FAQ: Firewall Admins Guide to Porn version 1.0.1 (Jan 15, 2000). One of the more frequent problem security administrators will face is porn. It is a popular Internet application, and even when restrictions are put into place, users find ways of getting around them. At the same time, users tend to be clueless as to the knowledge firewall admins have of their surfing habits. Every administrator of a large company that I know of has had to confront this issue, but not much is discussed about the topic in the literature. This document is intended as a guide for firewall admins in this area.
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<TITLE>FAQ: Firewall Admins Guide to Porn</TITLE>
<H1>FAQ: Firewall Admins Guide to Porn</H1>
One of the more frequent problem security administrators
will face is porn. It is a popular Internet application,
and even when restrictions are put into place, users
find ways of getting around them. At the same time,
users tend to be clueless as to the knowledge
firewall admins have of their surfing habits.
Every administrator of a large company that I know
of has had to confront this issue, but not much is
discussed about the topic in the literature.
<P>
This document is intended as a guide for firewall
admins in this area.
<P>
PS: If you may have trouble accessing this document
due to content blocking filters.
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<DL>
<DT><H1>0. Information about this FAQ</H1><DD>
<BLOCKQUOTE CLASS="copyright">
Copyright 1998-2000 by Robert Graham (<A HREF="mailto:firewall-pr0n@robertgraham.com">firewall-pr0n@robertgraham.com</A>.
All rights reserved. This document may be
only be reproduced (whole or in part) for non-commercial purposes. All reproductions
must contain this copyright notice and must not be altered, except by permision of the
author.
</BLOCKQUOTE>
Version 1.0.1, January 15, 2000
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<BR>
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<DT><H1>1. General Guide (non technical)</H1><DD>
<DT><H2>1.1 What the end user should know</H2><DD>
<TABLE WIDTH="50%" ALIGN="right" CELLSPACING="0" CELLPADDING="8"><TR><TD BGCOLOR="#CCCCCC"><B>Anecdote</B></TD></TR>
<TR><TD BGCOLOR="#FFFFCC"><SMALL>
At one time I worked for Network General on the Sniffer(tm) Network Analyzer.
A new utility under developement would sniff the URLs off the
wire, put them into a database, and ship them up to
the "SniffMaster" console.
<P>
We naturally test on our own network, and were immediately
confronted with URLs that were obviously porn sites, being
surfed during work hours. Many of these users were also
higher level employees (managers and above).
While the company had no policy <I>per se</I> against it,
it obviously wasn't good. It also made the engineers nervous,
because they didn't want to know such things.
<P>
The CTO at the time sent out a pretty good e-mail on the
subject. Basically, he clarified that Network General had the highest concentration
of network monitoring equipment in the world, simply for developement purposes.
Therefore, if somebody
had surfing habits they didn't want other to know about, then
they shouldn't surf at work.
<P>
Personally, I thought it would be a good intelligence test --
if they surfed porn sites at Network General, then they
obviously weren't too intelligent.
</SMALL></TD></TR></TABLE>
<P>
The first problem firewall admins face is educating clueless end-users as
to the scope of their powers. Users tend to think the Internet is unmonitored,
or that monitoring their activity would be illegal or immoral.
Also, they never hear of other people getting caught -- so they think
they will not get caught. They need to understand that their
Internet use <I>is</I> monitored, and that even if they
don't get "caught" (i.e. fired, etc.), they will be found out.
Many firewall admins simply don't have the time nor inclination
to pursue the matter. They will know, but they simply won't
tell anybody.
<P>
The first step in communicating this issue to end-users is to
explain to them that all traffic incoming/outgoing
traffic is monitored for security purposes. There exists a "firewall"
through which all traffic passes, which attempts to restrict
hacker attempts. Thise "firewall" logs all connections, and
the administrators frequently review those logs in order
catch those hacking attempts. If they are surfing porn sites,
the firewall admin will also accidentally see that as well.
The company may not be looking for such things, but they will
accidently find it.
<P>
The long an the short of it is: if you are surfing porn at work,
somebody knows. Just because they haven't talked to you about
it doesn't mean they don't know. They probably are just to
uncomfortable to tell you about it.
<P>
<DT><H2>1.2 What managers should know</H2><DD>
<TABLE WIDTH="50%" ALIGN="right" CELLSPACING="0" CELLPADDING="8"><TR><TD BGCOLOR="#CCCCCC"><B>Tidbit</B></TD></TR>
<TR><TD BGCOLOR="#FFFFCC"><SMALL>
It is often the managers, all the way up to the CEO, who are the worst
offenders. They feel that since they are at such high levels,
they don't have to play by the rules. This makes administrators
afraid of the higher-ups finding out what they
known -- and getting squished.
</SMALL></TD></TR></TABLE>
Porn surfing isn't necessarily a problem.
Sure, it wastes a bit of time, but surfing
news, sports, weather, etc. also waste time.
Porn shouldn't be disallowed for this reason
(though you may have other policies against
wasting corporate time).
<P>
Many companies have official policies against
knowing about monitoring for porn for legal reasons. This sounds
strange, but here is how it works: If you monitor content,
then you become liable for content. In this area, ignorance
generally is a good excuse. The best example of this
are Yahoo message boards on stock information. Yahoo
intentionally does not monitor content on these boards.
End-users have posted slander and knowingly false rumours
in attempts to manipulate stock prices. By not monitoring
such things, Yahoo is blameless in much the same manner
that the phone companies and ISPs are blameless in sending
that traffic over the wire. Legally, it just transfers
information among users.
<P>
AOL experienced this many years back. They got sued over
some content, because they partially <I>monitored</I> the content.
They were therefore found <I>responsible</I> for the content.
AOLs response was to cease monitoring most of its
message boards, and only monitored specific message boards
(for kids).
<P>
<DT><H2>1.3 What firewall admins should know</H2><DD>
<TABLE WIDTH="50%" ALIGN="right" CELLSPACING="0" CELLPADDING="8"><TR><TD BGCOLOR="#CCCCCC"><B>Anecdote</B></TD></TR>
<TR><TD BGCOLOR="#FFFFCC"><SMALL>
A major financial institution has no official policy
for/against porn, and officially does not monitor
employee net usage (for much those reasons mentioned
above).
<P>
However, technicians are constantly seeing evidence
of porn. This makes them very uncomfortable, because
it is often high-level VPs doing the surfing. This
makes them scared for their jobs, and they put informal
processes in place in order to delete the information
or not collect it. Therefore, when they evaluate
new network management products, they prefer products
that do not have porn-sniffing features, or ones
where such features can be easily disabled.
</SMALL></TD></TR></TABLE>
Firewall admins see porn surfing all the time,
whether or not companies have regulations against it.
The first question they have is "I've found porn,
what should I do now?".
<P>
Most are reluctent to do anything. This is HR (Human Resources)
job, not theirs. In particular, reporting such information
doesn't help their job, but can put them into great jeopardy.
For example, if they find a VP surfing porn sites against
company regulations, there is a better chance of them
losing their jobs than the VP.
<P>
Monitoring people is a very senstive issue, even when done
accidentally. Even though it the network, the computer,
and even people's time is technically "owned" by the company,
the employees rarely see it this way. If someone gets
fired for porn, it will generate a lot of ill will -- especially
toward the people who discovered it.
<DT><H2>1.4 A good solution</H2><DD>
The best solution I've heard of is the following: Log access
to all sites, then publish the log in a web page. The
log should include <I>who</I> is accessing <I>what</I>
web pages.
<P>
This solution has a number of benefits.
<UL>
<LI>Instead of using
technology to fight a social problem, it uses
a social solution to fight the problem.
<LI>The company has a whole doesn't need to have a policy
against porn -- employees will decide for themselves
what it is appropriate to view.
<LI>It is self regulating. The employee knows that everyone
else will know what they are doing, and will decide
accordingly. Even simple time wasting on the Internet
will be reduced.
<LI>Alieves most of the social/legal problems with "spying".
The firewall/security/network admins themselves
aren't officially looking at the logs -- just everyone
else in the company is.
</UL>
<P>
The biggest problem with this is false positives. For example,
there was a security article on Playboy.com that I went to
because it popped up in an AltaVista search result. Some
pr0n spam messages contain hyperlinks to images on the net,
which will show up. However, generally it is easy to
tell the difference between an "accident" that shows up once
or twice compared to an on-going clear abuse.
<DT><H1>2. How they will be caught</H1><DD>
Firewall admins, IDS admins, network managers,
and desktop managers are constantly seeing evidence of
porn.
<DT><H2>2.1 Packet Filter logs</H2><DD>
A popular type of firewall is the "packet filter".
Most routers nowadays support packet filtering
and logging.
<P>
This traps porn use in two ways. The first is simply
that <I>all</I> connections are logged, telling the
firewall admin who in the company was surfing which
site. Secondly, many companies block well-known porn
sites. <B>Denied</B> connections are placed in a separate
log that admins are more likely to see. (Firewall
admins typically don't have time to review the first
log, but often glance over the second log).
<EXAMPLE>
<DT><H2>2.2 Proxy logs</H2><DD>
<P>
Proxy are a different type of firewalls. They essentially
stop all Internet traffic at the box, then re-generate
the original requests. As far as the Internet sees,
all the requests come from the proxy, not from the
end-user.
<P>
Not only does this boost security, it also increases
performance. If multiple users want the access the
same file on the Internet, the proxy only needs to get
it once -- then "caches" it on its hard disk for
each subsequent access by other users.
<P>
Like firewalls, they log all the sites they visit.
Administrators reviewing such data for fault/performance
reasons will often come across pr0n.
<DT><H2>2.3 Sniffers</H2><DD>
<TABLE WIDTH="50%" ALIGN="right" CELLSPACING="0" CELLPADDING="8"><TR><TD BGCOLOR="#CCCCCC"><B>Anecdote</B></TD></TR>
<TR><TD BGCOLOR="#FFFFCC"><SMALL>
In the early 1990s before HTTP/HTML, the primary front-end for
Internet was text-based with things like Telnet, FTP, and so
on.
<P>
During this time I created a Telnet/rlogin session monitor
that would watch sessions on the wire and dump the contents
to the appropriate terminal emulator. This allowed me
list all current sessions, then view a snapshot of the
same thing the user was seeing on their screen. During developement,
I was essentially forced to
watch another engineer nearby who Telnetted daily out of the
company to another computer to read Usenet B&D groups.
Again, the biggest pr0n problem is the embarrassment it
causes us who find out about it.
</SMALL></TD></TR></TABLE>
Network managers (not just security managers) will
frequently put "sniffers" (wiretaps) on the network
in order to see what is going on. The main purpose
of these devices is to solve problems (like why
two devices can't talk, or why the network is slow).
<P>
There are many kinds of sniffing programs.
<DL>
<DT>RMON<DD>These are remote probes placed around
the network. They log all TCP/IP connections (RMONv2)
and send that information to a centralized console.
<DT>DSS (Distrbuted Sniffer System) from NAI<DD>Much the
same as RMONv2, these will monitor not only
connections but will also pull URLs off the
wire and send them to a centralized console.
<DT>IDS<DD>Like from Network ICE, ISS, Axent, or NAI.
These programs constantly sniff the wire looking
for intrusions, then report them to a centralized
console. They don't necessarily monitor <I>all</I>
connections, but they will report suspicious
ones up to a centralized console.
</DL>
<P>
See <A HREF="http://www.robertgraham.com/pubs/sniffing-faq.html">http://www.robertgraham.com/pubs/sniffing-faq.html</A>
for more information on packet sniffers.
<DT><H2>2.4 DNS cache</H2><DD>
Most companies setup their own DNS servers to resolve names in to
addresses (i.e. "www.microsoft.com" might resolve to "192.0.2.128").
In order to improve performance, these servers "cache" requests.
<P>
For example, when you load the URL "http://www.robertgraham.com", you
first ask your local DNS server for the corresponding IP address.
The DNS server "resolves" that address for you by sending a query
across the Internet to my DNS server. The second time you ask for this
address (or when somebody else in your same company asks for it), the
DNS server has remembered it and responds immediately, without
sending a second request across the Internet to my server.
<P>
An administrator of a DNS server will occasionally come across this
cache when administering the server. They won't know exactly who
surfed "www.robertgraham.com", but they will know somebody in the
organization has.
<P>
For example, the DNS server that I use for my website <I>and</I>
my outgoing traffic will show the
following hierarchy:
<UL>
<LI>robertgraham.com
<UL>
<LI>www
<LI>ftp
</UL>
<LI>Cache
<UL>
<LI>com
<UL>
<LI>microsoft
<UL>
<LI>www
<LI>support
</UL>
<LI>yahoo
<UL>
<LI>www
<LI>my
</UL>
</UL>
</UL>
</UL>
In the first section, you can tell that my DNS server will respond to queries
from the Internet for "www.robertgraham.com" and "ftp.robertgraham.com".
In the second section, you can tell that I've recently visited the
sites: www.microsoft.com, support.microsoft.com, www.yahoo.com, my.yahoo.com.
<DT><H2>2.5 Browser histories and cookies</H2><DD>
<TABLE WIDTH="50%" ALIGN="right" CELLSPACING="0" CELLPADDING="8"><TR><TD BGCOLOR="#CCCCCC"><B>Anecdote</B></TD></TR>
<TR><TD BGCOLOR="#FFFFCC"><SMALL>
One time I was reviewing the cookie list with a co-worker
on her machine, and one of them was from an obvious porn
site. I am pretty sure this was because of me -- I work
in security, and sometimes surf hacker sites to research
information. In the past (though less so now), hackers put
lots of porn advertising banners on their sites in order
to earn money. While re-installing software on my machine,
I may have used her machine for research -- and may have
visited a hacker site that pulled a banner from a porn
site that put a cookie on her machine. (This was in
an environment where we regularly use each other's machines).
</SMALL></TD></TR></TABLE>
One simple way employees reveal their surfing habits to
other employees is the "smart completion" feature of
newer browsers. The URL line at the top of the browser contains
a drop-down list box of recently visited sites, and will
"auto-complete" for you. As a user selects a URL or types
one partially in, a past URL of a porn site will inadvertently
appear. People standing over their shoulder will accidentally
see this.
<P>
Most browsers keep a list of all the URLs that a user has
browsed. A few clicks of the button will open this list.
Again, a user can easily accidentally open this list by clicking
on the wrong location, again exposing the list to people
standing nearby.
<P>
Similarly, sites will drop cookies on your machine. If you open
your cookie list you will probably see hundreds of cookies left
on your machine. Mostly, these sites are attempting to track
you. They place icons on other pages, and match the HTTP "Referer"
field with the cookie. They don't necessarily know who you
are, but they do know where you've been. Porn sites are very big
into various browser tricks, such as using JavaScript to open
infinite number of pages or using cookies to track you online.
It is very easty to accidentally acquire some porn cookies on
your machine, as I describe in the anecdote for this section.
<DT><H2>2.6 Browser cache</H2><DD>
<TABLE WIDTH="50%" ALIGN="right" CELLSPACING="0" CELLPADDING="8"><TR><TD BGCOLOR="#CCCCCC"><B>Anecdote</B></TD></TR>
<TR><TD BGCOLOR="#FFFFCC"><SMALL>
One day, I come into work, sit down at my machine
and use it as normal. However, I find some weird
programs in the Windows "Start" menu. One was
called "Live View", and the other called "Sex Chat".
<P>
Alarm bells start ringing in my head, of course.
I start all sorts of complicated plans to catch the culprit,
but unfortunately it was much easier than that.
<P>
The first thing I did was <CODE>dir /s /b *.jpg</CODE>
in my browser cache directory. Sure enough, I saw
lots and lots of files with names like "busty.jpg".
Furthermore, the timestamps of the files were always
for about 5-10 minutes around 4:15 am and 5:00 am
going back a couple of weeks.
I deduced that this must be the security guard. On his
rounds, he drops by my office and surfs porn.
<P>
Among the many stupid things he did was to
write down 900 numbers onto a pad of Post It notes,
which leaves an indentation in the underlying notes.
This gave me a sample of his handwriting. I went
and found the current security guard on duty
(this was a weekend) and match the hand writing
with the previous security guards report. This
nightly report also showed the schedule for the
security guard's rounds.
<P>
I communicated the incident to the facilities admin and got the guy
fired. I felt so violated (I am a geek after all), they
guard betrayed the companies trust, he may have been
reading proprietary info off my machine, and there
is no telling what kind of viruses or trojans he
could have accidentally downloaded. Personally, I feel
that being a guard is a lonely job, and that the
company should just provide him a machine for his desk :-)
so that he won't feel impelled to borrow other machines.
</SMALL></TD></TR></TABLE>
<P>
In much the same way that proxies (see above) cache files on the
hard disk, web browsers will also save files. This means
that every time a user visits the same web page, the web
browser doesn't need to go across the Internet and download
the same file again, dramatically speeding up web access.
<P>
The primary admin who comes across these caches is the
<B>desktop technician</B>. They frequently make house
calls to desktop machines, or work with the machines
inside their labs. Automated backups sometimes pull
down these directories accidentally, meaning the backup
tapes are filled with porn.
<P>
Even when the user take pains to bypass monitoring software,
encrypt their connections over SSL, or go through
anonymous browsing service, the files will always get
saved to the disk. If the user can view it, then it is more
than likely the system has saved it to disk somewhere.
<P>
Even deleting the cache doesn't always get rid of the files.
There are many ways to recover lost files, depending upon
how much effort you are willing to go to. The first step
would be built in undelete programs. The next would be
disk scanners (which disregard directory entries and pull
data directly from the disk). Those two method rely upon
the fact that the files have been forgotten about, but
not overwritten. However, a third method can sometimes
recover overwritten files. Even when things are overwritten,
magnetic traces of the original data are left behind.
This is why spies and the DoD recommend overwritting free
space at least 7 times in order to completely erase
old data. Such "wipe" features come as part of many
encyption packages.
<DT><H2>2.7 E-mail messages</H2><DD>
<P>
Most users do not realize how often e-mail is misdirected.
Mistyping the destination address often results in the e-mail
being forwarded to the postmaster of the destination domain.
This means that your e-mail may be read, even though nobody
is actively monitoring it.
<P>
Likewise, some companies do monitor e-mail. Many log headers in order
to track messages over time, others will store the entire contents
of text messages.
<P>
<TABLE WIDTH="50%" XALIGN="right" CELLSPACING="0" CELLPADDING="8"><TR><TD BGCOLOR="#CCCCCC"><B>Anecdote</B></TD></TR>
<TR><TD BGCOLOR="#FFFFCC"><SMALL>
I maintain e-mail for a domain that is similar to a company
in the United Kingdom (like "example.com" vs. "example.co.uk").
I get a fair amount of misdirected e-mail, 80% of which
is porn related (both text and images).
<P>
One of the messages was:
<PRE>
I'll be away now for 8 weeks and will be having my mail intercepted by
our receptionist who is the kind of person who would have me sacked for
the type of mail that I've been receiving lately, so could you please
not send me any messages until I return.
I look forward to seeing you (and my job!) on my return.
</PRE>
<P>
I am still curious as to the statistical significance
of the quantity of porn I receive this way. Since the sender
also receives a report that the e-mail address is wrong,
they rarely make the mistake twice. Furthermore, there
are about 30 different recipients in that company that
I've seen. Statistically, it seems that everyone is
sending/receiving porn all the time!
</SMALL></TD></TR></TABLE>
<DT><H1>X. Miscellaneous</H1><DD>
<DT><H2>X.1 Anecdotes</H2><DD>
If you have any anecdotes, I'd love to hear about them.
Please send me e-mail. I'll stick them in this section.
<P>
From <A HREF="http://www.nfr.net/firewall-wizards/mail-archive/1999/Jun/0237.html">http://www.nfr.net/firewall-wizards/mail-archive/1999/Jun/0237.html</A><DD>
<PRE>
Hey folks. First of all, obligatory thanks to all of you; reading your
discussions have helped me at my job tremendously, in providing a fairly
vendor independent perspecive on realistic security implementations. so
thanks, y'all.
I'd like to add that I feel it takes both types of involvement, for a
company to really implement a viable safeguard against liability for
illegal/inappropriate access. At my organization, we had a rather
unfortunate case of idiocy, which, although it didn't do much damage
prompted us to invoke some limitations on web traffic. We used a combination
of router based and independent software solutions to restrict access to a
list of categories of url's, and track and log all access. Using this,
along with periodic human log reading, we are able to decide if we need to
have reiterate the companies web browsing policy (which we TRY to ensure
employees are aware of when they are hired, although whose to say what they
ACTUALLY read in this day of quick signatures). The policy has been used to
discipline several employees, and we saw a growing degree of awareness of
the policy, as warnings have been issued about excessive non-work related
browsing.
We are, however, a smaller organization so this is feasible. I do not think
the work scales well, as the larger the organization the more segments to
monitor, the more access points you'll have, and the more general network
chatter you're going to have. All in all, I'd say its a waste of time,
actually, but The People Who Decide Things wanted it, and I actually enjoyed
setting it up in a sick sort of Control Freak way.
Anyways, that is all. Just thought I'd share; ultimately, the technology is
only going to aid you in enforcing a strong policy, and that takes not only
the will to enforce a policy, and the technology to make it tricky enough to
break that the attempt alone, which is logged, constitutes a clear desire to
break it and not an accident.
--
Henry Sieff
Network Drone
Orthodontic Centers of America
</PRE>
<DT><H2>X.2 Links</H2><DD>
I originally created this document during a discussion on the
firewall mailing list.
<DL>
<DT><A HREF="http://www.nfr.net/firewall-wizards/mail-archive/1999/Jun/0224.html">http://www.nfr.net/firewall-wizards/mail-archive/1999/Jun/0224.html</A><DD>
How Singapore blocks porn on a nationwide basis as part
of censorship efforts. One interesting poing is that the
efforts are <I>popular</I>. Another is that the goal of
the government is not to <I>block</I> porn, but make
its access <I>difficult</I>.
<DT><A HREF="http://www.nfr.net/firewall-wizards/mail-archive/1999/Jun/0186.html">http://www.nfr.net/firewall-wizards/mail-archive/1999/Jun/0186.html</A><DD>
Reponse to the question "How can I block inappropriate content?"
</DL>
</DL>
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