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h-55.irix.netprint.program.vulnerability.txt

h-55.irix.netprint.program.vulnerability.txt
Posted Sep 23, 1999

h-55.irix.netprint.program.vulnerability.txt

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h-55.irix.netprint.program.vulnerability.txt

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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

__________________________________________________________

The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
___ __ __ _ ___
/ | /_\ /
\___ __|__ / \ \___
__________________________________________________________

INFORMATION BULLETIN

IRIX netprint Program Security Vulnerability

May 13, 1997 16:00 GMT Number H-55
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: A security vulnerability exist in the
/usr/lib/print/netprint program.
PLATFORM: IRIX 5.3, 6.1 and 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4.
DAMAGE: Using a local account to exploit this vulnerability, remote or
local users may obtain unauthorized root access.
SOLUTION: Apply patches or workaround as indicated below.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY Exploit details involving this vulnerability have been made
ASSESSMENT: publicly available.
______________________________________________________________________________

[ Start SGI Security Advisory ]


- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory

Title: IRIX netprint Program Security Issues
Number: 19961203-02-PX
Date: May 8, 1997
______________________________________________________________________________

Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.

Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall
SGI be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or
for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages
of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of
any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________

- - --------------
- - --- Update ---
- - --------------

As part of on going security efforts, Silicon Graphics has replaced
patch 1686 with patch 2022. The original text from SGI Security
Advisory 19961203-01-PX has been updated to reflect this change.






Silicon Graphics Engineering and Worldwide Customer Service divisions have
become aware of a potential security issue in the /usr/lib/print/netprint
program found in IRIX 5.3, 6.1 and 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4.

Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems running IRIX versions
5.3, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4. This issue will be corrected in future releases
of IRIX.



- - --------------
- - --- Impact ---
- - --------------

The /usr/sbin/print/netprint program is used by the printing system
installed on all SGI systems.

A potential security vulnerability has been found that can result in
root privileges being obtained.

A local account is required in order to exploit this vulnerability both
locally and remotely.

Publicity of this vulnerability has been limited and has afforded
SGI the opportunity to fully investigate this issue and provide
the following information and solutions.



- - ----------------
- - --- Solution ---
- - ----------------


Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
not be possible.

The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by removing
the printing subsystem.


***************
*** WARNING ***
***************


Removing the print subsystem will remove all printing
capability from the system. Installing the patches below is
recommended over removal of the print subsystem.

If the print subsystem is removed, at a later time when the
patches below are to be installed, the print subsystem will
first have to be reinstalled from original IRIX distribution
CDs before the patches.



1) Become the root user on the system.

% /bin/su -
Password:
#


2) Remove the vulnerable subsystem.

# /usr/sbin/versions -v remove print


3) Return to previous level.

# exit
$



**** IRIX 3.x ****

Silicon Graphics Inc, no longer supports the IRIX 3.x operating system
and therefore has no patches or binaries to provide.


**** IRIX 4.x ****

This version of IRIX is not vulnerable. No action is required.



**** IRIX 5.0.x, 5.1.x, 5.2 ****

These versions of IRIX are not vulnerable. No action is required.



**** IRIX 5.3, 6.1 ****

For the IRIX operating system versions 5.3 and 6.1 an inst-able patch
has been generated and made available via anonymous FTP and your
service/support provider. The patch is number 1685 and will only
install on IRIX 5.3 and 6.1.


The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Patch 1685 can be found in the following
directories on the FTP server:

~ftp/Security

or

~ftp/Patches/5.3
~ftp/Patches/6.1


##### Checksums ####

The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:

Filename: README.patch.1685
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 33112 8 README.patch.1685
Algorithm #2 (sum): 26410 8 README.patch.1685
MD5 checksum: 91C8238A36AC03839C910F5E8AA4D62A

Filename: patchSG0001685
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 44784 1 patchSG0001685
Algorithm #2 (sum): 30237 1 patchSG0001685
MD5 checksum: CCB7EB0A9E1AE7464FB0F88FA05C2672

Filename: patchSG0001685.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 25112 1 patchSG0001685.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 39883 1 patchSG0001685.idb
MD5 checksum: D124D5F9E2F363F3500A496D393CD2D3

Filename: patchSG0001685.print_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 13809 21 patchSG0001685.print_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 44124 21 patchSG0001685.print_sw
MD5 checksum: AE6A66F1F7854D37BACDB43773941730



**** IRIX 6.0.x ****

IRIX operating system versions 6.0.x were limited release versions.
For the IRIX operating system versions 6.0.x an upgrade to 6.1 or
later is required first. When the upgrade is completed, then
the security patches described in the following sections can be
applied depending on the final version of the upgrade.



**** IRIX 6.1 ****

See the section "**** IRIX 5.3, 6.1 ****" above.



**** IRIX 6.2 ****

For the IRIX operating system version 6.2 an inst-able patch has
been generated and made available via anonymous FTP and your
service/support provider. The patch is number 2022 and will
only install on IRIX 6.2.

The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Patch 2022 can be found in the following
directories on the FTP server:

~ftp/Security

or

~ftp/Patches/6.2


##### Checksums ####

The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:


Filename: README.patch.2022
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 22870 8 README.patch.2022
Algorithm #2 (sum): 25749 8 README.patch.2022
MD5 checksum: 77AA72580D6AC26FBE845E0DA19224D5

Filename: patchSG0002022
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 18053 1 patchSG0002022
Algorithm #2 (sum): 37661 1 patchSG0002022
MD5 checksum: 45E0F0DB8C835C75C3DADB53CB31424C

Filename: patchSG0002022.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 10021 2 patchSG0002022.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 57571 2 patchSG0002022.idb
MD5 checksum: 1A8C6DD25A769B224C7238F2DBFDD478

Filename: patchSG0002022.print_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 19709 22 patchSG0002022.print_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 31923 22 patchSG0002022.print_sw
MD5 checksum: 00EF09617BC1F4811E43FB86FE6F3DAD



**** IRIX 6.3 (Early Access for O2) ****

IRIX operating system version 6.3 (Early Access for O2) is a limited
release version. An update to "IRIX 6.3 for O2 including R10000"
is required for this security issue. This security issue has
been addressed in the "IRIX 6.3 for O2 including R10000" distribution.



**** IRIX 6.4 S2MP (Origin200, Origin2000, Onyx2) ****

IRIX operating system version 6.4 S2MP (Origin200, Origin2000, Onyx2)
is a limited release version. An update to "IRIX 6.4 for Origin,
Onyx2, and Octane" is required for this security issue. This security
issue has been addressed in the "IRIX 6.4 for Origin,
Onyx2, and Octane" release.





- - -----------------------------------------
- - --- SGI Security Information/Contacts ---
- - -----------------------------------------

If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@csd.sgi.com.

------oOo------

Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for
use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely
available to any person needing the information and is available
via anonymous FTP and the Web.

The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches
are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches,
respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html.

For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@csd.sgi.com.

For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.

------oOo------

Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service
called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe
to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are
released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web
(http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/wiretap.html) or by sending email
to SGI as outlined below.

% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>
end
^d

In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.


------oOo------

Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site.
This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html.

------oOo------

For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.

______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may
be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon
Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and
includes its valid PGP signature.


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[ End SGI Security Advisory ]

______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphics Inc. for the
information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________


CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.

CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 510-422-8193
FAX: +1 510-423-8002
STU-III: +1 510-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov

For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites,
and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM -
8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 510-422-8193 and leave a message,
or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two
Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC
duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC
Project Leader.

Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.

World Wide Web: http://ciac.llnl.gov/
Anonymous FTP: ciac.llnl.gov (128.115.19.53)
Modem access: +1 (510) 423-4753 (28.8K baud)
+1 (510) 423-3331 (28.8K baud)

CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic
publications:
1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical
information and Bulletins, important computer security information;
2. CIAC-NOTES for Notes, a collection of computer security articles;
3. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector
(SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and
availability;
4. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the
use of SPI products.

Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package
called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To
subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the
following request as the E-mail message body, substituting
ciac-bulletin, ciac-notes, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name:

E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov:
subscribe list-name
e.g., subscribe ciac-notes

You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation
that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the
instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure
you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question.

If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address,
it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe,
get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc.

PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/.

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.

LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC)

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H-48: Internet Information Server Vulnerability
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