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95-08

95-08
Posted Sep 23, 1999

95-08

SHA-256 | 750a0b1bbe6a88cd5b240650f35da24fca8e4c380cbd1633f3361f45346d3abf

95-08

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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

=============================================================================
AA-95.08 AUSCERT Advisory
25 August, 1995
Sendmail V5 temporary file race condition
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

AUSCERT has received advice that a vulnerability exists in many versions of
sendmail that allows local users to read any file on the system, overwrite
or destroy files, or execute programs as any user (except root). This can
provide an avenue of attack to gain root privileges.

** An exploit for this vulnerability has been made available. AUSCERT
** recommends that the remedial action in Section 3 be performed immediately.

- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Description

There is a vulnerability in the way that some versions of sendmail
create temporary files. A race condition exists which allows users to
gain write privileges to the temporary files.

The vulnerable versions of sendmail have an incorrect umask setting
which causes temporary files to be created with insufficient
permissions. Sendmail then restricts permission using chmod(2),
creating the race condition which allows users to gain write access to
the temporary files.

Many Version 5 based sendmails are susceptible to this vulnerability.
This may include many vendor versions. This vulnerability has been
verified for SunOS 4.1.x (patches 100377-19, 101665-04, and 102423-01).

Sites which have source code for their version of sendmail can check
for this vulnerability by examining the source code as described in
Section 3.2.

For sites which do not have source code available, it is suggested that
they assume that this vulnerability exists and follow the instructions
listed in Section 3.1.

2. Impact

By exploiting the vulnerabilities, intruders may be able to read any
file on the system, overwrite or destroy files, or run programs on the
system as any user (except root). This may ultimately lead to root
compromise.

Intruders require an account on the system to exploit this
vulnerability.

3. Workarounds

AUSCERT believes that any one of the workarounds in Sections 3.1, 3.2,
or 3.3 is sufficient to remove this vulnerability. Vendor patches may
address this vulnerability in the future (Section 3.4).

3.1 Protecting the sendmail mail queue directory

The sendmail control files are created in the mail queue directory
(generally /usr/spool/mqueue) as defined by the "OQ" configuration
option. The vulnerability may be removed by restricting general user
access to this directory. For example, as root:

# /bin/chmod 700 /usr/spool/mqueue

This action provides increased security for the mail subsystem. More
information concerning sendmail can be obtained from:

Bryan Costales, Sendmail, O'Reilly & Associates Inc., 1994 (Page 203).

and:

Evi Nemeth et al, Unix System Administration Handbook, 2nd Edition,
Prentice Hall, 1995 (Page 460).

3.2 Modifying the source code

Sites which have source code available for their version of sendmail
should check the umask setting currently used by sendmail.

Typically, the umask setting is found in main.c and looks like:

OldUmask = umask(0);

If the call to umask() specifies an argument of "0", then a race
condition may be exploited. To prevent this race condition, the
umask() setting should at least deny group and world write permissions
as the default setting. Sites should change the setting in the source
code to:

OldUmask = umask(022);

After modification, sendmail should be rebuilt and re-installed, and
all running instances of sendmail restarted.

3.3 Install sendmail Version 8.6.12 (or later)

The only versions of sendmail verified as not containing this
vulnerability are Eric Allman's sendmail Versions 8.6.10 to 8.6.12.
Sites should consider converting their sendmail to Version 8.6.12.

Versions of sendmail prior to 8.6.10 contain serious security
vulnerabilities and should be upgraded immediately to 8.6.12.

Sendmail version 8.6.12 can be obtained from:

ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/ftp.cs.berkeley.edu/ucb/sendmail/
sendmail.8.6.12.*

Information to assist sites in converting from Sun's sendmail to
Version 8 can be found in the sendmail.8.6.12.misc.tar.Z file which is
found in the directory above.

Information to assist sites in converting from IDA sendmail to Version
8 has been released by Ben Golding and can be found in:

ftp://ftp.connect.com.au/pub/mail/sendmail.8.6.12.ida.tar.Z

3.4 Install vendor patches

Install vendor patches for sendmail as they become available. Please
note that several sendmail Version 5 vulnerabilities have been reported
to vendors recently. It is important to verify that all reported
vulnerabilities are addressed when installing patches.


- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUSCERT acknowledges 8lgm for reporting this problem.
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact AUSCERT or your
representative in FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams).

AUSCERT is the Australian Computer Emergency Response Team, funded by the
Australian Academic Research Network (AARNet) for its members. It is
located at The University of Queensland within the Prentice Centre.
AUSCERT is a full member of the Forum of Incident Response and Security
Teams (FIRST).

AUSCERT maintains an anonymous FTP service which is found on:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au.

This archive contains past SERT and AUSCERT Advisories, and other computer
security information.

AUSCERT also maintains a World Wide Web service which is found on:
http://www.auscert.org.au.

Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile: (07) 3365 4477
Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
AUSCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
On call after hours for emergencies.

Postal:
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
c/- Prentice Centre
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld. 4072.
AUSTRALIA

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Version: 2.6.2i
Comment: Finger pgp@ftp.auscert.org.au to retrieve AUSCERT's public key

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g7ANEgZxrxnJ8wemjTbWjfNpw7xLvre9kSbE3fq5w80wDoYYHco1r9RyDST7UxcI
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=ORI2
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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