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ISS Security Advisory March 14, 2000

ISS Security Advisory March 14, 2000
Posted Mar 16, 2000
Site xforce.iss.net

Internet Security Systems (ISS) has identified a vulnerability in the encryption used to conceal the password and login ID of a registered SQL Server user in Enterprise Manager for Microsoft SQL Server 7.0. When registering a new SQL Server in the Enterprise Manager or editing the SQL Server registration properties, the login name that will be used by the Enterprise Manager for the connection must be specified. If a SQL Server login name is used instead of a Widows Domain user name and the Always prompt for login name and password checkbox is not set, the login ID and password are weakly encrypted and stored in the registry.

tags | registry
SHA-256 | a9b3ac0aadd5b79df35825305233bd3833e09c5e6281fa3a3dce365b9a84405f

ISS Security Advisory March 14, 2000

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ISS Security Advisory
March 14, 2000

Vulnerability in Microsoft SQL Server 7.0 Encryption Used to Store
Administrative Login ID

Synopsis:

Internet Security Systems (ISS) has identified a vulnerability in the
encryption used to conceal the password and login ID of a registered SQL
Server user in Enterprise Manager for Microsoft SQL Server 7.0. When
registering a new SQL Server in the Enterprise Manager or editing the SQL
Server registration properties, the login name that will be used by the
Enterprise Manager for the connection must be specified. If a SQL Server
login name is used instead of a Widows Domain user name and the 'Always
prompt for login name and password' checkbox is not set, the login ID and
password are weakly encrypted and stored in the registry.

When a DBA (database administrator) logs into a workstation with a roaming
profile, the login ID and password are stored in a registry key. This
information is stored as the file NTUSER.DAT (for Windows NT) or USER.DAT
(for Windows 95 or Windows 98) when the user logs off. An attacker can open
this file in a text editor to view the DBA login ID and password encrypted.
An attacker can reverse this encryption to gain access to the DBA login ID
and password.

Impact:

Remote and local attackers who acquire the system administrator password
have full control over the database server software as well as full access
to the content and integrity of the database.

Affected Versions:

Microsoft Enterprise Manager for SQL Server 7.0 is vulnerable.

Description:

The encryption used to conceal the password and login ID of a registered SQL
Server user in Enterprise Manager for SQL Server 7.0 can be reversed. The
encryption scheme used is an alphabetic substitution where each Unicode
character in the password is XOR'ed with a two byte value according to its
position in the string. If the 'Always prompt for login name and password'
checkbox is not set when registering a SQL Server, the login ID and password
is weakly encrypted and stored in the following registry key:
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSSQLServer\SQLEW\Registered Server X.

By design, the HKEY_CURRENT_USER registry hive is meant to be available only
to the currently logged on user. That is, when a different Windows NT user
logs onto the system, a different copy of the HKEY_CURRENT_USER registry
hive is loaded. In practice, the HKEY_CURRENT_USER registry hive is saved
locally as the file NTUSER.DAT or USER.DAT when a user logs off. This
registry hive can be opened in Notepad and the encrypted login ID and
password can be easily located. If the DBA has a roaming profile, the
NTUSER.DAT file will be saved on every workstation the DBA logs into.

Recommendations:

To securely use SQL Server, Microsoft recommends using Windows Integrated
Security. In Windows Integrated Security mode passwords are never stored, as
your Windows Domain sign-on is used as the security identifier to the
database server.


If a SQL Server login ID is specified for logging into a server in the
Enterprise Manager, Microsoft recommends using the option 'Always prompt for
login name and password' to prevent passwords from being stored in the
registry.

ISS SAFEsuite security assessment software, Database Scanner, contains a
security check for this vulnerability and is currently available for
customers in the latest version of Database Scanner, 3.0.1.

Credits:

This vulnerability was discovered by Internet Security Systems (ISS). ISS
would like to thank Microsoft for their response and handling of this
vulnerability.

_____

About Internet Security Systems (ISS)
ISS is a leading global provider of security management solutions for
e-business. By offering best-of-breed SAFEsuite (tm) security software,
industry-leading ePatrol (tm) managed security services, and strategic
consulting and education services, ISS is a trusted security provider to its
customers, protecting digital assets and ensuring the availability,
confidentiality and integrity of computer systems and information critical
to e-business success. ISS' lifecycle e-business security management
solutions protect more than 5,000 customers including 21 of the 25 largest
U.S. commercial banks, 9 of the 10 largest telecommunications companies and
over 35 government agencies. Founded in 1994, ISS is headquartered in
Atlanta, GA, with additional offices throughout North America and
international operations in Asia, Australia, Europe, Latin America and the
Middle East. For more information, visit the ISS Web site at www.iss.net or
call 888-901-7477.

Copyright (c) 2000 by Internet Security Systems, Inc.

Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this Alert
electronically. It is not to be edited in any way without express consent of
the X-Force. If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this Alert in
any other medium excluding electronic medium, please e-mail xforce@iss.net
for permission.

Disclaimer

The information within this paper may change without notice. Use of this
information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are
NO warranties with regard to this information. In no event shall the author
be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with
the use or spread of this information. Any use of this information is at the
user's own risk.

X-Force PGP Key available at: http://xforce.iss.net/sensitive.php3 as well
as on MIT's PGP key server and PGP.com's key server.

Please send suggestions, updates, and comments to: X-Force (xforce@iss.net)
of Internet Security Systems, Inc.

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