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h-14.SGI.IRIX.vulnerabilities.txt

h-14.SGI.IRIX.vulnerabilities.txt
Posted Sep 23, 1999

h-14.SGI.IRIX.vulnerabilities.txt

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h-14.SGI.IRIX.vulnerabilities.txt

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__________________________________________________________

The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
___ __ __ _ ___
/ | /_\ /
\___ __|__ / \ \___
__________________________________________________________

INFORMATION BULLETIN

SGI IRIX Vulnerabilities (systour, OutOfBox, cdplayer, datman)

December 12, 1996 19:00 GMT Number H-14
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: Four problems have been identified for SGI IRIX: 1) systour, 2)
OutOfBox, 3) cdplayer, and 4) datman/cdman.
PLATFORM: All SGI systems running IRIX versions related to the following
vulnerabilities: 1 and 2) 5.x, 6.0.x, 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3,
3 and 4) 5.x and 6.x.
DAMAGE: 1 and 2) The inst program could be manipulated to execute
arbitrary commands with root privileges.
3 and 4) These vulnerabilities may allow local users to gain
root privileges.
SOLUTION: Apply the workarounds and solutions indicated below.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY Exploit details involving these vulnerabilities have been
ASSESSMENT: widely distributed.
______________________________________________________________________________

[ Start CERT Advisory ]

1. and 2. systour and OutOfBox Vulnerabilities

=============================================================================
CERT(sm) Vendor-Initiated Bulletin VB-96.19
December 10, 1996

Topic: Possible Vulnerabilities in systour and OutOfBox
Source: Silicon Graphics Inc.

To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, the
CERT Coordination Center is forwarding the following information from
Silicon Graphics Inc. SGI urges you to act on this information as soon
as possible. SGI contact information is included in the forwarded text
below; please contact them if you have any questions or need further
information.

=======================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================
______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory

Title: Possible Vulnerabilities in systour and OutOfBox
Title: Subsystems for IRIX 5.x, 6.0.x, 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3
Number: 19961101-01-I
Date: November 6, 1996
______________________________________________________________________________

Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.

Silicon Graphics will not be liable for any indirect, special, or
consequential damages arising from the use of, failure to use or improper
use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________


Recently, potential security vulnerabilities in the OutOfBox and systour
subsystems have been advertised in several public forums. Additionally,
the Australian Computer Emergency Response Team (AUSCERT) released an
advisory (AA-96.08) on this issue.

Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issues and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems running IRIX versions
5.0.x, 5.1.x, 5.2, 5.3, 6.0.x, 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. This issue will be
corrected in future releases of IRIX.


---------------
---- Impact ---
---------------

The Silicon Graphics Indigo Magic System Tour and OutOfBox Experience
packages are factory installed on all Silicon Graphics Indy systems.

The Indigo Magic System Tour and OutOfBox Experience packages are not
factory installed with any Silicon Graphics Indigo2 systems however, CDs
with these packages are provided with the systems.

The OutOfBox Experience subsystem is factory installed on all Silicon
Graphics O2 systems. The System Tour subsystem is not part of the
software provided for the O2 system.

Note that either or both the Indigo Magic System Tour and OutOfBox
Experience subsystems maybe be installed from CD on any Silicon Graphics
system.

The purpose of these two packages, systour and OutOfBox, are to demonstrate
and highlight the features and capabilities of the user environment and
system.

Due to the disk space requirements of these subsystems, most sites will
remove these subsystems for disk space reclamation as part of initial
system setup. Those sites which have done this will not be vulnerable.

On those systems that the subsystems are still installed on, both
subsystems provide background setuid root programs to perform a subsystem
removal when a user decides to remove the software. This removal is done
using the standard IRIX /usr/sbin/inst program that manages IRIX software.

Provided with the right environment, the inst program could be manipulated
to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges.

An account on the vulnerable system is required for exploit. With an
account, these vulnerabilities are exploitable by both local and remote
access.

-----------------
---- Solution ---
-----------------

There are no patches for these issues. However, using the
information below steps can be taken to eliminate the exposure.

To determine if the OutOfBox and systour subsystems are installed
on a particular system, the following command can be used:


% versions OutOfBox.sw systour.sw
I = Installed, R = Removed

Name Date Description

I OutOfBox 11/05/96 OutOfBox Experience, 1.1
I OutOfBox.sw 11/05/96 OutOfBox Experience Software, 1.1
I OutOfBox.sw.complete 11/05/96 Complete OutOfBox Experience
I OutOfBox.sw.intro 11/05/96 OutOfBox Intro Movies

I systour 02/12/96 Indigo Magic System Tour, 5.2
I systour.sw 02/12/96 System Tour Execution Environment
I systour.sw.eoe 02/12/96 System Tour Execution Environment


In the above case, the subsystems of concern are installed and the steps
below should be performed. If no output is returned by the command,
the subsystems are not installed and no further action is required.


**** IRIX 4.x ****

The 4.x version of IRIX is not vulnerable as the System Tour and
OutOfBox Experience subsystems are not part of available software
for this IRIX version. No action is required.


**** IRIX 5.x, 6.0, 6.0.1, 6.1, 6.2 ****

There are no patches for this issue.

The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by either
changing the program permissions (use step 2a) or by removing the
subsystems (use step 2b).


1) Become the root user on the system.

% /bin/su -
Password:
#

2) Choose either step 2a or 2b depending on which
has the desired result.

2a) Change the setuid root permissions on the programs
of concern.

# /bin/chmod u-s /usr/lib/tour/bin/RemoveSystemTour
# /bin/chmod u-s /usr/people/tour/oob/bin/oobversions

************
*** NOTE ***
************

Removing the setuid root permissions from these tools
will prevent non-root users from removing the subsystems.
Removal of the subsystems will only be possible if the
systour or OutOfBox user is a root user or if the inst
IRIX software manager is used by root for removal.


2b) Remove the vulnerable subsystems.

# /usr/sbin/versions -v remove systour OutOfBox

4) Return to previous level.

# exit
$


**** IRIX 6.3 ****

The IRIX operating system version 6.3 does not have the System
Tour subsystem but does have the OutOfBox Experience subsystem.

There are no patches for this issue.

The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by either
changing the program permissions (use step 2a) or by removing the
subsystems (use step 2b).


1) Become the root user on the system.

% /bin/su -
Password:
#

2) Choose either step 2a or 2b depending on which
has the desired result.

2a) Change the setuid root permissions on the program
of concern.

# /bin/chmod u-s /usr/people/tour/oob/bin/oobversions

************
*** NOTE ***
************

Removing the setuid root permissions from this program
will prevent non-root users from removing the subsystem.
Removal of the subsystem will only be possible if the
OutOfBox user is a root user or if the inst IRIX software
manager is used by root for removal.


2b) Remove the vulnerable subsystem.

# /usr/sbin/versions -v remove OutOfBox


4) Return to previous level.

# exit
$


-------------------------
---- Acknowledgments ---
-------------------------

Silicon Graphics wishes to thank AUSCERT and FIRST members worldwide for
their assistance in this matter.

------------------------------------------
---- SGI Security Information/Contacts ---
------------------------------------------

If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@csd.sgi.com.

------oOo------

Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for
use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely
available to any person needing the information and is available
via anonymous FTP and the Web.

The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches
are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches,
respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html.

For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@csd.sgi.com.

For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.

------oOo------

Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service
called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe
to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are
released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web
(http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/wiretap.html) or by sending email
to SGI as outlined below.

% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>
end
^d

In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.

------oOo------

Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site.
This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html.

------oOo------

For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.

========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE=============================

[ End CERT Advisory ]

*****************************************************************************

[ Start AUSCERT Advisories ]

3. cdplayer Vulnerability

===========================================================================
AA-96.11 AUSCERT Advisory
SGI IRIX cdplayer Vulnerability
22 November 1996

Last Revised: 10 December 1996
Removed comment about using cdman(1) in Section 3.1.
The cdman program has since been found vulnerable
(see AA-96.20).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

AUSCERT has received information that there is a vulnerability in the
"cdplayer" program distributed with IRIX 5.x and 6.x. cdplayer(1) is a
Motif based control panel used for playing audio compact disks.

This vulnerability may allow local users to gain root privileges.

Exploit details involving this vulnerability have been widely distributed.
This vulnerability can be exploited without a CD-ROM drive being attached
to the machine being attacked.

At this stage, AUSCERT is unaware of any official vendor patches. AUSCERT
recommends that sites apply the workaround given in Section 3 until vendor
patches are made available.

This advisory will be updated as new information becomes available.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Description

cdplayer(1) is a program that creates a Motif based control panel used
for playing audio Compact Discs on a CD-ROM drive.

There is a vulnerability in cdplayer that allows directories to be
created anywhere on the system. These directories are created using
root privileges with permissions following the umask of the person
running the program.

Exploit details involving this vulnerability have been made publicly
available. Sites should note that a CD-ROM drive does not need to be
attached for this vulnerability to be exploited.

This program may be installed under both IRIX 5.x and 6.x. By default,
it is installed under /usr/bin/X11/cdplayer. To determine whether
the cdplayer program is installed, sites should check for its
presence with the command:

% ls -l /usr/bin/X11/cdplayer

If this program is installed, sites should take the actions recommended
in Section 3 immediately.

2. Impact

Local users may be able to create arbitrary directories anywhere on
the system. This may be leveraged to gain root privileges.

3. Workarounds/Solution

AUSCERT recommends that sites prevent the exploitation of the
vulnerability in cdplayer by immediately applying the
workaround given in Section 3.1.

Currently there are no vendor patches available that address this
vulnerability. AUSCERT recommends that official vendor patches be
installed when they are made available.

3.1 Remove setuid and execute permissions

Until official vendor patches are made available, sites should remove
the setuid root and execute permissions from cdplayer. To do this,
the following command should be run as root:

# chmod 400 /usr/bin/X11/cdplayer
# ls -l /usr/bin/X11/cdplayer
-r-------- 1 root sys 127648 Jul 17 12:28 /usr/bin/X11/cdplayer

Note that this will remove the ability for users to run this program.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. datman/cdman Vulnerability

===========================================================================
AA-96.20 AUSCERT Advisory
SGI IRIX datman/cdman Vulnerability
10 December 1996

Last Revised: --

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

AUSCERT has received information that there is a vulnerability in the
datman(1) program distributed with IRIX 5.x and 6.x. datman is a
program used for playing audio tapes and CDs.

This vulnerability may allow local users to gain root privileges.

Exploit details involving this vulnerability have been widely distributed.

At this stage, AUSCERT is unaware of any official vendor patches. AUSCERT
recommends that sites apply the workaround given in Section 3 until vendor
patches are made available.

This advisory will be updated as new information becomes available.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Description

datman(1) is a program for playing audio tapes and CDs. When called
as datman it works as a tape recorder. When called as cdman or when
the -cd option is specified, datman works as a CD player. By default,
the file /usr/sbin/cdman is a symbolic link to /usr/sbin/datman.

There is a vulnerability in datman that allows local users to execute
arbitrary commands with root privileges.

Exploit details involving this vulnerability have been made publicly
available.

This program may be installed under both IRIX 5.x and 6.x. By default,
it is installed under /usr/sbin/datman. To determine whether the
datman program is installed, sites should check for its presence
with the command:

% ls -l /usr/sbin/datman

If this program is installed, sites should take the actions recommended
in Section 3 immediately.

2. Impact

Local users may be able to run arbitrary commands with root privileges.

3. Workarounds/Solution

AUSCERT recommends that sites prevent the exploitation of the
vulnerability in datman by immediately applying the workaround
given in Section 3.1.

Currently there are no vendor patches available that address this
vulnerability. AUSCERT recommends that official vendor patches be
installed when they are made available.

3.1 Remove setuid and execute permissions

Until official vendor patches are made available, sites should remove
the setuid root and execute permissions from datman. To do this,
the following command should be run as root:

# chmod 400 /usr/sbin/datman
# ls -l /usr/sbin/datman
-r-------- 1 root sys 795200 Nov 22 1994 /usr/sbin/datman

Note that this will remove the ability for users to run this program.

4. Additional measures

Most Unix systems ship numerous programs which have setuid or
setgid privileges. Often the functionality supplied by these
privileged programs is not required by many sites. The large number
of privileged programs that are shipped by default are to cater for
all possible uses of the system.

AUSCERT encourages sites to examine all the setuid/setgid programs
and determine the necessity of each program. If a program does not
absolutely require the setuid/setgid privileges to operate (for
example, it is only run by the root user), the setuid/setgid
privileges should be removed. Furthermore, if a program is not
required at your site, then all execute permissions should be removed.

A sample command to find all setuid/setgid programs is (run as root):

# find / \( -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 \) -exec ls -ld {} \;

It is AUSCERT's experience that many vulnerabilities are being
discovered in setuid/setgid programs which are not necessary for the
correct operation of most systems. Sites can increase their security
by removing unnecessary setuid/setgid programs.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[ End AUSCERT Advisories ]

_______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of CERT, AUSCERT, and SGI for the
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.

CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 510-422-8193
FAX: +1 510-423-8002
STU-III: +1 510-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov

For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites,
and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM -
8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 510-422-8193 and leave a message,
or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two
Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC
duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC
Project Leader.

Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.

World Wide Web: http://ciac.llnl.gov/
Anonymous FTP: ciac.llnl.gov (128.115.19.53)
Modem access: +1 (510) 423-4753 (28.8K baud)
+1 (510) 423-3331 (28.8K baud)

CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic
publications:
1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical
information and Bulletins, important computer security information;
2. CIAC-NOTES for Notes, a collection of computer security articles;
3. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector
(SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and
availability;
4. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the
use of SPI products.

Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package
called ListProcessor, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To
subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the
following request as the E-mail message body, substituting
CIAC-BULLETIN, CIAC-NOTES, SPI-ANNOUNCE or SPI-NOTES for list-name and
valid information for LastName FirstName and PhoneNumber when sending

E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov:
subscribe list-name LastName, FirstName PhoneNumber
e.g., subscribe ciac-notes OHara, Scarlett W. 404-555-1212 x36

You will receive an acknowledgment containing address, initial PIN,
and information on how to change either of them, cancel your
subscription, or get help.

PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/.

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.

LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC)

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H-10: HP-UX Security Vulnerabilities (passwd, fpkg2swpkg, newgrp)
H-11: sendmail Group Permissions Vulnerability
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Notes 10 - 6/16/95 PKZ300B Trojan, Logdaemon/FreeBSD, vulnerability
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Notes 11 - 7/31/95 Virus Update, Hats Off to Administrators,
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