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Posted Jan 10, 2000

Subject SGI IRIX 5.x and 6.x fsdump Security Date 11-mar-97

systems | irix
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S-97-18.asc

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===============================================================================
>> CERT-NL, 01-Mar-2000 <<
>> All CERT-NL information has been moved to http://cert.surfnet.nl. Links <<
>> to CERT-NL information contained in this advisory are therefore outdated. <<
>> <<
>> CERT-NL also has stopped the CERT-CC-Mirror service. Due to this the <<
>> links to the CERT-CC mirror are obsolete. Visit the CERT-CC site for the <<
>> complete CERT-CC advisory texts: http://www.cert.org <<
===============================================================================
===============================================================================
Security Advisory CERT-NL
===============================================================================
Author/Source : Gert Meijerink Index : S-97-18
Distribution : World Page :
Classification: External Version:
Subject : SGI: IRIX 5.x and 6.x fsdump Security Date : 11-mar-97
===============================================================================

By courtesy of Silicon Graphics we received the following information.

A security vulnerability has been found with the fsdump program
used in the rfind Server Utilities, in the optionally installed
subsystem eoe.sw.rfindd (IRIX 6.2) or eoe2.sw.rfindd (IRIX
releases prior to 6.2).

CERT-NL recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure.
______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory

Title: IRIX 5.x and 6.x fsdump Security
Number: 19970301-01-P
Date: March 10, 1997
______________________________________________________________________________

Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.

Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall
SGI be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or
for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages
of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of
any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________

- - -------------------
- - --- Description ---
- - -------------------

A security vulnerability has been found with the fsdump program
used in the rfind Server Utilities, in the optionally installed
subsystem eoe.sw.rfindd (IRIX 6.2) or eoe2.sw.rfindd (IRIX
releases prior to 6.2).

Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems running
IRIX versions 5.x, 6.0.x, 6.1, and 6.2. This issue has been corrected in
more recent releases of IRIX and will be corrected in future releases
of IRIX.



- - --------------
- - --- Impact ---
- - --------------

The fsdump program is found in the eoe.sw.rfindd and eoe2.sw.rfindd
subsystems which are not installed by default. As optional subsystems,
these packages must be explicitly installed for use. Only systems with
the fsdump program present are vulnerable.

Root permissions can be obtained on any system which has the
/var/rfindd/fsdump program installed with setuid permissions.

Exploitation of this vulnerability requires access to an established
account on the system.

Provided with an established account, the vulnerability can be exploited
locally or remotely.

This issue has been publically disclosed in several public forums
including the BUGTRAQ mailing list.


- - ----------------
- - --- Solution ---
- - ----------------

The solution to this problem is to remove the setuid bit on the
fsdump program or to remove the rfindd subsystem.

To determine if the subsystem containing the fsdump program is installed
on a particular system, the following command can be used:

% versions -Inv | grep rfindd

I eoe.sw.rfindd 1233007732 rfind Server Utilities


In the above case, the optional subsystem containing the fsdump software is
installed and the steps in the section titled "**** IRIX 5.x, 6.0, 6.0.1,
6.1, 6.2 ****" should be performed. If no output is returned then the
subsystem is not installed but existence of the program should be
double checked with the following command:

% ls -al /var/rfindd/fsdump /usr/rfindd/fsdump
Cannot access /var/rfindd/fsdump: No such file or directory
Cannot access /usr/rfindd/fsdump: No such file or directory


In the above case, the fsdump program is not found and no further action
is required. If a file listing is returned, then the fsdump program is
present and the steps below should be performed.




**** IRIX 5.x, 6.0, 6.0.1, 6.1, 6.2 ****

There are no patches for this issue.

The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability. There
are two possible solutions to this issue. Solution A in which
the fsdump program permissions are corrected or Solution B in
which the rfindd subsystem is removed. Either solution can be
used depending on site requirements.





Solution A - Change program permissions.


1) Become the root user on the system.

% /bin/su -
Password:
#


2) Move fsdump's cron task from the rfindd crontab file
(/var/spool/cron/crontabs/rfindd) to the crontab file
for root (/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root) by concatenating
the rfind crontab file to the root crontab file. Then
move the rfindd crontab file out of the way so it will not
be used.

# cd /var/spool/cron/crontabs
# cat rfindd >> root
# mv rfindd rfindd.old.insecure


3) Edit the root crontab file and change the newly added line to
execute in the rfindd directory.

# vi /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root

{Find the newly added fsdump line}

3 0-3,5-23 * * * /etc/chkconfig rfindd && exec ./runfsdump

{Add the cd operation to the fsdump line}

New entry ----+
|
V
|-------------|
3 0-3,5-23 * * * cd /var/rfindd; /etc/chkconfig rfindd && exec ./runfsdump

{Save the file and exit}



4) Remove the setuid bit from the shipped fsdump program

# chmod -s /var/rfindd/fsdump


5) Return to previous level.

# exit
$



Solution B - Removal of the software.


1) Become the root user on the system.

% /bin/su -
Password:
#


2) Remove the vulnerable subsystems.

# /usr/sbin/versions -v remove eoe.sw.rfindd eoe2.sw.rfindd


3) Determine what patches are install on the system.

# versions -b | grep patch | cut -c4-20


4) From the patches found in step 3, remove any occurances of
the following patches:


patchSG0000159
patchSG0000415
patchSG0000528
patchSG0000739
patchSG0000852
patchSG0000159
patchSG0001122

To remove a patch, use the versions command. For example,
to remove the patch patchSG0000528:


# /usr/sbin/versions -v remove patchSG0000528


5) Return to previous level.

# exit
$





**** IRIX 6.3 and 6.4 ****


The IRIX operating system versions 6.3 and 6.4 do not have this
vulnerability and no further action is required.






- - ------------------------
- - --- Acknowledgments ---
- - ------------------------



Silicon Graphics wishes to thank FIRST members worldwide for their
assistance in this matter.

============================================================================
CERT-NL is the Computer Emergency Response Team for SURFnet customers. SURFnet
is the Dutch network for educational, research and related institutes. CERT-NL
is a member of the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST).

All CERT-NL material is available under:
http://cert.surfnet.nl/

In case of computer or network security problems please contact your local
CERT/security-team or CERT-NL (if your institute is NOT a SURFnet customer
please address the appropriate (local) CERT/security-team).

CERT-NL is one/two hour(s) ahead of UTC (GMT) in winter/summer,
i.e. UTC+0100 in winter and UTC+0200 in summer (DST).

Email: cert-nl@surfnet.nl ATTENDED REGULARLY ALL DAYS
Phone: +31 302 305 305 BUSINESS HOURS ONLY
Fax: +31 302 305 329 BUSINESS HOURS ONLY
Snailmail: SURFnet bv
Attn. CERT-NL
P.O. Box 19035
NL - 3501 DA UTRECHT
The Netherlands

NOODGEVALLEN: 06 22 92 35 64 ALTIJD BEREIKBAAR
EMERGENCIES : +31 6 22 92 35 64 ATTENDED AT ALL TIMES
CERT-NL'S EMERGENCY PHONENUMBER IS ONLY TO BE USED IN CASE OF EMERGENCIES:
THE SURFNET HELPDESK OPERATING THE EMERGENCY NUMBER HAS A *FIXED*
PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH YOUR ALERT AND WILL IN REGULAR CASES RELAY IT
TO CERT-NL IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER. CERT-NL WILL THEN CONTACT YOU.
===============================================================================

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