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Advisory ID: SYSS-2019-005
Product: ABUS Secvest (FUAA50000)
Manufacturer: ABUS
Affected Version(s): v3.01.01
Tested Version(s): v3.01.01
Vulnerability Type: Cryptographic Issues (CWE-310)
Risk Level: Medium
Solution Status: Open
Manufacturer Notification: 2019-03-15
Solution Date: -
Public Disclosure: 2019-05-02
CVE Reference: CVE-2019-9861
Authors of Advisory: Matthias Deeg, Gerhard Klostermeier (SySS GmbH)

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Overview:

ABUS Secvest (FUAA50000) is a wireless alarm system with different
features.

Some of the supported features as described by the manufacturer are 
(see [1]):

"
* Convenient operation via the app (Android/iOS), integrated web
  browser and also at the alarm panel
* For up to 50 users with freely selectable control options
  (code/chip key/remote control)
* Active intrusion protection in combination with additional mechatronic
  wireless window/door locks
* Video verification of alarms via email, push notifications or via the
  app
* Up to 48 individually identifiable wireless detectors, eight control
  panels, 50 remote controls
* Integrated dialling device
* VdS Home certified and EN 50131-1 Level 2
* Alarm verification via the integration of up to six IP cameras
* 32 additional wireless outputs for flexible event control
* Switching to monitoring station via protocols possible
"

Due to the use of an insecure RFID technology (MIFARE Classic), ABUS
proximity chip keys (RFID tokens) [2] of the ABUS Secvest wireless alarm
system can easily be cloned and used to deactivate the alarm system in
an unauthorized way.

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Vulnerability Details:

SySS GmbH found out that the RFID technology used by the ABUS Secvest
wireless alarm system and its ABUS proximity keys (MIFARE Classic RFID
tags) is vulnerable to RFID cloning attacks.

The information stored on the used proximity keys can be read easily in
a very short time from distances up to 1 meter, depending on the used
RFID reader. A working cloned RFID token is ready for use within a
couple of seconds using freely available tools.

Thus, an attacker with one-time access to the information of an ABUS
proximity key for an ABUS Secvest wireless alarm system is able to
create a rogue RFID token that can be used to deactivate the alarm
system in an unauthorized manner.

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Proof of Concept (PoC):

SySS GmbH could successfully clone ABUS proximity keys of an ABUS
Secvest wireless alarm system using different freely available
off-the-shelf tools like an Android smartphone with the Mifare Classic
Tool (MCT) [3], a ChameleonMini [4], and an RFID/NFC reader/writer [5]
and disarm the wireless alarm system in an unauthorized way.

All three RFID cloning attacks are demonstrated in our SySS
proof-of-concept video "ABUS Secvest Proximity Key Cloning PoC Attack"
[6].

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Solution:

SySS GmbH is not aware of a solution for this reported security
vulnerability.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclosure Timeline:

2019-03-15: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
2016-05-02: Public release of security advisory

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

References:

[1] Product website for ABUS Secvest wireless alarm system
    https://www.abus.com/eng/Home-Security/Alarm-systems/Secvest-wireless-alarm-system/Alarm-panels-and-kits/Secvest-Wireless-Alarm-System

[2] Product website for ABUS proximity chip key
    https://www.abus.com/eng/Home-Security/Alarm-systems/Secvest-wireless-alarm-system/Control-devices-and-extensions/Proximity-Chip-Key

[3] MIFARE Classic Tool - MCT
    https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.syss.MifareClassicTool

[4] GitHub repository of ChameleonMini
    https://github.com/emsec/ChameleonMini

[5] OBO Hands RFID/NFC Reader/Writer
    https://www.amazon.de/dp/B07DHL9XQ4/

[6] SySS Proof-of-Concept Video: ABUS Secvest Proximity Key Cloning PoC Attack
    https://youtu.be/sPyXTQXTEcQ

[7] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2019-005
    https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2019-005.txt

[8] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
    https://www.syss.de/en/news/responsible-disclosure-policy/

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Credits:

This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg and Gerhard
Klostermeier of SySS GmbH.

E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de
Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Materialien/PGPKeys/Matthias_Deeg.asc
Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB

E-Mail: gerhard.klostermeier (at) syss.de
Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Gerhard_Klostermeier.asc
Key fingerprint = 8A9E 75CC D510 4FF6 8DB5 CC30 3802 3AAB 573E B2E7

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclaimer:

The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS Web
site.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Copyright:

Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0
URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en

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