag);
  +                     if (vp->v_type == VCHR && disablexworkaround &&
  +                             (flags & (MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_COPY)))
  +                              return (EINVAL);
  +                     /*
                         * Ensure that file and memory protections are
                         * compatible.  Note that we only worry about
                         * writability if mapping is shared; in this case,
  @@ -243,12 +266,20 @@
                                maxprot |= VM_PROT_READ;
                        else if (prot & PROT_READ)
                                return (EACCES);
  -                     if (flags & MAP_SHARED) {
  -                             if (fp->f_flag & FWRITE)
  -                                     maxprot |= VM_PROT_WRITE;
  -                             else if (prot & PROT_WRITE)
  -                                     return (EACCES);
  -                     } else
  +                     /*
  +                      * If we are sharing potential changes (either via
  +                      * MAP_SHARED or via the implicit sharing of character
  +                      * device mappings), and we are trying to get write
  +                      * permission although we opened it without asking
  +                      * for it, bail out.  Check for superuser, only if
  +                      * we're at securelevel < 1, to allow the XIG X server
  +                      * to continue to work.
  +                      */
  +                     if (((flags & MAP_SHARED) != 0 ||
  +                             (vp->v_type == VCHR && disablexworkaround)) &&
  +                             (fp->f_flag & FWRITE) == 0 && (prot & PROT_WRITE) !=
0)
  +                             return (EACCES);
  +                     else
                                maxprot |= VM_PROT_WRITE;
                        handle = (caddr_t) vp;
                }

VI.   Thanks

     This advisory is based on the OpenBSD Security Advisory, dated
     February 20 2, 1998.  Thanks to "Thomas H. Ptacek" <tqbf@enteract.com>
     for allowing this.

     Thanks to "Cy Schubert" <cschuber@uumail.gov.bc.ca> for porting the
     OpenBSD patch to FreeBSD.
    
=============================================================================
FreeBSD, Inc.

Web Site:                       http://www.freebsd.org/
Confidential contacts:          security-officer@freebsd.org
PGP Key:                        ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/CERT/public_key.asc
Security notifications:         security-notifications@freebsd.org
Security public discussion:     security@freebsd.org

Notice: Any patches in this document may not apply cleanly due to
        modifications caused by digital signature or mailer software.
        Please reference the URL listed at the top of this document
        for original copies of all patches if necessary.
=============================================================================

[ End FreeBSD, Inc. Advisory ]

______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of FreeBSD, Inc. for the
information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________


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