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=============================================================================
AA-95.03 AUSCERT Advisory
April 3, 1995
An overview of SATAN
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

There has been a lot of speculation in the internet community in
anticipation of the release of the Security Administrator Tool for
Analyzing Networks (SATAN). AUSCERT have decided to release this advisory
in order to dispel some of the confusion about the nature of the tool and
its uses. Questions that we will be answering in this document are:

1.0 General
1.1 What is SATAN?
1.2 Does SATAN break into systems?
1.3 Preparing for the release of SATAN
1.4 What vulnerabilities does SATAN check for?
2.0 Requirements
2.1 What will you need in order to run SATAN?
3.0 Availability
3.1 Where can you get a copy of SATAN?
3.2 When will SATAN be available?
4.0 Post Release
4.1 What are the possible effects of the release of a tool such as
SATAN?
4.2 How can you tell if you are being scanned by someone using SATAN?

Appendix A: Discussion of vulnerabilities identified by SATAN.

Much of the detail in this advisory is drawn from the pre-release SATAN
documentation available via anonymous ftp from:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/ftp.win.tue.nl/satan_doc*

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.0 General

1.1 What is SATAN?

SATAN (the Security Administrator Tool for Analyzing Networks) is a
testing and reporting tool that collects a variety of information
about networked hosts.

SATAN has been designed to help systems administrators to automate the
process of testing their systems for known vulnerabilities that can be
exploited via the network. This will be particularly useful for
networked systems with multiple hosts. It will also be particularly
useful to would-be intruders looking for systems with security holes.
Herein lies the controversy.

SATAN is written mostly in Perl and utilizes a HTML Web browser such as
Netscape, Mosaic or Lynx to provide the user interface. This easy to
use interface drives the scanning process and presents the results in
summary format. As well as reporting the presence of vulnerabilities,
SATAN also gathers large amounts of general network information, such
as which hosts are connected to subnets, what types of machines they
are and which services they offer.

SATAN can be configured to scan at 3 levels:

light
This is the least intrusive scan. SATAN collects information from
the DNS (Domain Name System), tries to establish what RPC (Remote
Procedure Call) services the host offers and what file systems it
shares via the network. With this information, SATAN finds out the
general character of a host (file server, diskless workstation).

normal (includes light scan probes)
At this level, SATAN probes for the presence of common network
services including finger, remote login, ftp, WWW, Gopher and email.
With this information, SATAN establishes the operating system type
and, where possible, the software release version.

heavy (includes normal scan probes)
After it has found out what services are offered by the target,
SATAN looks at them in more depth and does a more exhaustive scan
for network services offered by the target. At this scanning level
it checks for the vulnerabilities it is configured to check. (see
below for a list of these).

These are the default settings for each level. SATAN can easily be
configured to do more or less scanning at each level.

It is worth noting that SATAN can only scan hosts that are visible on
the network. External users can not probe hosts behind a suitably
configured firewall.


1.2 Does SATAN break into systems?

SATAN is a reporting and analysis tool only. As distributed, it does not
break into systems. However SATAN is modular and easily extended, so after
it is released modified versions could be designed to compromise systems.


1.3 Preparing for the release of SATAN

SATAN tests for the presence of several known vulnerabilities, each of
which has a workaround or solution available. It is strongly
recommended that you apply the workarounds and solutions discussed in
Appendix A before April 5, 1995. The discussions in Appendix A draw
directly from the SATAN documentation.

Please note that securing your hosts against the vulnerabilities tested
for by SATAN does not necessarily make your hosts secure. It is
imperative that you continue to take all of the usual security
measures, like applying all security patches and performing regular
monitoring activities.

It is strongly recommended that you review all Unix hosts with the
AUSCERT Unix Security Checklist. This document is available via
anonymous ftp from
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/papers/unix_security_checklist_1.0


1.4 What vulnerabilities does SATAN check for?

SATAN comes configured to test for the following eleven vulnerabilities.

1. Are NFS file systems exported to unprivileged programs?
2. Are NFS file systems exported to arbitrary hosts?
3. Are NFS file systems exported via the portmapper?
4. Is there NIS password file access from arbitrary hosts?
5. Is there REXD access from arbitrary hosts?
6. Are arbitrary files accessible via TFTP?
7. Is remote shell access available from arbitrary hosts?
8. Is X server access control disabled?
9. Is there a writable anonymous FTP home directory?
10. Is there an insecure version of sendmail in use?
11. Is there an insecure version of wu-ftpd in use?

None of these vulnerabilities/problems are new. All of them are well
known and have been used by intruders in the past.

SATAN makes spotting these vulnerabilities simple, both for the systems
administrator and for anyone else looking for vulnerabilities on the
network.

See Appendix A for a detailed overview of these vulnerabilities and their
suggested solutions.

SATAN is also configurable. You can add program modules to implement
checks of your own devising.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.0 Requirements

2.1 What will you need in order to run SATAN?

The pre-release implementation of SATAN is supported for SunOS 4.1.x,
Solaris and IRIX. The official release should support many more systems.
In order to run it effectively you will need:

32M memory
20M disk space(Includes space for supplementary packages such as
perl5 and Mosaic)

HTML viewer (like Mosaic/Netscape/Lynx)
perl5
C compiler

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.0 Availability

3.1 Where can you get a copy of SATAN?

AUSCERT will be mirroring SATAN when it is released. It will be
available from our ftp server at
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/ftp.win.tue.nl/satan*

A pre-release documentation package is already available. It contains
a copy of SATAN with all the processing software removed. It is worth
getting a copy of this, installing it and having a look at the sample
database and documentation pages. This is a good introduction to the
product and should help answer any questions you have about it.
AUSCERT currently mirror this on our anonymous ftp server at
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/ftp.win.tue.nl/satan_doc*


3.2 When will SATAN be available.

SATAN is scheduled for release on April 5, 14:00 GMT. This is
00:00 AEST on the 6th of April.

The software will be available on AUSCERT's ftp site at 00:00 AEST on
Thursday the 6th of April.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.0 Post Release

4.1 What are the possible effects of the release of a tool such as SATAN?

1) Increased interest in computer cracking by everyone including the
media.
2) Increased awareness of the specific vulnerabilites that SATAN tests
for.
3) Increased interest in the specific vulnerabilites that SATAN tests
for by intruders and wannabees.
4) Increased accessability/knowledge of what services are available on
hosts visible on the network.
5) Increased probing of sites by outsiders (both intentionally and
unintentionally).


4.2 How can you tell if you are being scanned by someone using SATAN?

As part of a heavy scan, SATAN will attempt to access many ports and
services in a very short space of time. However, many UNIX network daemons
do not provide sufficient logging to determine if a system is being probed
by SATAN.

For daemons started by inetd (rshd, telnetd, ftpd and so on) this
level of logging can be provided by tcp_wrappers. A heavy scan should
be identified readily in tcp_wrapper logs.

As well as logging, tcp_wrappers also provide access control to most
network services.

tcp_wrappers is available via anonymous ftp from:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/ftp.win.tue.nl/
tcp_wrappers_7.2.tar.gz

We strongly recommend that you install and run tcp_wrappers.

Other tools which also provide extra logging (plus other features including
access control) include portmap_3, rpcbind-1.1 and logdaemon-4.7. Details
of these can be found in "Appendix A" as they directly provide workarounds
or solutions to certain vulnerabilities.


CIAC (U.S. Dept. of Energy's Computer Incident Advisory Capability)
have written a tool to monitor the network and identify the source of a
port scanner (such as used by SATAN in heavy scan). The program,
called Courtney, monitors connections to the ports probed by SATAN.
When a scan is noticed, the probing host is reported.

This tool is available via anonymous ftp from:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/ciac.llnl.gov/sectools/unix/courtney*

==========================================================================
Appendix A Discussion of vulnerabilities identified by SATAN

The discussions in this appendix draw directly from the SATAN documentation,
"Vulnerabilities -- a Tutorial." The "See also" sections may include added
material and references not found in the original SATAN documentation.

It is suggested that the CERT advisories referenced in the vulnerability
information be reviewed to gain a greater understanding of the workarounds
and solutions to particular vulnerabilities. Also the advisories often give
more detailed instructions for applying the solutions/workarounds.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.1 Writable FTP home directory

A.1.1 The Problem

When the FTP home directory of a UNIX host is writable, a remote intruder
can upload a .rhosts or .forward file to gain access to the system, or may
be able to replace files.

When a PC (DOS or MAC) permits anonymous users write access to its file
system, a remote intruder may be able to replace arbitrary programs or
configuration files, or corrupt the file system by filling it up.

A.1.2 Fix for UNIX Systems

Make sure that the FTP home directory, and all system files and directories
below it, are owned by root.

Make sure that they are not writable by anonymous users. As a rule, no file
or directory should be owned by the FTP account.

A.1.3 Other tips for UNIX Systems

Change the login shell of the ftp account to /bin/false.

A.1.4 See also

1) AUSCERT's UNIX Security Checklist (section 3.0)
2) CERT document about secure writable anonymous ftp from
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/cert/tech_tips/anonymous_ftp
3) CIAC document about anonymous ftp from
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/ciac.llnl.gov/ciacdocs/ciac2308.txt

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.2 Unprivileged NFS access

A.2.1 Background

When an NFS client host wants to access a remote file or directory, its
operating system sends a request to the NFS server. The request specifies,
among others, a file identifier, the operation (read, write, change
permission, etc.), and the identity of the user on whose behalf the
operation is to be done.

By default, the user identity is specified with the UNIX numeric user and
group ids. With this scheme, also called AUTH_UNIX, the server simply
believes anything that the client sends it.

A.2.2 The Problem

An NFS request is nothing but a network message. Any user can run a program
that generates arbitrary NFS requests. Such programs have been available
for several years, and writing them does not require unusual programming
skills.

When an NFS server accepts requests with AUTH_UNIX authentication from
unprivileged user programs, a malicious user can execute file access
requests on behalf of any user. Reason: with AUTH_UNIX authentication, the
user identity is nothing but a few user and group ID numbers in a network
message.

A.2.3 Fix

The fix is to avoid AUTH_UNIX authentication and to use something that
involves cryptography. For example, secure NFS with DES or Kerberos
credentials. Unfortunately, many NFS implementations support AUTH_UNIX
authentication only. Consult your system documentation.

A partial, but more common, solution is to configure the NFS server, and
where possible, the mount daemon, to accept requests only from privileged
system programs (such as UNIX kernels), and to reject NFS requests that are
sent by unprivileged user programs.

SunOS 4 administrators modify /etc/rc.local
rpc.mountd (no -n option)
echo "nfs_portmon/W1" | adb -w /vmunix
/dev/kmem

SunOS 5 administrators modify /etc/system
set nfs:nfs_portmon = 1

On other systems, the mountd command-line options differ, and the kernel
variable may be called nfsportmon or something similar.

Note: rejecting NFS requests from unprivileged user programs does not
protect your servers against malicious superusers or against malicious PC
programs.

A.2.4 Other tips

Where practical, export file systems read-only.

Consider blocking ports 2049 (nfs) and 111 (portmap) on your routers.

A.2.5 See also

1) AUSCERT's UNIX Security Checklist (section 2.5)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.3 Unrestricted NFS export

A.3.1 The Problem

When a file system is exported without restriction, an intruder can
remotely compromise user or system files, and then take over the machine.
For example, an intruder can remotely replace a system program or
configuration file, like .rhosts (to obtain interactive access) or .forward
(to obtain non-interactive access).

A.3.2 Fix

Make sure all file exports specify an explicit list of clients or
netgroups. Export file systems read-only where possible.

A.3.3 Other tips

Some versions of the NFS mount daemon cannot expand large netgroups and
will export to the world anyway; see also Cert advisory CA-94:02.

Check your vendor patch list.

In NIS netgroup members, empty host fields are treated as wildcards and
cause the mount daemon to grant access to any host.

Consider blocking ports 2049 (nfs) and 111 (portmap) on your routers.

A.3.4 See also

1) AUSCERT's UNIX Security Checklist (section 2.5)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.4 NIS password file access

A.4.1 Background

The NIS (Network Information Service) implements network-wide access to
administrative information. Examples of databases (also called NIS maps)
that are shared via NIS:

the password file that describes what users have access to the system,
the table with names and addresses of hosts on the network,
electronic mail aliases.

NIS databases are organized in domains. One NIS server can serve multiple
NIS domains. In order to perform a query, a client sends a request to a NIS
server and specifies

a NIS domain name,
the name of the database (NIS map) to be searched,
a search key.

A.4.2 The Problem

Many NIS implementations provide no access control. Every host that asks
for information will receive a reply. In order to perform a query, one
needs to know the server's NIS domain name. Often, this name is easy to
guess, or it can be obtained via the bootparam network service.

When the local network is accessible from other networks, a remote intruder
can collect password file information and run a password guessing program.
Many people (including Dan Klein) have demonstrated that people tend to
choose passwords that are easy to guess.

A.4.3 Fix

Several vendors have added access control to their ypserv implementation.

Check your system documentation or vendor patch list. The control file is
sometimes called securenets.

A.4.4 Workarounds

Run a portmapper with access control.

A.4.5 Other tips

Consider blocking ports 111 (portmap) on your network gateway. This makes
attacks on NIS and NFS mount daemons much harder.

Enforce a policy for choosing passwords by installing an alternative passwd
command, for example anlpasswd.

A.4.6 See also

1) AUSCERT's UNIX Security Checklist (sections 2.3, 2.12 and 4.4 )
2) CERT advisory CA-92:13.SunOS.NIS.vulnerability
CERT advisory CA-93:01.REVISED.HP.NIS.ypbind.vulnerability
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/cert/cert_advisories/{CA-92:13*,CA-93:01*}
3) anlpasswd is available from
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/info.mcs.anl.gov/anlpasswd.tar.Z

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.5 Portmapper exports

A.5.1 Background

In order to perform operations via the NFS network file system protocol, a
client host sends NFS requests to the NFS server daemon with:

an NFS file handle that specifies the target of the operation,
the operation (lookup, read, write, change permissions),
the user on whose behalf the request is sent.

When an NFS client host wants to access a remote file system for the first
time, it first needs to obtain an NFS file handle. To this end, the client
host sends a mount request to the server's mount daemon. The server's
mount daemon verifies that the client host has permission to access the
requested file system. When the mount daemon grants access, it sends a
(directory) file handle back to the NFS client.

A.5.2 The problem

For efficiency reasons, most NFS export restrictions are enforced by the
mount daemon. Individual file access operations are handled by the NFS
daemon, and the origin of such requests is examined only in special cases
such as remote superuser access.

Instead of talking directly to the mount daemon, a malicious NFS client can
ask the server's portmapper daemon to forward the request to the mount
daemon. When the mount daemon receives the request from the portmapper, the
mount daemon will believe that the request comes from the file server, and
not from the malicious client.

When the file server exports file systems to itself (for example, because
the server is a netgroup member) the mount daemon grants access and replies
with a file handle. The portmapper forwards the handle to the malicious
client. From now on, the client can talk directly to the server's NFS
daemon to access the directory and all files below it.

A.5.3 Fix

Run a portmapper (or rpcbind program in case of System V.4) that does not
forward mount etc. requests. Consult your vendor's patch list. See also:
Cert Advisory 94:15.

A.5.4 Other tips

Export file systems read-only where possible.

Consider blocking ports 2049 (nfs) and 111 (portmap) on your routers.

A.5.5 See also

1) CERT Advisory CA-94:15.NFS.Vulnerabilities
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/cert/cert_advisories/CA-94:15.*
2) Wietse Venema has written a portmapper with access control plus other
enhancements, portmap_3. Also available is a replacement rpcbind.
These can can be found on:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/ftp.win.tue.nl/
{portmap_3.shar.Z,rpcbind_1.1.tar.Z}

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.6 REXD access

A.6.1 Background

The rexd service, and the on client program, implement remote command
execution via the network. To the extent that it is possible, the complete
client environment, including working directory and environment variables,
is made available on the remote system.

A.6.2 The problem

A request for remote command execution contains, among others, the command
to be executed, and a user and group id. By default, the rexd server
believes everything that the client sends it. An intruder can exploit the
service to execute commands as any user (except perhaps root). The typical
rexd server has no protection against abuse: most implementations have no
provision for access control, nor do they require that the client uses a
privileged network port.

A.6.3 Fix

Disable the rexd service. Usually this is accomplished by editing the
inetd.conf file, and by sending a HUP signal to the inetd process.

Some rexd implementations can be configured to use a more secure protocol.
Consult your manual pages for details.

A.6.4 See also

1) CERT advisory CA-92:05.AIX.REXD.Daemon.vulnerability
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/cert/cert_advisories/CA-92:05*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.7 Remote shell access

A.7.1 The Problem

When the remote login/remote shell service trusts every host on the
network, a malicious superuser on an arbitrary host can gain access as any
user (except perhaps root). Once inside, the intruder can replace system
programs or configuration files (such as the password file) and take over
the machine.

In addition, there are guest or administrative accounts that might not have
passwords protecting the account, which allows anyone to remotely login as
that user and gain access to the host.

A.7.2 Fix

Remove the wildcard (+) from the /etc/hosts.equiv file. Be careful with the
use of the -@group netgroup feature, as there are many incorrect
implementations.

Delete or disable any accounts without a password from the system or NIS
password file.

A.7.3 Other tips

Give system accounts such as bin and daemon a non-functional shell (such as
/bin/false) and put them in the /etc/ftpusers file so they cannot use ftp.

A.7.4 See also

1) AUSCERT's UNIX Security Checklist (sections 2.3 and 2.4)
2) Wietse Venema's logdaemon package, includes replacements for rsh and rlogin
daemons. By default these versions do not accept wild cards in host.equiv
or .rhost files. They also have an option to disable user .rhost files.
logdaemon is available via anonymous ftp from:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/ftp.win.tue.nl/logdaemon*

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.8 Sendmail vulnerabilities

A.8.1 The Problem

With almost every sendmail version that was built before February 1995, a
malicious user can gain unauthorized privileges by exploiting newlines in
command-line arguments or in the process environment. Intruders need to
have access to an account on your system to exploit this problem.

In addition, pre-8.6.10 versions of sendmail that support IDENT (RFC 1413)
functionality have a problem that could allow an intruder to gain
unauthorized access to your system remotely (that is, without having access
to an account on the system).

A.8.2 Fix

Ensure that you are running the most recent version of sendmail.

A.8.3 See also

1) AUSCERT's UNIX Security Checklist (section 2.13)
2) CERT advisory CA-95:05.sendmail.vulnerabilities
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/cert/cert_advisories/CA-95:05*

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.9 TFTP file access

A.9.1 Background

The TFTP (trivial file transfer protocol) service provides remote access to
files, without asking for a password. It is typically used for the
initialization of diskless computers, of X terminals, or of other dedicated
hardware.

A.9.2 The problem

When the TFTP daemon does not limit access to specific files or hosts, a
remote intruder can use the service to obtain copies of the password file
or of other system or user files, or to remotely overwrite files.

A.9.3 Fix

Restrict TFTP access to only limited subtree of the file system. Consult
your tftpd manual pages for details. When no access restriction is
possible, restrict TFTP access by using a tcp wrapper.

A.9.4 See also

1) AUSCERT's UNIX Security Checklist (section 2.9)
2) AUSCERT Advisory SA-93.05.tftp.Attacks:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/auscert-advisory/SA-93.05.tftp.Attacks
3) CERT advisories
CA-91:18.Active.Internet.tftp.Attacks
CA-91:19.AIX.TFTP.daemon.vulnerability
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/cert/cert_advisories/{CA-91:18*,CA-91:19*}
4) If your version of tftp does not have a chroot option (which would allow
you to limit access to a directory subtree) then you can use the
chrootuid program to provide this functionality. It is available from:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/ftp.win.tue.nl/chrootuid*

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.10 X server access

A.10.1 Background

The X Window system implements an environment where applications use the
network to interact with a user workstation's display, keyboard and mouse.
There are two classes of programs:
The X server: the program that manages the user's workstation display and
input devices. X clients: the applications that run on the user's
workstation or elsewhere in the network.

A.10.2 The problem

When the X server permits access from arbitrary hosts on the network, a
remote intruder can connect to the X server and:

Read the user's keyboard, including any passwords that the user types,
Read everything that is sent to the screen,
Write arbitrary information to the screen,
Start or terminate arbitrary applications,
Take control of the user's session.

A.10.3 Fix

Remove all instances of the xhost + command from the system-wide Xsession
file, from user .xsession files, and from any application programs or shell
scripts that use the X window system.

A.10.4 Other tips

Use the X magic cookie mechanism or equivalent. With logins under control
of xdm, you turn on authentication by editing the xdm-config file and
setting the DisplayManager*authorize attribute to true. When granting
access to the screen from another machine, use the xauth command in
preference to the xhost command.

A.10.5 See also

1) AUSCERT's UNIX Security Checklist (section 8)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.11 WU-FTPD Vulnerability
(This may not be listed in the pre-release documentation version)

A.11.1 Background

The wuarchive FTPD daemon (or WU-FTPD) is a highly modified version (and
significantly larger) version of FTPD that provides extra logging, limited
remote command support, and other features to the standard BSD version of
FTPD. The additional code adds greatly to the complexity, and multiple
significant software bugs have been found in it.

A.11.2 The problem

There is a race condition in the code, as well as a bug in the SITE EXEC
command, that allows anyone (remote or local) root access on a host running
a vulnerable FTPD daemon. Support for anonymous FTP is not required to
exploit this vulnerability.

A.11.3 Fix

Don't use extended or modified FTPD daemons unless they are necessary -
vendors code is typically more stable and secure. Upgrade to a more recent
version of WU-FTPD; it can be found at the wuarchive ftp site. Restrict
FTP access by using a tcp wrapper.

A.11.4 See also:

1) AUSCERT's UNIX Security Checklist (section 3)
2) CERT Advisory 93:06.wuarchive.ftpd.vulnerability and
CERT Advisory 94:07.wuarchive.ftpd.trojan.horse
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/cert/cert_advisories/{CA-93:06*,CA-94:07*}

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUSCERT wishes to thank Wietse Venema and Dan Farmer, the writers of SATAN,
as well as CIAC, DFN-CERT and CERT for their contributions to this advisory.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact AUSCERT or your
representative in FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams).

AUSCERT is the Australian Computer Emergency Response Team, funded by the
Australian Academic Research Network (AARNet) for its members. It is
located at The University of Queensland within the Prentice Centre.
AUSCERT is a full member of the Forum of Incident Response and Security
Teams (FIRST).

AUSCERT maintains an anonymous FTP service which is found on:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au. This archive contains past SERT and AUSCERT
Advisories, and other computer security information.

AUSCERT also maintains a World Wide Web service which is found on:
http://www.auscert.org.au.

Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile: (07) 365 4477
Telephone: (07) 365 4417 (International: +61 7 365 4417)
AUSCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
On call after hours for emergencies.

Postal:
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
c/- Prentice Centre
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld. 4072.
AUSTRALIA
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