exploit the possibilities
Home Files News &[SERVICES_TAB]About Contact Add New

Microsoft Chakra JIT Server IRBuilder::Build Integer Overflow

Microsoft Chakra JIT Server IRBuilder::Build Integer Overflow
Posted Aug 16, 2017
Authored by Ivan Fratric, Google Security Research

The Microsoft Chakra JIT server suffers from an integer overflow in IRBuilder::Build.

tags | advisory, overflow
advisories | CVE-2017-8637
SHA-256 | 6639f5e0c1bdd2f5bed8084c2cf405fcb0a5da8cf37e3dda8f8472c91bcd2d16

Microsoft Chakra JIT Server IRBuilder::Build Integer Overflow

Change Mirror Download
 Microsoft Chakra JIT server integer overflow in IRBuilder::Build 

CVE-2017-8637


There is an issue in Chakra JIT server that can be potentially exploited to compromise the JIT process from a compromised browser content process. Bugs like this could potentially be used to bypass ACG (Arbitrary Code Guard) in Microsoft Edge.

The issue has been confirmed on a ChakraCore build from the latest source.

Chakra JIT server takes bytecode as an input from the calling process. JIT server can either compile a function or a loop body. When the client asks the JIT process to compile a loop body, in addition to the bytecode buffer, the client sends a start offset and an end offset inside the buffer (CodeGenWorkItemIDL->jitData->bodyData->loopHeaders->startOffset and CodeGenWorkItemIDL->jitData->bodyData->loopHeaders->endOffset). These values aren't validated by the JIT server.

This can lead to out-of-bound reads in the bytecode buffer, but it can also lead to an out-of-bounds write as demonstrated below.

In IRBuilder.cpp in IRBuilder::Build() on this line

offsetToInstructionCount = lastOffset + 2;

lastOffset is user-controlled. If lastOffset is sufficiently large, an integer overflow occurs and offsetToInstructionCount wraps around to a small value. offsetToInstructionCount is then used to allocate an array:

m_offsetToInstruction = JitAnewArrayZ(m_tempAlloc, IR::Instr *, offsetToInstructionCount);

Due to the overflow, the array is goint to be too small to hold the required data. Finally, an overflow happens in IRBuilder::AddInstr on

Assert(offset < m_offsetToInstructionCount);
if (m_offsetToInstruction[offset] == nullptr)
{
m_offsetToInstruction[offset] = instr;
}

Note #1: While there is an assert() here it will only affect the debug build.
Note #2: Due to the if() statement, an attacker can only overwrite a null-value.

To demonstrate the issue, it is sufficient to change the value of CodeGenWorkItemIDL->jitData->bodyData->loopHeaders->endOffset to 0xffffffff before calling RemoteCodeGen() function on the JIT server when JITing a loop body.



This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse
or a patch has been made broadly available, the bug report will become
visible to the public.




Found by: ifratric

Login or Register to add favorites

File Archive:

June 2023

  • Su
  • Mo
  • Tu
  • We
  • Th
  • Fr
  • Sa
  • 1
    Jun 1st
    18 Files
  • 2
    Jun 2nd
    13 Files
  • 3
    Jun 3rd
    0 Files
  • 4
    Jun 4th
    0 Files
  • 5
    Jun 5th
    0 Files
  • 6
    Jun 6th
    0 Files
  • 7
    Jun 7th
    0 Files
  • 8
    Jun 8th
    0 Files
  • 9
    Jun 9th
    0 Files
  • 10
    Jun 10th
    0 Files
  • 11
    Jun 11th
    0 Files
  • 12
    Jun 12th
    0 Files
  • 13
    Jun 13th
    0 Files
  • 14
    Jun 14th
    0 Files
  • 15
    Jun 15th
    0 Files
  • 16
    Jun 16th
    0 Files
  • 17
    Jun 17th
    0 Files
  • 18
    Jun 18th
    0 Files
  • 19
    Jun 19th
    0 Files
  • 20
    Jun 20th
    0 Files
  • 21
    Jun 21st
    0 Files
  • 22
    Jun 22nd
    0 Files
  • 23
    Jun 23rd
    0 Files
  • 24
    Jun 24th
    0 Files
  • 25
    Jun 25th
    0 Files
  • 26
    Jun 26th
    0 Files
  • 27
    Jun 27th
    0 Files
  • 28
    Jun 28th
    0 Files
  • 29
    Jun 29th
    0 Files
  • 30
    Jun 30th
    0 Files

Top Authors In Last 30 Days

File Tags

Systems

packet storm

© 2022 Packet Storm. All rights reserved.

Services
Security Services
Hosting By
Rokasec
close