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Microsoft .NET Framework 4.7 DLL Hijacking

Microsoft .NET Framework 4.7 DLL Hijacking
Posted Jun 30, 2017
Authored by Stefan Kanthak

Microsoft .NET Framework version 4.7 suffers from dll hijacking vulnerabilities.

tags | exploit, vulnerability
systems | windows
MD5 | 5b1e4d178e8382d65a9f6aa04db6bba5

Microsoft .NET Framework 4.7 DLL Hijacking

Change Mirror Download
Hi @ll,

the executable installers for .NET Framework 4.7 (released about
2 months ago)

* NDP47-KB3186500-Web.exe,
Microsoft .NET Framework 4.7 (Web Installer) for Windows 7 SP1 etc.,
available from <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=55170>,

* NDP47-KB3186497-x86-x64-AllOS-ENU.exe,
Microsoft .NET Framework 4.7 (Offline Installer) for Windows 7 SP1 etc.,
available from <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=55167>,

* NDP47-KB3186497-x86-x64-AllOS-DEU.exe,
Microsoft .NET Framework 4.7 Sprachpaket (Offlineinstaller) fur Windows 7 SP1 etc,
available from <https://www.microsoft.com/de-de/download/details.aspx?id=55169>,

* NDP47-DevPack-KB3186612-ENU.exe,
Microsoft .NET Framework 4.7 Developer Pack and Language Packs for Windows 7 SP1 etc.,
available from <https://www.microsoft.com/en-US/download/details.aspx?id=55168>,

are vulnerable: they allow arbitrary code execution via DLL hijacking,
resulting in escalation of privilege.

On a fully patched Windows 7 SP1 (which has a market share around 50%)
NDP47-KB3186500-Web.exe, NDP47-KB3186497-x86-x64-AllOS-ENU.exe and
ALL language packs NDP47-KB3186497-x86-x64-AllOS-???.exe load at
least the following DLLs from their application directory (typically
%USERPROFILE%\Downloads\) instead Windows' system directory
%SystemRoot%\System32\ and execute their DllMain() routine:
Cabinet.dll, Version.dll, CryptDll.dll, CryptSP.dll, NTMARTA.dll,
UXTheme.dll, DWMAPI.dll

NDP47-DevPack-KB3186612-ENU.exe loads least the following DLLs from its
application directory (typically %USERPROFILE%\Downloads\) instead
Windows' system directory %SystemRoot%\System32\ and executes their
DllMain() routine:
Cabinet.dll, MSI.dll, Version.dll, SPP.dll, VSSAPI.dll, ATL.dll,
VSSTrace.dll, NTMARTA.dll, UXTheme.dll, DWMAPI.dll, CryptSP.dll,
RPCRTRemote.dll


See <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/426.html>,
<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/427.html>
<https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html>,
<https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/2269637.aspx>,
<https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff919712.aspx> and
<https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682586.aspx> for this
well-known beginner's error.


See <https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2008/09/carpet-bombing-and-directory-poisoning.html>,
<http://blog.acrossecurity.com/2012/02/downloads-folder-binary-planting.html>,
<http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2012/Aug/134> and
<http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/load-library-safely.aspx>
for more information.

JFTR: it's a shame that these installers, built 2017-04-22, still
show this 20+ year old beginner's error!


For NDP47-KB3186500-Web.exe and NDP47-KB3186497-x86-x64-AllOS-???.exe
this results thanks to their embedded application manifest which
specifies "requireAdministrator" in escalation of privilege.

NDP47-DevPack-KB3186612-ENU.exe achieves the escalation of privilege
with a call of itself via "RunAs".




Proof of concept/demonstration:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. download <https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/download/SENTINEL.DLL>
and save it as UXTheme.dll in your "Downloads" directory;

2. copy the downloaded UXTheme.dll as Version.dll, Cabinet.dll etc.
(see the list of DLL names above);

3. download
<https://download.microsoft.com/download/A/E/A/AEAE0F3F-96E9-4711-AADA-5E35EF902306/NDP47-KB3186500-Web.exe>,
<https://download.microsoft.com/download/D/D/3/DD35CC25-6E9C-484B-A746-C5BE0C923290/NDP47-KB3186497-x86-x64-AllOS-ENU.exe>,
<https://download.microsoft.com/download/8/3/8/838A8A52-67BA-4F1C-BA95-FABBA994352C/NDP47-KB3186497-x86-x64-AllOS-DEU.exe>,
...,
<https://download.microsoft.com/download/A/1/D/A1D07600-6915-4CB8-A931-9A980EF47BB7/NDP47-DevPack-KB3186612-ENU.exe>,
and save them in your "Downloads" directory;

4. run the downloaded NDP47-*.exe and notice the message boxes displayed
from the DLLs: PWNED!


Mitigation & detection:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

* NEVER run executable installers from your "Downloads" directory;

* dump/avoid executable installers, use *.MSI instead!

* stay FAR away from software written by sloppy coders who don't
know their target platform, and ignore their own companies
guidelines/recommendations!

* see <https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/2533623>,
<https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/2269637> and
<https://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/load-library-safely.aspx>

* also see <https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/verifier.html>
and <https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/!execute.html>

* dump .NET Framework alltogether!


stay tuned
Stefan Kanthak


Timeline:
~~~~~~~~~

2017-06-13 vulnerability report sent to vendor

2017-06-13 reply from vendor:
"MSRC case 39179 opened"

2017-06-21 reply from vendor:
"We have investigated the issue and determined it does not
warrant an explicit fix for down level products. [...]
Loading binaries from the application directory is a by
design functionality of the Windows library search order
process."

2017-06-21 OUCH!
The "application directory" can be removed from the library
search path since Windows Vista and the update KB2533623!
See <https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh310515.aspx>
or <https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms684179.aspx>.
Which DLLs do the installers need or expect to load from
their "application directory"?

2017-06-28 no reply from vendor since 7 days, report published



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