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             __________________________________________________________

                       The U.S. Department of Energy
                    Computer Incident Advisory Capability
                           ___  __ __    _     ___
                          /       |     /_\   /
                          \___  __|__  /   \  \___
             __________________________________________________________

                             INFORMATION BULLETIN

                SGI ATT Packaging Utility Security Vulnerability

February 7, 1996 15:00 GMT                                          Number G-12
_______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM:       A problem in the ATT Packaging Utility (eoe2.sw.oampkg).
PLATFORM:      All SGI systems running IRIX 5.2, 5.3, 6.0, 6.0.1, and 6.1
DAMAGE:        Local and remote users can overwrite files and/or become root on
               a targeted SGI system.
SOLUTION:      If the packaging subsystem is installed, change permissions on 
               selected programs (see below). Install vendor patch when 
               available.
_______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY  Knowledge of how to exploit this vulnerability is widely known.
ASSESSMENT:
_______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC has obtained information from Silicon Graphics Inc. describing a
vulnerability in the SGI ATT Packaging Utility (eoe2.sw.oampkg). If the package
is installed, CIAC recommends changing the permissions by following the steps
below.


[ Start SGI Security Bulletin ]

______________________________________________________________________________
                Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory

         Title: Incorrect Permissions on Packing Subsystem
         Number:         19960102-01-P
         Date:           January 29, 1996
______________________________________________________________________________

Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI community
for its consideration, interpretation and implementation.   Silicon Graphics
recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.

Silicon Graphics will not be liable for any consequential damages
arising from the use of, or failure to use or use properly, any of the
instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________


Silicon Graphics has discovered a security vulnerability within the
"ATT Packaging Utility" (eoe2.sw.oampkg) subsystem available for the
IRIX operating system.  SGI has investigated this issue and recommends
the following steps for neutralizing the exposure.  It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems running IRIX 5.2, 5.3,
6.0, 6.0.1, 6.1.   This issue has been corrected for future releases of
IRIX.


- - --------------
- - --- Impact ---
- - --------------

The "ATT Packaging Utility" (eoe2.sw.oampkg) subsystem is not installed
as part of the standard IRIX operating system.  It is optionally installed
when manually selected to be installed when using the IRIX inst program.
Therefore, not all SGI systems will have this subsystem installed.

For those systems that the subsystem installed, both local and remote
users may be able to overwrite files and/or become root on a targeted SGI
system.


- - ----------------
- - --- Solution ---
- - ----------------

To determine if the packaging system is installed on a particular system,
the following command can be used:

       % versions eoe2.sw.oampkg | grep oampkg
       I  eoe2.sw.oampkg       03/25/94  ATT Packaging Utility
       %

In the above case, the packaging system is installed and the steps
below should be performed. If no output is returned by the command,
the subsystem is not installed and no further action is required.

*IF* the packaging subsystem is installed, the following steps can
be used to neutralize the exposure by changing permissions on select
programs of the eoe2.sw.oampkg subsystem.

There is no patch for this issue.


       1) Become the root user on your system.

              % /bin/su
              Password:
              #


       2) Change the permissions on the following programs.

              # /sbin/chmod 755 /usr/pkg/bin/pkgadjust
              # /sbin/chmod 755 /usr/pkg/bin/abspath


       3) Return to the previous user state.

              # exit
              %


- - -----------------------------------------
- - --- SGI Security Information/Contacts ---
- - -----------------------------------------

Past SGI Advisories and security patches can be obtained via
anonymous FTP from sgigate.sgi.com or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com.
These security patches and advisories are provided freely to
all interested parties.   For issues with the patches on the
FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@csd.sgi.com.

For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.

If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@csd.sgi.com.

For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider.  A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.

[ End SGI Security Bulletin ]

CIAC would like to acknowledge and thank SGI for the information presented in
this bulletin. 

CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the
National Institute of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of
FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization
established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security 
teams worldwide.

CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be
contacted at:
    Voice:    +1 510-422-8193
    FAX:      +1 510-423-8002
    STU-III:  +1 510-423-2604
    E-mail:   ciac@llnl.gov

For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites, and the NIH
may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM - 8AM PST), call the
CIAC voice number 510-422-8193 and leave a message, or call 800-759-7243
(800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two Sky Page PIN numbers, the
primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC duty person, and the secondary
PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC Project Leader.

Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.

   World Wide Web:      http://ciac.llnl.gov/
   Anonymous FTP:       ciac.llnl.gov (128.115.19.53)
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You will receive an acknowledgment containing address, initial PIN, and
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PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
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please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's
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This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the
United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the
University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty,
express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the
accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product,
or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
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