__________________________________________________________

                       The U.S. Department of Energy
                    Computer Incident Advisory Capability
                           ___  __ __    _     ___
                          /       |     /_\   /
                          \___  __|__  /   \  \___
             __________________________________________________________

                             INFORMATION BULLETIN

             Sun libc/libnsl vulnerabilities (Sun Bulletin #00137a)

December 13, 1996 18:00 GMT                                       Number H-06a
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM:       A buffer over-run vulnerability exists in the libc and libnsl
               libraries under Solaris 2.5 and 2.5.1 that can allow an
               unauthorized user to gain access to the system and root
               privileges.
PLATFORM:      Solaris 2.5 and 2.5.1 ONLY; SunOS 4.1.X systems are not
               vulnerable.
DAMAGE:        An unauthorized user (whether internal or external) could gain
               access to the system and gain root privileges.
SOLUTION:      Apply the patches recommended by the vendor as listed below.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY  Any Sun system running versions 2.5 or 2.5.1 of the Solaris
ASSESSMENT:    operating system could be attacked by a local or remote user
               and gain root access. A vulnerability script has been widely
               published to exploit this vulnerability.
______________________________________________________________________________

[ Begin Sun Bulletin ]

=============================================================================
         SUN MICROSYSTEMS SECURITY BULLETIN: #00137a, 11 Dec 1996
=============================================================================

ADDENDUM

This is an amended version of Sun Microsystems Security Bulletin #00137,
which discussed recently released security patches for Solaris 2.5 and
2.5.1. The changes correct two mistakes. No new information is provided.

The original bulletin, released 20 Nov 1996, stated:

        Since the current version (v1.0) of SISS, the Solaris Internet
        Server Supplement, is based largely on 2.5.1 code, it too is
        vulnerable.

In fact, SISS v1.0 (the only version to date) is *not* vulnerable to this
attack.

The original version of the bulletin also contained a typographical
error. References to Solaris "5.1.1" should instead read "5.5.1".

This amended version of the bulletin contains corrections for both
errors. We regret any inconvenience caused by the inaccuracies in the
original version of the bulletin.


BULLETIN TOPICS

In this bulletin Sun announces the release of security-related patches
for Solaris 2.5 (SunOS 5.5) and Solaris 2.5.1 (SunOS 5.5.1). The
patches relate to a single problem involving vulnerabilities in both
the libc and libnsl libraries.

Sun strongly recommends that you install these patches immediately on
every affected system. An exploitation script was publicly released
earlier this week for this vulnerability and the script is now widely
distributed. Many 2.5 and 2.5.1 systems are therefore currently
vulnerable to attack. Earlier versions of SunOS, including 4.1.x, do
not have the bug and are not vulnerable.

As of this writing Sun is aware of no successful attacks based on this
problem.


I.   Who is Affected, and What to Do

II.  Understanding the Vulnerability

III. List of Patches

IV.  Checksum Table


APPENDICES

A.   How to obtain Sun security patches

B.   How to report or inquire about Sun security problems

C.   How to obtain Sun security bulletins or short status updates


         Send Replies or Inquiries To:

         Mark Graff
         Sun Security Coordinator
         MS MPK17-103
         2550 Garcia Avenue
         Mountain View, CA 94043-1100

         Phone: 415-786-5274
         Fax:   415-786-7994
         E-mail: security-alert@Sun.COM


Sun acknowledges with thanks the CERT Coordination Center (Carnegie
Mellon University), AUSCERT, and Marko Laakso (University of Oulu) for
their assistance in the preparation of this bulletin.

Sun, CERT/CC, and AUSCERT are all members of FIRST, the Forum of Incident
Response and Security Teams. For more information about FIRST, visit
the FIRST web site at "http://www.first.org/".

Keywords:       gethostbyname, root, libc, libnsl
Patchlist:      103187-09, 103188-09, 103612-06, 103613-06, 103614-06
Cross-Ref:

                                -----------

Permission is granted for the redistribution of this Bulletin, so long
as the Bulletin is not edited and is attributed to Sun Microsystems.
Portions may also be excerpted for re-use in other security advisories
so long as proper attribution is included.

Any other use of this information without the express written consent
of Sun Microsystems is prohibited. Sun Microsystems expressly disclaims
all liability for any misuse of this information by any third party.

=============================================================================
         SUN MICROSYSTEMS SECURITY BULLETIN: #00137a, 11 Dec 1996
=============================================================================


I.   Who is Affected, and What to Do

Sun has verified that this vulnerability affects all supported Solaris
2.5 (SunOS 5.5) and Solaris 2.5.1 (SunOS 5.5.1) systems. Earlier
versions of SunOS, including 4.1.x, do not have the bug and are not
vulnerable.

Installing and running the software provided in these patches completely
closes the vulnerability. For information about how to obtain these and
other Sun patches, see Appendix A.

To see which version of SunOS your system is running, use a command such as:

        % uname -a

If your system is running SunOS 5.5 or 5.5.1, it is vulnerable.


II.  Understanding the Vulnerability

If exploited, this vulnerability can be used to gain root access on
attacked systems. The attack could be initiated from a remote system.
Even penetration through a firewall may be possible, depending upon
which services and applications (such as rlogin) are allowed to pass
through the firewall.

Because this vulnerability is located in two key system libraries, many
setuid/setgid system utilities are affected and possibly exploitable.

There has been a buffer over-run vulnerability discovered in both the
libc and the libnsl libraries under Solaris 2.5/2.5.1.  Many setuid and
setgid programs, as well as network programs running with root
privileges, are dynamically linked against these libraries.  This
vulnerability has the potential for any program using these libraries,
running with root privileges, to be exploited, giving root privileges.


III. List of Patches

The patches required to close this vulnerability are listed below.

    A. Solaris 2.x (SunOS 5.x) patches

    Patches which replace the affected libraries and executables are available
    for every supported version of SunOS 5.x.

        OS version      Patch ID
        ----------      ---------
        SunOS 5.5       103187-09
        SunOS 5.5_X86   103188-09
        SunOS 5.5.1     103612-06
        SunOS 5.5.1_x86 103613-06
        SunOS 5.5.1_ppc 103614-06


    B.  Solaris 1.x (SunOS 4.1.x) patches

    No patches are needed for SunOS 4.1.x, which is not vulnerable.


IV.  Checksum Table

In the checksum table we show the BSD and SVR4 checksums and MD5 digital
signatures for the compressed tar archives.

File            BSD             SVR4            MD5
Name            Checksum        Checksum        Digital Signature
--------------- -----------     ---------       --------------------------------
103187-09.tar.Z 55543 2779      1318 5557       2AF86E9126BB8B0505743D0283C175A6
103188-09.tar.Z 21952 2523      13621 5046      E0455AAC6DF587E9F9EC88082B9613B2
103612-06.tar.Z 29415 2752      38423 5503      56DF3214D8C5CC58C9AC223C9C7ACEBC
103613-06.tar.Z 30698 2501      29921 5002      7E27DF259B595231188D2725E2B6AE59
103614-06.tar.Z 05172 2766      46856 5532      193E63B9C5E2B829D59B1FCBE2E2981F

The checksums shown above are from the BSD-based checksum (on 4.1.x,
/bin/sum; on SunOS 5.x, /usr/ucb/sum) and from the SVR4 version on
on SunOS 5.x (/usr/bin/sum).


APPENDICES

A.   How to obtain Sun security patches

    1. If you have a support contract

    Customers with Sun support contracts can obtain any patches listed
    in this bulletin (and any other patches--and a list of patches) from:

       - SunSolve Online
       - Local Sun answer centers, worldwide
       - SunSITEs worldwide

    The patches are available via World Wide Web at http://sunsolve.sun.com.

    You should also contact your answer center if you have a support
    contract and:

       - You need assistance in installing a patch
       - You need additional patches
       - You want an existing patch ported to another platform
       - You believe you have encountered a bug in a Sun patch
       - You want to know if a patch exists, or when one will be ready

    2. If you do not have a support contract

    Customers without support contracts may now obtain security patches,
    "recommended" patches, and patch lists via SunSolve Online.

    Sun does not furnish patches to any external distribution sites
    other than the ones mentioned here. The ftp.uu.net and ftp.eu.net
    sites are no longer supported.

    3. About the checksums

    So that you can quickly verify the integrity of the patch files
    themselves, we supply in each bulletin checksums for the tar archives.

    Occasionally, you may find that the listed checksums do not match
    the patches on the SunSolve or SunSite database. This does not
    necessarily mean that the patch has been tampered with. More likely,
    a non-substantive change (such as a revision to the README file)
    has altered the checksum of the tar file. The SunSolve patch database
    is refreshed nightly, and will sometimes contain versions of a patch
    newer than the one on which the checksums were based.

    In the future we may provide checksum information for the
    individual components of a patch as well as the compressed archive
    file. This would allow customers to determine, if need be, which
    file(s) have been changed since we issued the bulletin containing
    the checksums.

    In the meantime, if you would like assistance in verifying the
    integrity of a patch file please contact this office or your local
    answer center.


B.   How to report or inquire about Sun security problems

If you discover a security problem with Sun software or wish to
inquire about a possible problem, contact one or more of the
following:

   - Your local Sun answer centers
   - Your representative computer security response team, such as CERT
   - This office. Address postal mail to:

         Sun Security Coordinator
         MS MPK17-103
         2550 Garcia Avenue
         Mountain View, CA 94043-1100

         Phone: 415-786-5274
         Fax:   415-786-7994
         E-mail: security-alert@Sun.COM

We strongly recommend that you report problems to your local Answer
Center. In some cases they will accept a report of a security bug
even if you do not have a support contract. An additional notification
to the security-alert alias is suggested but should not be used as your
primary vehicle for reporting a bug.


C.   How to obtain Sun security bulletins or short status updates

    1. Subscription information

    Sun Security Bulletins are available free of charge as part of
    our Customer Warning System. It is not necessary to have a Sun
    support contract in order to receive them.

    To receive information or to subscribe or unsubscribe from our
    mailing list, send mail to security-alert@sun.com with a subject
    line containing one of the following commands.


        Subject         Information Returned/Action Taken
        -------         ---------------------------------

        HELP            An explanation of how to get information

        LIST            A list of current security topics

        QUERY [topic]   The mail containing the question is relayed to
                        a Security Coordinator for a response.

        REPORT [topic]  The mail containing the text is treated as a
                        security bug report and forwarded to a Security
                        Coordinator for handling. Please note that this
                        channel of communications does not supersede
                        the use of Sun Solution Centers for this
                        purpose.  Note also that we do not recommend
                        that detailed problem descriptions be sent in
                        plain text.

        SEND topic      Summary of the status of selected topic. (To
                        retrieve a Sun Security Bulletin, supply the
                        number of the bulletin, as in "SEND #103".)

        SUBSCRIBE       Sender is added to the CWS (Customer
                        Warning System) list.  The subscribe feature
                        requires that the sender include on the subject
                        line the word "cws" and the reply email
                        address.  So the subject line might look like
                        the following:

                                SUBSCRIBE cws graff@sun.com

        UNSUBSCRIBE     Sender is removed from the CWS list.


    Should your email not fit into one of the above subjects, a help
    message will be returned to you.

    Due to the volume of subscription requests we receive, we cannot
    guarantee to acknowledge requests. Please contact this office if
    you wish to verify that your subscription request was received, or
    if you would like your bulletin delivered via postal mail or fax.

    2. Obtaining old bulletins

    Sun Security Bulletins are available via the security-alert alias
    and on SunSolve. Please try these sources first before contacting
    this office for old bulletins.

                                ------------

[ End Sun Bulletin ]

_______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sun Microsystems for the
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
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