Subject Vendor Initiated Bulletin FreeBSD man page Date 23-may-96
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>> CERT-NL, 01-Mar-2000 <<
>> All CERT-NL information has been moved to http://cert.surfnet.nl. Links <<
>> to CERT-NL information contained in this advisory are therefore outdated. <<
>> <<
>> CERT-NL also has stopped the CERT-CC-Mirror service. Due to this the <<
>> links to the CERT-CC mirror are obsolete. Visit the CERT-CC site for the <<
>> complete CERT-CC advisory texts: http://www.cert.org <<
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Security Advisory CERT-NL
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Author/Source : Gert Meijerink Index : S-96-28
Distribution : World Page : 1
Classification: External Version: 1
Subject : Vendor Initiated Bulletin: FreeBSD man page Date : 23-may-96
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By courtesy of FreeBSD, Inc. we received information on a vulnerability in the
man page utility.
CERT-NL recommends to implement the provided workaround.
==============================================================================
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-96:11 Security Advisory
Revised: Wed May 22 00:11:46 PDT 1996 FreeBSD, Inc.
Topic: security compromise from man page utility
Category: core
Module: man
Announced: 1996-05-21
Affects: FreeBSD 2.0, 2.0.5, 2.1, 2.1-stable, and 2.2-current
Corrected: 2.1-stable and 2.2-current as of 1996-05-21
FreeBSD only: yes
Patches: ftp://freebsd.org/pub/CERT/patches/SA-96:11/
=============================================================================
I. Background
FreeBSD replaced the standard BSD manual page reader with
code developed by a third party to support compressed manual
pages. A bug was found in the manual page reader which can
allow an unprivileged local user to compromise system security
in a limited fashion. This problem is present in all source
code and binary distributions of FreeBSD version 2.x released
before 1996-05-21.
II. Problem Description
The man program is setuid to the "man" user. By executing a
particular sequence of commands, an unprivileged local user
may gain the access privileges of the "man" user. However,
root access could be obtained with further work.
III. Impact
The "man" user has no particular special privileges, it is
the owner of the /usr/share/man/cat[0-9] directory hierarchy.
Unformatted system manual pages are owned by the "bin" user.
However, further exploits once "man" is obtained could
possibly allow a local user to obtain unlimited access via
a trojan horse.
This vulnerability can only be exploited by users with a valid
account on the local system.
IV. Workaround
One may simply disable the setuid bit on the /usr/bin/man file.
This will disable caching of formatted manual pages, no system
functionality will be lost. This workaround will suffice for
all versions of FreeBSD affected by this problem.
As root, execute the command:
# chmod u-s /usr/bin/man
then verify that the setuid permissions of the files have been
removed. The permissions array should read "-r-xr-xr-x" as
shown here:
# ls -l /usr/bin/man
-r-xr-xr-x 1 man bin 28672 May 19 20:38 /usr/bin/man
We also suggest applying the following patch to the source
distribution so that the man program will not be installed
setuid man should you rebuild from sources:
*** /usr/src/gnu/usr.bin/man/man/Makefile Sun Feb 25 13:39:52 1996
--- /usr/src/gnu/usr.bin/man/man/Makefile Wed May 22 00:13:05 1996
***************
*** 1,7 ****
PROG= man
SRCS= man.c manpath.c glob.c
- BINMODE=4555
- BINOWN= man
.if exists(${.CURDIR}/../lib/obj)
LDADD= -L${.CURDIR}/../lib/obj -lman
--- 1,5 ----
V. Solution
The FreeBSD team is in the process of rewriting portions of
the manual program to avoid this and similar vulnerabilities.
This security advisory will be updated when a complete solution
is available.
=============================================================================
FreeBSD, Inc.
Web Site: http://www.freebsd.org/
Confidential contacts: security-officer@freebsd.org
PGP Key: ftp://freebsd.org/pub/CERT/public_key.asc
Security notifications: security-notifications@freebsd.org
Security public discussion: security@freebsd.org
==============================================================================
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is the Dutch network for educational, research and related institutes. CERT-NL
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