AA-96.14.HP-UX.fpkg2swpkg.vul
3f6fa0eec235d48005759f8e68ce10caad935c24745683757e26aa149374050d
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AA-96.14 AUSCERT Advisory
HP-UX fpkg2swpkg Vulnerability
29 November 1996
Last Revised: --
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AUSCERT has received information that a vulnerability exists in the
HP-UX 10.x program fpkg2swpkg.
This vulnerability may allow local users to gain root privileges.
Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made
publicly available.
At this stage, AUSCERT is unaware of any official vendor patches. AUSCERT
recommends that sites apply the workaround given in Section 3 until vendor
patches are made available.
This advisory will be updated as more information becomes available.
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1. Description
The HP-UX 10.x fpkg2swpkg(1m) program is used to translate fpkg (HP-UX
9.x) network media or Product Specification Files (PSFs) to SD
swpackage (HP-UX 10.x) PSFs.
The fpkg2swpkg program creates files in an insecure manner. As this
program executes with root privileges, it is possible for local users
to create or append to arbitrary files on the system.
Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made publicly
available.
The default location for fpkg2swpkg is /usr/sbin/fpkg2swpkg.
2. Impact
Local users may be able to create or append to arbitrary files on
the system. This can be leveraged to gain root privileges.
3. Workarounds/Solution
AUSCERT recommends that sites prevent the exploitation of the
vulnerability in fpkg2swpkg by immediately applying the
workaround given in Section 3.1.
Currently there are no vendor patches available that address this
vulnerability. AUSCERT recommends that official vendor patches be
installed when they are made available.
3.1 Remove setuid and execute permissions
Until official vendor patches are made available, sites should remove
the setuid root and execute permissions from fpkg2swpkg. To do this,
the following command should be run as root:
# chmod 400 /usr/sbin/fpkg2swpkg
# ls -l /usr/sbin/fpkg2swpkg
-r-------- 1 root bin 57344 May 30 1996 /usr/sbin/fpkg2swpkg
Note that this will remove the ability for any user to run this
program. If only the setuid permissions are removed, it is still
possible for users to gain privileges when fpkg2swpkg is executed
by the root user.
4. Additional measures
Most Unix systems ship with numerous programs which have setuid or
setgid privileges. Often the functionality supplied by these
privileged programs is not required by many sites. The large number
of privileged programs that are shipped by default are to cater for
all possible uses of the system.
AUSCERT encourages sites to examine all the setuid/setgid programs
and determine the necessity of each program. If a program does not
absolutely require the setuid/setgid privileges to operate (for
example, it is only run by the root user), the setuid/setgid
privileges should be removed. Furthermore, if a program is not
required at your site, then all execute permissions should be removed.
A sample command to find all setuid/setgid programs is (run as root):
# find / \( -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 \) -exec ls -ld {} \;
It is AUSCERT's experience that many vulnerabilities are being
discovered in setuid/setgid programs which are not necessary for the
correct operation of most systems. Sites can increase their security
by removing unnecessary setuid/setgid programs.
For example, the functionality provided by the fpkg2swpkg program is
not needed by most sites. If sites had previously disabled the
fpkg2swpkg program, they would not have been vulnerable to this latest
exploit.
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AUSCERT thanks Hewlett-Packard for their continued assistance and technical
expertise essential for the production of this advisory. AUSCERT also
thanks Information Technology Services of the University of Southern
Queensland for their assistance.
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The AUSCERT team have made every effort to ensure that the information
contained in this document is accurate. However, the decision to use the
information described is the responsibility of each user or organisation.
The appropriateness of this document for an organisation or individual
system should be considered before application in conjunction with local
policies and procedures. AUSCERT takes no responsibility for the
consequences of applying the contents of this document.
If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact AUSCERT or
your representative in FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security
Teams).
AUSCERT is located at The University of Queensland within the Prentice
Centre. AUSCERT is a full member of the Forum of Incident Response and
Security Teams (FIRST).
AUSCERT maintains an anonymous FTP service which is found on:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/. This archive contains past SERT and AUSCERT
Advisories, and other computer security information.
AUSCERT also maintains a World Wide Web service which is found on:
http://www.auscert.org.au/.
Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile: (07) 3365 4477
Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
AUSCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
On call after hours for emergencies.
Postal:
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
c/- Prentice Centre
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld. 4072.
AUSTRALIA
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Revision History
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