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S-98-18.asc

S-98-18.asc
Posted Jan 10, 2000

Subject SGI Overflow vulnerability in suid_exec Date 14-Apr-98

tags | overflow
SHA-256 | 10a3a2fee78a1341004cd94f1558319805dc260267506b6cebe1fb9f13a3c596

S-98-18.asc

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===============================================================================
>> CERT-NL, 01-Mar-2000 <<
>> All CERT-NL information has been moved to http://cert.surfnet.nl. Links <<
>> to CERT-NL information contained in this advisory are therefore outdated. <<
>> <<
>> CERT-NL also has stopped the CERT-CC-Mirror service. Due to this the <<
>> links to the CERT-CC mirror are obsolete. Visit the CERT-CC site for the <<
>> complete CERT-CC advisory texts: http://www.cert.org <<
===============================================================================
===============================================================================
Security Advisory CERT-NL
===============================================================================
Author/Source : Rene Ritzen Index : S-98-18
Distribution : World Page : 1
Classification: External Version: 1
Subject : SGI Overflow vulnerability in suid_exec Date : 14-Apr-98
===============================================================================

By courtesy of Silicon Graphics, Inc. we received information on a
Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in suid_exec
CERT-NL recommends to perform the workaround outlined in the section temporary
solution below.

______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory

Title: suid_exec Buffer Overflow
Title: AUSCERT AA-96.17
Number: 19980405-01-I
Date: April 6, 1998
______________________________________________________________________________

Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.

Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall
Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________


- - - -----------------------
- - - --- Issue Specifics ---
- - - -----------------------

The suid_exec program is part of the Korn Shell (ksh) software distributions.

Under normal operation, the suid_exec program will run shell scripts
setuid. Unfortunately, a buffer overrun has been discovered in the
suid_exec program which could allow arbitrary commands to be run as the
privileged user root.

Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems.


- - - --------------
- - - --- Impact ---
- - - --------------

The suid_exec program is installed by default on all IRIX 5.x and 6.x
systems.

With a local account, the suid_exec buffer overrun vulnerability can be
exploited locally and remotely.

The suid_exec buffer overrun vulnerability can be utilized to execute
commands with root privileges.

The suid_exec buffer overrun vulnerability has been publicly discussed
in Usenet newsgroups and mailing lists and also reported in AUSCERT
Security Advisory AA-96.17.


- - - --------------------------
- - - --- Temporary Solution ---
- - - --------------------------

To disable the programs that are believed to be vulnerable, use the
following steps.


1) Become the root user on the system.


% /bin/su -
Password:
#


2) Change the setuid root permissions on the program.

# /bin/chmod 400 /sbin/suid_exec

************
*** NOTE ***
************

Removing these permissions from suid_exec will stop
non-root users from executing setuid/setgid shell
scripts and scripts upon which read permissions have
not been set.


3) Confirm the new permissions on the program.

# ls -la /sbin/suid_exec
-r-------- 1 root sys 14384 May 30 1996 /sbin/suid_exec


4) Using the find command, locate any additional copies of suid_exec
and disable them.

Note that this is one long command, though we have separated it
onto two lines using backslashes.

# find / -local -type f -name suid_exec \
-print -ok chmod 400 '{}' \;

This command will find all files on a system that are
- only in the local file system you name (/ -local)
- regular files (-type f)
- named appropriately (-name suid_exec)

Once found, those files will
- have their names printed (-print)
- have their modes changed, but only if you type `y' in response
to the prompt (-ok chmod 400 '{}' \;)

5) Return to previous level.

# exit
$


- - - ----------------
- - - --- Solution ---
- - - ----------------

The suid_exec program is considered freeware and will not be patched.
As freeware software, all reasonable efforts will be made to address
the issue in future versions of the software.


OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions
---------- ----------- ------- -------------

IRIX 3.x no
IRIX 4.x no
IRIX 5.0.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.1.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.2 yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.3 yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 6.0.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 6.1 yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 6.2 yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 6.3 yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 6.4 yes not avail Note 1


Notes:

1) Freeware upgrades should be applied.


- - - ------------------------
- - - --- Acknowledgments ---
- - - ------------------------

Silicon Graphics wishes to thank AUSCERT for their assistance in
this matter.


- - - -----------------------------------------------------------
- - - --- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
- - - -----------------------------------------------------------

If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@sgi.com.

==============================================================================
CERT-NL is the Computer Emergency Response Team for SURFnet customers. SURFnet
is the Dutch network for educational, research and related institutes. CERT-NL
is a member of the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST).

All CERT-NL material is available under:
http://cert.surfnet.nl/

In case of computer or network security problems please contact your local
CERT/security-team or CERT-NL (if your institute is NOT a SURFnet customer
please address the appropriate (local) CERT/security-team).

CERT-NL is one/two hour(s) ahead of UTC (GMT) in winter/summer,
i.e. UTC+0100 in winter and UTC+0200 in summer (DST).

Email: cert-nl@surfnet.nl ATTENDED REGULARLY ALL DAYS
Phone: +31 302 305 305 BUSINESS HOURS ONLY
Fax: +31 302 305 329 BUSINESS HOURS ONLY
Snailmail: SURFnet bv
Attn. CERT-NL
P.O. Box 19035
NL - 3501 DA UTRECHT
The Netherlands

NOODGEVALLEN: 06 22 92 35 64 ALTIJD BEREIKBAAR
EMERGENCIES : +31 6 22 92 35 64 ATTENDED AT ALL TIMES
CERT-NL'S EMERGENCY PHONENUMBER IS ONLY TO BE USED IN CASE OF EMERGENCIES:
THE SURFNET HELPDESK OPERATING THE EMERGENCY NUMBER HAS A *FIXED*
PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH YOUR ALERT AND WILL IN REGULAR CASES RELAY IT
TO CERT-NL IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER. CERT-NL WILL THEN CONTACT YOU.
===============================================================================

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